State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh

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FACTS OF THE CASE:

1. In the present matter, appellant-State filed a case seeking grant of leave to prefer an appeal against the judgment and order dated 19.4.2000 passed by V Additional Sessions Judge, Sitapur, by virtue of which, respondent-accused was acquitted of the charges pertaining to Section 409 and 486 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC). 
2. Thereafter, the appeal filed by the appellant-State was dismissed on the ground that the authority granting sanction was inappropriate, by the High court order. This appeal to the Appellate court seeks to challenge the High court order. The respondent was facing trial for commission of offence punishable under Sections 409, 420, 461 and 468 IPC. 
3. In appeal, learned V Additional Sessions Judge, Sitapur, observed that the person granting sanction for initiation was not the rightful authority to do so, also, taking into account the provisions laid down in Sections 218, 219 and 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( hereinafter referred to as CRPC), the charges framed were wrong since they were framed in respect of the transaction for more than one year. This meant the accused was entitled to acquittal. High court in its order considered only the question of appropriate authority to grant sanction.

ISSUES ADVANCED:

1. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant comes within discharge of official duty. 
2. Whether the reasoning of the High court in its order is valid and the charges framed were erroneous. 

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:

The counsel for appellant argued that the charges framed against the accused make it evident that no part of the alleged offence comes under execution of official duty, therefore, the same is not protected under Section 197 of the Code. The application and effect of Section 464 of IPC has to be observed. The acts in question had no reasonable connection with discharge of his official duty therefore the protection under Section 197 cannot be claimed and there is no need for a prior sanction.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

The learned counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that it is a prior condition to obtain a sanction under Section 197 of CRPC from a competent authority to initiate proceedings for offences punishable under Sections Sections 406 and 409 read with Section 120-B of IPC. The order of the High court dismissing the appeal stands valid since the authority granting sanction was not authorised to do so. As the sanction was inappropriate, the court lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed during the course of his service.

JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT:

• The court interpreted the application of Section 197 of CRPC as per the condition and circumstances of the present case. It is abundantly clear that no court action lies in absence of sanction to take cognizance from an appropriate authority for offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant in disposal of official duty. 
• Dwelling deep into the meanings of words contained in the section, the definition of the term “official” according to Black’s law dictionary is an act or omission performed by an officer holding a public office in his official capacity. It should be noted that the Section does not extend its protective shield to every act or omission done by a public servant as performance of his official duty. 
• A public official is not envisioned to be engaged in criminal activities therefore the alleged acts lie outside the purview of official duty. Thus, Section 197 of CRPC has to be construed strictly with a narrow sense, while determining its applicability to any act or omission. It is observed that the alleged acts were performed by the official in course of his service but the same do not constitute part of his official duty. As a result of which, protection under Section 197 cannot be availed.
• To attract Section 197 of CRPC, the acts in question must form a reasonable connection with the disposal of official duty. In the present case, no reasonable nexus can be seen between the act and official duty of the officer.
• The court found the contention of respondent, that prior sanction is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution, as equally erroneous. Since sanction is obtained for acts relating to discharge of official duty, it is evident that, in this case no sanction is required as offences punishable under section 409, 420, 461 and 468 IPC do not fall within discharge of official duty. This eliminates the question of sanction for initiation of proceedings and also makes the High court’s reasoning and order invalid.
• Regarding the alleged error in framing of charges, the related provision is considered which mandates that ”no finding sanction or order by a court of competent jurisdiction becomes invalid unless it is so that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned because of any error omission or irregularity in the charge including in misjoinder of charge”. The onus to prove the failure of justice falls on the accused.
• The court set aside the order of the High court and allowed leave to appeal, to be heard on merits.

REASONING OF THE COURT:

• The provision of protection guaranteed under Section 197 extends to acts done by public officials in discharge of official duty. Such protection ensures safety from unnecessary harassment and vexatious prosecutions. The extent of its applicability is determined by the court depending upon the facts of the case. 
• As observed in the case of B. Saha and Ors. v. M. S. Kochar, words employed in section 197 are capable of being construed in narrow as well as wider sense depending upon the facts of the case. It is of paramount importance to balance the application, as a narrow interpretation of the provision would render the section altogether sterile while in a wider sense it would promise a blanket protection for every act done by an official in the course of his service. For appropriate application of the section, the understanding of what constitutes “official duty” is necessary. 
• It was observed that an act or omission done by a person holding public office, in the capacity of a public official, constitutes official duty. In the present case, the alleged acts clearly do not form a part of official duty nor do they remotely come within what is entrusted with and expected from a public servant. Thus, in this case, the interpretation of Section 197 has to be done in a stricter and narrow sense as the public official engaged himself into activities he was not entitled to indulge in.
• The court in the case of Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari explained to what extent acts or omissions committed by public servants can be deemed to be official. It was observed that the offences alleged to have been committed must form a reasonable nexus with the discharge of official duty and not just a fanciful claim of performance of duty. Only when the court discerns a reasonable connection between the two, the protection guaranteed in Section 197 can be availed.
• In S.A. Venkataraman v. The State and in C. R. Bansi v. The State of Maharashtra this Court has held that “There is nothing in the words used in Section 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case when a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance, although he had been such a person at the time the offence was committed.” Such an observation eliminates the need for sanction in the present case and upholds the jurisdiction of the court in taking cognizance of the offence. The related contention of the respondent that for offences under Sections 406 and 409 read with Section 120-B of IPC sanction under Section 197 of the Code is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution stands rejected. 
• The court relied on the rulings of S.R. Munnipalli v. Bombay and in Amrik Singh v. State Pepsu while explaining not every act or omission done by a public servant needs a sanction for prosecution since not every act or omission cannot be said as execution of official duty.
• The court stated the legal position observed in the case of  Harihar Prasad, etc. v. State of Bihar in which it was seen that the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-8, read with Section 409 of the IPC and also Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in Section 197 of the CRPC. Such acts do not form a part of official duty, therefore, want of sanction cannot bar the court from taking cognizance of the offence.
• The decision in State of Kerala v. Padmanabhan Nair related to forgery done by a public servant for the purpose of cheating, in no way comes within disposal of official duty and perhaps cannot be excused under the protective cover of Section 197.
• Regarding the framing of charges it was observed that failure to frame charges or error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charge cannot be a ground for nullifying any sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction, unless proven that it has led to delivery of injustice. The onus to establish that failure of justice has been occasioned falls on the accused.
• With these views, the court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and directed that leave to appeal shall be granted.

CONCLUSION:

There lies no doubt that the court has traversed the limits of judicial scrutiny while interpreting the intent and language of provisions, ensuring appropriate application of sections in line with facts and circumstances of the cases. The instances of corruption and use of officials might not be cloaked under or excused by the protective cover of Section 197 of CRPC. The same has to be balanced along with according due protection from harassment to the public officers engaged in rightful conduct. The Court from the standpoint of the applicability of Section 197 of the Code and the facts, directed the matter to be considered purely on its own merits. Therefore, upon cumulative understanding of facts and sections of CRPC, the issues advanced stand hereby disposed of.

FOOTNOTES: 

1. (1979 (4) SCC 177)
2. (AIR 1956 SC 44)
3. (AIR 1958 SC 107) 
4. (1970 (3) SCC 537)
5. (1955 (1) SCR 1177) 
6. (1955 RD-SC 9)
7. (1972 (3) SCC 89)
8. (1999 (5) SCC 690)

written by Divyanshi bais intern under legal vidhiya

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