| CITATION | SCC(2019) |
| DATE OF JUDGEMENT | 5 March 2021 |
| COURT | SUPREME COURT |
| APPELLANT | MADAN MOHAN SINGH |
| RESPONDENT | VED PRAKASH ARYA |
| BENCH | ASHOK BHUSHAN JUSTICE ,R SUBHASH REDDY |
INTRODUCTION
The case revolves around a dispute concerning the tenancy and subletting of a property. The appellant challenged the decisions of the trial court and High Court, arguing that they overlooked key evidence, including a partnership deed and administrative orders. The appellant sought to reinstate the First Appellate Court’s ruling, which had previously determined the respondent was not a tenant and that the property was not sublet.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The appellant, Madan Mohan Singh, was allotted Booth No.186 in Sector 35-D, Chandigarh, by the Estate Officer, Chandigarh Administration, via an allotment letter dated 20.06.1972 . The allotment terms prohibited the appellant from transferring his rights or subletting the premises. On 18.12.1976, the appellant entered into a partnership deed with the respondent, Ved Prakash, to conduct a cycle repairing business at the booth. The respondent dissolved the partnership by notice on 04.10.1979, after which he allegedly became an employee of the appellant. The Estate Officer terminated the hire-purchase agreement on 09.09.1980/15.04.1982, citing misuse of the premises. The appellant challenged this termination order before the Chief Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh, while the respondent claimed occupancy rights.On 09.02.1984, the Estate Officer ordered the eviction from the booth, which the respondent appealed against. The Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, dismissed the appeal on 10.06.1985, noting the booth belonged to the appellant and the respondent was an employee. The Chief Administrator, on 13.03.1986, restored the booth to the appellant and confirmed that the respondent was his servant. The appellant filed Civil Suit No.77 of 1986 seeking a mandatory injunction to vacate the booth, which the trial court dismissed on 29.02.1992, recognizing the respondent as a tenant despite lack of tenancy documents. The First Appellate Court, on 02.12.1996, overturned the trial court’s decision, supporting the appellant’s claim and rejecting the tenancy assertion. The High Court, in its judgment dated 06.12.2018, set aside the First Appellate Court’s decree, siding with the respondent.The appellant is then challenged the High Court’s decision, emphasizing administrative findings and the lack of evidence for tenancy.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The appellant was allotted a booth in Chandigarh in 1972, which he could not transfer or sublet. In 1976, he entered a partnership with the respondent, Ved Prakash, to run a cycle repair business. The partnership dissolved in 1979, and the appellant claimed the respondent became his employee. In 1980, the Estate Officer terminated the booth’s lease due to improper use, which the appellant contested. The Chief Administrator later restored the booth to the appellant, identifying Ved Prakash as his servant. The appellant filed a suit in 1986 to regain possession after terminating the respondent’s services. Ved Prakash claimed tenancy, which the trial court accepted. However, the First Appellate Court reversed this decision in 1996, supporting the appellant. The High Court later ruled in favor of Ved Prakash, prompting the appellant to challenge the decision.
ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the defendant was a tenant of the premises.
2. Whether the partnership deed signed by the plaintiff and defendant on 18.12.1976 was a sham document.
3. Whether the premises were sublet to the defendant in violation of Clause 12 of the Allotment Order.
4. Whether the decision of the Chief Administrator, which stated that the defendant was a servant of the hirer, was binding on the parties.
5. The validity of the High Court’s judgment dismissing the Regular Second Appeal filed by the plaintiff seeking relief for permanent and mandatory injunction against the defendant using the Booth No. 186 for cycle repairs.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS
The respondent argued that he had been a tenant since December 18, 1976. While he acknowledged signing the partnership deed, he claimed it was merely a facade to avoid the restrictions of Clause 12 of the Allotment Order. He maintained that this deed should not influence his tenancy status. Moreover, he disputed the relevance of the Chief Administrator’s decision, which classified him as a servant of the hirer, contending that it should not be binding regarding tenancy matters.
ARGUMENTS IF RESPONDENT
1. The respondent argued that the partnership deed signed on December 18, 1976, was merely a facade designed to circumvent Clause 12 of the Allotment Order, which explicitly prohibited subletting.
2. They maintained that the partnership deed was not a legitimate document and should not impact their assertion of tenancy.
3. The respondent claimed they were indeed a tenant of the premises.
4. They asserted that the trial court’s findings, which acknowledged their tenancy, should be upheld.
5. The respondent contended that the decision of the Chief Administrator, which labeled them as a servant of the hirer, was incorrect and should not be binding.
6. The respondent challenged the First Appellate Court’s conclusion that the trial court’s findings were based on assumptions and lacked substantial evidence.
7. They argued that the evidence presented should have been sufficient to prove their tenancy.
8. The respondent emphasized that the partnership deed was a sham intended to protect the hirer from legal repercussions.
9. They contended that the signing of the partnership deed should not negate their tenancy claim.
10. The respondent believed that the High Court erred in not adequately considering the context and implications of the partnership deed and Clause 12 of the Allotment Order.
ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT
1. The appellant contended that the respondent did not present any tenancy documents.
2. They argued that the First Appellate Court rightly determined that the trial court’s decision on tenancy was based on conjecture and insufficient evidence.
3. The appellant maintained that the partnership deed, executed on 18.12.1976 by both parties, was a genuine document, contrary to the respondent’s claims of it being a mere formality.
4. They asserted that the partnership deed had legal implications that could not be disregarded.
5. The appellant highlighted that Clause 12 of the Allotment Order forbade subletting and that the Chief Administrator’s 1986 ruling, which identified the respondent as a servant rather than a tenant, was conclusive.
6. They argued that both the trial and High Courts overlooked the Chief Administrator’s decision and the provisions of Clause 12.
7. The appellant sought the reinstatement of the First Appellate Court’s ruling, immediate possession of the property, and the ability to claim damages and manage profits from the respondent’s use of the premises.
CASE LAW REFFERED
C.M. Beena and Another v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao: This case established that the conduct of parties before and after the creation of a relationship is important for understanding their intentions.
PROVISIONS REFERRED
Clause 12 of the Allotment Letter: This clause prohibits subletting of the premises and stipulates that any dispute regarding subletting will be resolved by the Chief Administrator, whose decision is binding on the parties.
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971: This Act governs the eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises.
JUDGEMENT
The court allowed the appeals and restored the judgement of the 1st appelate court which was given on 2 Dec 1996.Chadigarh Administration ‘s Estate officer will make sure that the appellant is immediately given possesion of the the premises of Booth no . it would be open for the appellant so that he can initiate the correct procedure to compensate the costs of the defendant for the use of the building .
CONCLUSION
The case revolves around a dispute regarding the defendant’s tenancy and alleged subletting of public property. The trial court had initially recognized the defendant as a tenant, but the First Appellate Court overturned this decision, citing a lack of evidence and the binding nature of the partnership deed and Clause 12 of the Allotment Letter, which prohibits subletting without administrative approval. The appellate court’s decision underscores the importance of adhering to contractual agreements, administrative rulings, and having concrete evidence to substantiate claims, setting a precedent for stricter enforcement of property management regulations.
ANALYSIS
The case deals with a dispute over the tenancy and subletting of a property. The appellant, Madan Mohan Singh, was allotted Booth No.186 in Sector 35-D, Chandigarh, in 1972. The allotment terms prohibited the appellant from transferring his rights or subletting the premises. In 1976, the appellant entered into a partnership deed with the respondent, Ved Prakash, to run a cycle repair business at the booth. The respondent dissolved the partnership in 1979, and the appellant claimed the respondent became his employee. The estate officer terminated the hire-purchase agreement in 1980, and the appellant challenged this termination order. The respondent claimed occupancy rights. The appellant filed a Civil Suit No.77 of 1986 seeking a mandatory injunction to vacate the booth, which the trial court dismissed. The First Appellate Court overturned the trial court’s decision, supporting the appellant’s claim and rejecting the tenancy assertion. The High Court set aside the First Appellate Court’s decree, siding with the respondent. The appellant challenged the High Court’s decision, emphasizing administrative findings and the lack of evidence for tenancy.
REFERENCES
Written By Tannu an Intern Under Legal Vidhiya
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