INTRODUCTION:
The magistrate takes cognizance in the case to make the accused in the court and direct him to be present or brought before the court as the circumference may be through the process of issue. In simple words, it means that the court has the power to ask questions to the accused and the accused is answerable to the court. The concerned magistrate shall take cognizance of all the allegations that have been made on the police report which has been filed by the complainant to the police or to the magistrate. After that, if the magistrate is of opinion, then he may issue a process against the accused which has been provided under section 204 of the code of criminal procedure. The magistrate can also by observing the facts of the case issue a summons or warrant to the accused. The magistrate has also the power to postpone the process of issue which has been provided under section 202 of the code of criminal procedure.
FACTS: –
The litigant, one S. Varma, and Forthcoming Goldstein were the vendors of Hungarian Speculation Trust Ltd. (in willful liquidation) hereinafter alluded to as Hungerford). Hungerford was the registered owner of 51% of the company’s shares at all times and was usually entitled to control and manage that company. 2295 shares with a face value of Rs were comprised of these 51% shares. 1.000 each. The company had 707 of these shares in its possession. The remaining 49 percent of shares belonged to Respondent 5, Haridas Mundra. In or around 1961, Hungerford consented to sell and Mundra chose to buy the 51% offers. Suit No. was filed by Mundra 600 of 1961 against Hungerford in the High Court of Calcutta for explicit execution of the said understanding. The High Court ordered Hungerford to deliver the cited 2295 shares in exchange for a payment of Rs. An injunction preventing Hungerford from exercising its rights as a holder of those 51% shares was issued for 86 lacs and odd and remained in effect until Mundra received delivery of the aforementioned shares. Interestingly, Mundra was able to acquire control and management of the company with the 49 percent shares he owned without having to pay the price of the 51 percent shares until Hungerford delivered all 2295 shares, of which 707 were in the company’s custody. Hunger-ford had to figure out how to get those 707 shares back from the company in order to deliver all 2295 shares and get paid Rs in exchange. 86 million and a half from Mundra. S. Varma, who was living in England at the time, arrived in India in or around May 1965. As indicated by the grumbling, Varma, joined by one N. K. Majumdar, went to the organization’s office on May 27, 1965, and upon his solicitation for the said 707 offer endorsements, got from respondent 2(D.M. Jaffray) the said share declarations. After that, Varma gave Mundra a receipt for those share certificates and signed an indemnity bond to protect the business from any claims Mundra might have against those 707 share certificates. By the said bond the outlets of Hungerford repaid the organization to the degree of Rs. 53 lacs that the company was said to have paid in taxes to the Turner family and agreed to help the company get that money back from the Turners’ estates, produce the 707 share certificates whenever they were needed to be delivered to Mundra in accordance with the decree, and pay back any claims that might have been made after they were delivered to Varma. Hungerford would, in accordance with the aforementioned decree, be able to deliver to Mundra all of the aforementioned 2295 shares once those 707 share certificates were handed over to Verma.
ISSUES: –
- Whether the chief presidency magistrate is competent to order to make an investigation under section 156(3) of the code of criminal procedure?
- Whether the explained reason provided for the furnishing indemnity bond on behalf of Hungerford is reasonable or not?
- Whether the said statement of Jaffray can be utilized in this case when the statement is not part of the record of this case?
CONTENTIONS OF BOTH PARTIES: –
the appellant wanted to discuss the details of the case, but we stopped him because the High Court only heard arguments about whether or not Section 195(1)(c) of the Code was applicable. Following this, Mr. Chagla made two assertions: 1) Even though it was true that Hoon presented the aforementioned receipt (document 2) to the police during their investigation of Hoon’s complaint, as required by Section 156(3) of the Code, those proceedings before the police were part and parcel of the proceedings before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, and production of the receipt there was production before the Magistrate; 2) That the receipt had already been presented to the High Court, and that after that, the High Court alone, not Jaffray, could initiate a complaint under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code. Mr. Chagla claims that the decree in Mundra’s suit No. 600 of 1961 was passed, Hungerford took out execution procedures asserting in that Turner Morrison and Co. ought to be made to give up to the vendors of Hungerford the said 707 offer endorsements to empower them to fulfill the expressed pronouncement by conveying every one of the 2, 295 offers (remembering the 707 offers for question) to Mundra against the installment of cost thereof by Mundra. Turner Morrison & Co. argued that because it was not a party to the suit, those proceedings did not prejudice it. As one of Hungerford’s liquidators, Hoon filed a counter-affidavit asserting that Varma had entrusted the aforementioned shares to Jaffray and attaching copies of the aforementioned receipt and indemnity bond to support that claim. Hoon verified the authenticity of the copy attached to his affidavit by presenting the original receipt to counsel for Turner Morrison & Co. during the hearing in that case. for the organization immediately reviewed it and viewed the duplicate as a right duplicate. As a result, it would appear that the item presented to the High Court was merely a copy of the aforementioned receipt. The original was not “produced” before the Court; rather, it was shown to the counsel in order to prevent any contention that the copy was not genuine or accurate. So, the question is whether Jaffray’s complaint can be said to be barred by Section 195(1)(c) of the Code on either of the two arguments made by Mr. Chagla.
JUDGEMENT: –
The Presidency Magistrate determined that the appellant had not established a prima facie case, and as a result, he was unable to recommend the process. The question of whether Hoon can be said to have “produced” or “tended in evidence” the aforementioned receipt before the Chief Presidency Magistrate is the first part of Mr. Chagla’s argument. There is no doubt that Hoon ever presented the receipt as evidence. It was delivered by him before the police in the course of the examination by requested by the Justice under Segment 156(3) of the Code and was then seized by them. Mr. Chagla, on the other hand, argued that even though the receipt was not presented as evidence, it was nevertheless “produced,” a term with many different meanings. The appeal is granted, and the High Court’s decision and judgment are overturned. to issue the process and proceed with it, the Chief Presidency Magistrate. Mr. Chagla is correct in this regard; a document is said to have been produced in a court when it is produced for more than just the purpose of being offered as evidence. First and foremost, the police specialists have under Segments 154 and 156 of the Code a legal right to examine a cognizable offense without requiring any assent from a legal power, and, surprisingly, the High Court has no innate power under Area 561-An of the Code to slow down the activity of that legal power. In the present case, the Chief Presidency Magistrate had, in accordance with Section 156(3), ordered a police investigation. Second, it is well established that, in order for the Magistrate to be considered to have taken cognizance of an offense under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code, he must have not only considered the contents of the complaint that was presented to him, but he must also have done so in order to proceed in accordance with Section 200 and the provisions that come after that section. However, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offense if he has only used his mind to order an investigation under Section 156(3) or to issue a warrant for the purpose of an investigation. No proceeding could be said to have begun before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, of which the police inquiry could be said to be a component, as the Chief Presidency Magistrate had not even taken cognizance of the offense and had only applied his mind to direct a police investigation under Section 156(3). As a result, the first part of Mr. Chagla’s argument cannot be accepted. To that Mr. Chagla’s contention was that once a record claimed to be manufactured is utilized in any proceeding under the steady gaze of any court whenever Segment 195(1)(c) would on the double be drawn in and would be a bar against a grievance by a party grumbling of its false client in any later procedure. First and foremost, the language of Section 195(1)’s clause (c) does not support such a proposition. If a party to a court proceeding alleges to have committed any of the enumerated offenses in relation to a document produced or presented as evidence in that proceeding, only upon a complaint by that court can a private complaint be taken into consideration. This clause makes this clear. The exact court before which a party to a proceeding has produced or offered as evidence a document pertaining to which the offense is alleged to have been committed is referred to as “such court.” To put it another way, clause (c) states that the court before which a proceeding is taking place and a party to that proceeding is said to have committed an offense in regard to a document produced or tendered in evidence by him is the court that can take cognizance of the offense based on the complaint. Section 195(1)(c) states that, rather than a private party, the court before which an offense is alleged to have been committed in relation to a document produced in a proceeding before it should file or cause to be filed a complaint. The Supreme Court has determined that Section 203 Cr. P.C. does not recommend holding a regular trial to determine whether the accusations against the accused are true.
CONCLUSION: –
It is established law that when an order is passed under Section 203 or 204 Cr. P.C., all that is required is a prima facie case, not whether the evidence presented will lead to the accused’s conviction. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal and Others 1973 (10) ACC 181 (SC), while thinking about the plan of Areas 200, 203 Cr. P.C., the Supreme Court has determined that Section 203 Cr. P.C. does not recommend holding a regular trial to determine whether or not the accusations made against the accused are true. Section 203 has two sections. The first section outlines the evidence that the Magistrate must consider, and the second states that the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint if he determines that there is insufficient evidence to proceed.
written by RITTI RAMYA, LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, DEHRADUN, (VIII SEMESTER)
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