UNION OF INDIA VS A.K. NAJEEB (2021) 3 SCC 713

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UNION OF INDIA VS A.K. NAJEEB (2021) 3 SCC 713

BACKGROUND

In the Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb case, the respondent, a member of a fundamentalist group, was accused of facilitating an attack on Professor TJ Joseph in Kerala in 2010. He was arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in 2015 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). In 2019, the Kerala High Court granted bail to Najeeb due to significant delays in the trial, which was challenged by the NIA. The NIA filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court, arguing that the NIA special court had previously denied bail based on the UAPA provisions. The NIA contended that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA prohibits bail for offenses under the Act. In its final ruling, the Supreme Court dismissed the NIA’s appeal, stating that the respondent’s right to a speedy trial, protected under Article 21 of the Constitution, prevailed. However, the court did not establish a clear standard for similar cases in the future. The bench, comprising Justices NV Ramana, Surya Kant, and Aniruddha Bose, confirmed the power of constitutional courts to grant bail to accused individuals charged or arrested under the stringent UAPA. Despite this judgment, various unresolved issues related to UAPA, and bail jurisprudence remain.

FACTS

According to the prosecution, Professor T.J. Joseph framed a Malayalam question paper for the second semester BCom examination at Newman College, Thodupuzha, which was considered objectionable by certain sections of society, particularly a specific religion. The respondent and other members of the Popular Front of India (PFI) sought retaliation for this perceived blasphemy. On July 4, 2010, around 8 a.m., they carried out an attack on Professor Joseph while he was returning home with his mother and sister after attending Sunday mass at a local church. During the attack, the PFI members forcibly intercepted the victim’s car, restrained him, and brutally severed his right palm using choppers, knives, and a small axe. Additionally, they hurled country-made bombs at bystanders to create panic and deter them from helping the victim.

 An FIR was consequently lodged against the attackers by the professor’s wife under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120-B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506 Part II, 307, 149 IPC; and Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act. During the investigation, it came to light that the attack on Professor T.J. Joseph was part of a well-planned conspiracy involving meticulous pre-planning, several unsuccessful attempts, and dangerous weapons. As a result, numerous individuals, including the present respondent, were charged by the police. The respondent was accused of being a key conspirator and faced charges under Sections 153-A, 201, 202, and 212 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), along with Sections 16, 18, 18-B, 19, and 20 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA).

However, the respondent managed to evade authorities and was declared an absconder, leading to his trial being separated from the other co-conspirators. The co-accused faced trial separately and were found guilty by the Special Court, NIA. As a result, they were handed cumulative sentences ranging from two to eight years of rigorous imprisonment. The respondent was arrested on April 10, 2015, and charged by the National Investigation Agency (NIA). Despite making six bail attempts between 2015 and 2019, he was denied bail due to evidence indicating his involvement in the offense under the UAPA. However, in May 2019, the High Court granted him bail, citing the delay in the trial and the need for an expeditious process under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stayed the bail order, and the respondent has since spent nearly five years and five months in judicial custody.

ISSUES

1. Can a violation of Article 21 override the statutory provisions of Section 43D (5) of the UAPA?
2. Is the court obligated to reject bail when there is a prima facie belief of the suspect’s guilt?
3. Is it possible to appeal the court’s decision to grant bail if no reason is given for the decision?

ARGUMENTS 

PETITIONERS 

The appellant’s counsel, the learned Additional Solicitor General, argued that the High Court’s decision to grant bail to the respondent was erroneous as it failed to consider the statutory provisions of Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA. Citing the precedent of NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, they emphasized that bail proceedings under the UAPA are distinct, and the courts are obligated to deny bail when there is a prima facie belief of the suspect’s guilt. It was further asserted that during previous hearings before the Special Court and the High Court, sufficient evidence emerged to suggest that the respondent was prima facie guilty of the charges against him. The fact that the respondent had been absconding for a significant period was also highlighted as a legitimate concern, indicating he might not return if granted bail. In response to concerns about the trial’s expediency, the NIA submitted an additional affidavit, stating their plan to examine 276 witnesses and conduct the trial on a day-to-day basis, aiming to complete it within approximately one year.

RESPONDENT

 The learned Senior Counsel representing the respondent put forth several arguments in their favor. They pointed out that many co-accused had already been acquitted, and even those convicted received sentences of no more than eight years. Considering that the respondent has already spent nearly five-and-a-half years in custody without the trial commencing, it would be a violation of his constitutional rights and liberty to serve most of his sentence without any formal adjudication of guilt by a judicial authority. The Senior Counsel emphasized that such a prolonged period of incarceration, with no trial progress, goes against the respondent’s right to a speedy trial and access to justice. They cited the cases of Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India and Hussain v. Union of India to support their argument. These cases establish that extended detention without trial could be deemed a violation of fundamental rights, allowing the constitutional courts to intervene and grant bail, even when there are restrictions specified under special enactments. The Senior Counsel contended that once the High Court had exercised its discretion to grant bail, such a decision should not be easily interfered with unless there are exceptional circumstances.

JUDGEMENT

 The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, striking a balance between the appellant’s right to present evidence to prove the charges and the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. The defendant’s right to present evidence and establish their allegations beyond a reasonable doubt was recognized in line with Part III of the Constitution. Consequently, the appellant’s Special Leave Petition (SLP) was considered unsustainable. The court clarified that UAPA Section 43D(5) could still be applicable in cases of Article 21 violation, but constitutional courts retain the authority to grant bail despite such statutory limitations. The presence of statutory restrictions like UAPA Section 43D(5) does not automatically bar Constitutional Courts from granting bail if Part III of the Constitution is violated. The court emphasized that when considering the legislative policy against granting bail, the strict provisions can be relaxed if there is little likelihood of completing the trial within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration has already exceeded a significant portion of the prescribed sentence. This approach ensures that provisions like UAPA Section 43D(5) are not solely used to deny bail or disregard the constitutional right to a speedy trial. It allows Constitutional Courts to balance the interests of justice and individual rights when deciding on bail applications under such statutes. In the present case, despite the NIA declaring the accused prima facie guilty and Section 43D(5) of UAPA allowing bail denial, the courts can still grant bail if the accused’s constitutional rights are violated. The court found that the ‘right to speedy trial’ was infringed, leading to the Supreme Court supporting the High Court’s decision.

Furthermore, Section 43D(5) does not impose any precondition to prevent the accused from committing another crime, and it seems to be used as a means to delay bail. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision and deemed the special leave petition as unmaintainable.

REFERENCE 

http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/dgbz8e9q  (2021) 3 SCC 713.

This Article is written by Devyani Kapse of ILS Law College Pune, an Intern at Legal Vidhya.

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