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Citation	AIR 2006 SC 3385
Date of Judgement	11/10/2006
Court	Supreme Court of India
Case Type	Criminal Appeal No. 284-285 of 2005
Petitioner	Epuru Sudhakar & Anr.
Respondent	Govt. Of A.P. and Ors.
Bench	Arijit Pasayat
Referred

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION –

In India, proposing a mercy proposal to the president in compliance with Article 72 of the Indian Constitution is the first step in the process of granting pardon. This petition is first assessed by the home ministry working together with the concerned state government, and relying on the home minister’s recommendations, it is then forwarded to the president.

The constitution gives the President the power to pardon. The President may grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment, as well as suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of anyone found guilty of any crime, according to the Article 72 of the Indian Constitution.

The ministerial council would monitor misuse of usage. Similarly, Article 161 of the Indian Constitution says that the governor of a state has the authority to commute sentences, suspend sentences, give reprieves, or remit penalties for those guilty of crimes against laws that fall under the state’s executive authority. The state governor may award a convict a pardon, reprieve, respite, or remission of the relevant punishment when they have broken a state law.

The order which was being passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Principal Secretary, whereby Gowru Venkata Reddy (Respondent Number 2) was granted remission of the unexpired period of about seven years imprisonment is the subject of this writ

petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, GOMs. No. 170 from (11/8/2005) is contested.

BACKGROUND –

The writ petition has been filed, among other things, stating that the impugned order was passed without the application of mind and the grant of remission (referred to in the writ petition as the grant of pardon) was unlawful in nature. The recommendations made for grant of remission were based on irrelevant and extraneous materials (unrelated information).

The Governor has not been given the accurate reality in its right context. Respondent No. 3 claimed pardon based only on allegations that he had been involved in fake cases because of political rivalry. The aforementioned plea could not have been taken into consideration as a justification for the issuance of pardon because this Court found Respondent No.2 guilty in its judgement. Since the pardon was granted based upon the consideration of unimportant information and the exclusion of relevant materials the same is liable to be set aside.

FACTS OF THE CASE –

The first petitioner, Epuru Sudhakar, is the son of the late Sh. Epuru Chinna Ramasubbaiah, who was killed on October 19, 1995 together with another person. Petitioner No. 2 asserts that he is the descendant of the late Sh. Tirupati Reddy, who was reportedly being killed by Respondent No. 2 when the latter was out on bail for the murder of petitioner no.1’s father.
Respondent No.2 was tried for the murders of the late Sh. Epuru Chinna Ramasubbaiah and Ambi Reddy, and the case ultimately came before this court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 519-521 of 2003. This Court decided the case in a judgement dated November 19, 2003, and Respondent No.2’s conviction was changed from one under Section 3023 to Section 304(1)4 read with Section 1095 of the IPC the conviction for certain additional penalties was upheld.
On 28.5.2003, the Respondent No.3 (referred to be the wife of the Respondent No.2) submitted a request for parole to be granted to the Respondent No.2, and on 18.10.2003 parole was granted for a period of 15 days. However, the same was cancelled on 30.10.2003 by the State Government in light of the report sent by the Superintendent of Police, Kurnool, stating

that due to the Respondent No.2’s release on parole, there was a likelihood of a breach of peace and law and order if the Respondent No.2 visits Nandikotkur Assembly Constituency.

On May 12, 2004, Respondent No. 3 was elected to the Legislative Assembly after running in the Andhra Pradesh Assembly Election. She asked for the parole of respondent No. 2 on May 14, 2004. The same was granted on May 19, 2004, and it was periodically renewed.
A fourth 15-day extension was given on July 18, 2004. Respondent No. 3 sent a representation to Respondent No.1 on October 10, 2004, asking that Respondent No. 2 to be absolved through the use of the Constitution’s pardon power under Article 161. Respondent No. 3 claimed that Respondent No. 2 was involved in false accusations because of political competition. On October 18, 2004, while the pardon request was still ongoing, a one-month parole was granted.
By pardoning Respondent No.2’s unfinished sentence on 11.8.2005, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh reportedly exercised his authority under Article 161 of the Constitution. The Superintendent of Central Prison, Cherlapally, R.R. District, issued an order for Respondent No. 2’s release on 12.8.2005 after receiving instructions from the Director General and Inspector General of Police (Correction Services) of Andhra Pradesh to do so.

ISSUES –

Is it feasible to override the presidential pardon through judicial review?

What can be the possible restrictions on such types of power?

What legal requirements do the governor or president have while using this pardoning power in India?
What is the extent of the governor’s or president’s pardoning authority, and is it unrestricted?

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT’S SIDE –

1) The congressional activist who was convicted by the then-Andhra Pradesh governor, Sushil Kumar Shinde, had “illegal sentence immunity because the relevant materials were not submitted to the governor and the controversial order was Adopted under consideration,” the petitioner’s learned counsel claimed.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT’S SIDE –

The knowledgeable attorney for the defendant and defendants 2 and 3 vehemently rebutted this claim, claiming that the petition was the consequence of political retaliation. The Governor, who is the highest constitutional authority who approves the order to grant referrals, has taken into account all pertinent information. The petitioner purportedly conflates sentence reductions with pardons. The materials in this case need to be forwarded, therefore the hospital shouldn’t get involved. The order application should be denied due to the limited reach of judicial review.
It is argued that the petitioner conflated the terms pardon and sentence reduction. In this instance, the evidence supported the granting of remission, and this Court shouldn’t get involved. The writ petition deserved to be dismissed given the restricted scope for judicial review.

JUDGEMENT –

The Supreme Court of India first outlined the justifications for the creation of administrative indulgence, highlighting that they were meant to prevent unfairness to the guilty party and acknowledging that society would not benefit, and the criminal had acknowledged his mistakes. His subsequent incarceration and subsequent conduct as a law-abiding citizen. By acknowledging that the public benefit is the legitimate goal of any sentence, it also lessens the excessive rigour in the administration or execution of criminal justice.

Another concern is that legal action taken by the legal system is not always wise or positive and does not always successfully lessen guilt. Governments and monarchies believe that in order to provide remedies, authorities outside of the legal system must be established, such as having the ability to lessen or avoid certain criminal convictions.

The Hon’ble Court continued by stating that while the role of administrative power is to carry out verdicts, the role of the judicial branch is to administer justice and sentence offenders. The President shall not alter, amend, or substitute any judicial records in any way when exercising his pardoning authority and analyzing the evidence in the criminal case file to determine the defendant’s guilt and sentence.

The judgement of the honourable court is still in force. According to the constitution, the president enjoys what is referred to as “benevolent jurisdiction.” This authority is separate from

the judiciary and operates on a different plane; it cannot be viewed as an extension of the latter. As a result, the act of reducing the sentence through a presidential pardon is an exercise of executive authority, limiting but not entirely eliminating the judicial department’s discretion.

But does this mean that the administrative authority to grant pardons is unrestricted and immune from judicial review? The decision cited several past Supreme Court judicial decisions that had been effective in attempting to ascertain whether the nature and scope of the president’s decision were proper for judicial proceedings. According to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maru Ram v. Federation of India⁸, Article 72 “should not be exercised arbitrarily, maliciously, or in complete disregard of the highest constitutional standards.” Contact the judiciary if the byproduct is not legally accepted.

In Kehar Singh v. Union of India the Supreme Court decided that even if the Supreme Court had already reached a legal decision, the president might still learn the case’s merits by exercising administrative clemency. On the other hand, the President’s order might only be subject to judicial review on the basis of its merits within the constrained limitations established in the Maru Ram case.

Therefore, it is clear from all of the examples presented that the court has the authority to conduct judicial review of the presidential pardon in order to correct unjust or capricious rulings. But the breadth is constrained. The judiciary’s authority does not begin to operate until the order has been authorized. This includes a.) Accidental application; b.) Ignoring the Council of Ministers’ recommendations. Dishonesty, exclusion of pertinent materials, dishonesty, and arbitrary materials round out the list. The opinion of renowned academic lawyer Sir William Wade was taken into consideration by Judge Pasayat, who agreed that due to the variety of wording in Article 72, it is impossible to determine the precise circumstances under which this authority may be exercised.

The petition’s contention that the remission order is clearly unjustified is rejected. Respondent No. 1 may, however, treat the petition as still pending for future review. The Governor shall have the power to review documents provided to him by State authorities and to conduct whatever

investigations he deems appropriate and necessary in order to determine the pertinent factors in any other situation.

The Federal Court of India concluded in Tata Cellular v. The Federal Court of India¹⁰ that when performing judicial review of a presidential pardon, the court does not act as an appellate court since it lacks experience in overturning administrative decisions, but instead reviews the process by which decisions are reached. Be concerned with the lone legality issue. If the president pardons, it is beyond his or her authority, a legal mistake has been made, natural justice norms have been broken, the president has decided that a reasonable court has reached its conclusion, and the president has abused his or her authority.

CONCLUSION –

In a word, the decision is crucial because it clarifies whether judicial scrutiny of a presidential pardon renders Article 72 unnecessary. A body of prior Supreme Court cases suggests that, though limited, judicial review of presidential pardons is permissible when executive clemency goes beyond the bounds of legal reasonableness, which results from the continued balance between administrative and judicial power.

REFERENCES –