NAGABHUSAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA.

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CITATION	CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 443 OF 2020AIR 2021 SUPREME COURT 1290, AIRONLINE 2021 SC 112
DATE OF JUDGEMENT	MARCH 08, 2021
COURT	THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
APPELLANT	NAGABHUSAN
RESPONDENT	STATE OF KARNATAKA
BENCH	JUSTICE M.R SHAH AND JUSTICE DHANANJAYA CHANDRACHUD

INTRODUCTION

The present criminal case deals with the Supreme Court’s judgement on the challenge to the order of conviction passed by the High Court of Karnataka, reversing the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellant, Nagabhusan was charged with section 498 A (cruelty) and section 302 read with section 34 of IPC (person committing murder shall be charged with life imprisonment or death penalty).

The case majorly focuses on the victims multiple dying declarations and medical evidence. “Dying declaration means the statement given by the person who is no more to assist the judge in order to ascertain the facts which cumulatively or in isolation constituted crime in which the person has been the victim”.

The victim provided two dying declarations, which made it difficult for the court to decide which to consider. The trial court decided to examine the first dying statement, and disregarded the second. However, when the appeal was heard by the Karnataka High Court, the High court decided that the second dying declaration was supported by medical evidence and was thus taken into consideration. As a result, the High Court reversed the acquittal order of the trial Court to conviction order.

FACTS:

Rekha (deceased) was married to the accused ten years ago prior to the date of incident. She was subjected to mental cruelty and dowry was demanded from her parents. After this incident mediation was held. Her parents on two occasions gave the sum of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 20,000/- to the matrimonial home. On 24.06.2010, after an argument with the deceased, the accused doused her with kerosene and set her on fire. She was brought to the hospital, but later on succumbed to injuries she died.
On 25^th October, 2010 the police recorded the statement of the deceased (Exhibit D2), in which the deceased stated that the fire was an accident. The kerosene was poured from the can into the bottle, it spilled onto the clothes that were on ground. When the deceased tried to take the clothes off the ground, the candle fell onto the clothes, setting them on fire and causing burn injuries to her.
Later on 27^th October, 2010 the investigating officer went to hospital to record her statement (Exhibit P5). It was observed that the second dying declaration made by the deceased was contradictory to the first one. The deceased, in the presence of her parents and others, gave the statement that she and the accused had an argument after which the accused doused her with kerosene and set her on fire. As the deceased was threatened that her children would be killed if she didn’t depict the fire as an accident.
The second dying declaration was rejected by the Trial Court, citing the fact that it was recorded in front of her parents rather than right after the incident, which raised the possibility of influence and tutoring, hence the Trial Court acquitted the accused. Aggrieved by the decision of the Trial Court, an appeal was made to Karnataka High Court. High Court re appreciated the entire evidence and also found that the Trial Court overlooked the second dying declaration is not justifiable.
The High Court found the second dying declaration (Exhibit P5) to be reliable due to medical evidence and the injuries sustained by the deceased as no stove was found near the deceased. Hence High Court reversed the order of the trial Court and passed an order of conviction of the accused.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant has filed a special petition before the Supreme Court of India.

ISSUES:

Whether the order of the High Court to have reversed the Trial court’s decision of acquittal and ordered conviction of accused valid?

CONTENTIONS RAISED BY APPELLANT:

Learned counsel for appellant contended that High Court has done a grave error in reversing a well reasoned judgement and order of acquittal.
The High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction vested in it under section 378 of Criminal Procedure Code.
There were material contradictions in two dying declarations made by the deceased and the fact that the trial court relied upon the first dying declaration exhibit D2 because it was made immediately after the incident and not later. It is to be noted that the second dying declaration was made in front of the deceased parent’s; hence the statement given during that time may be contradicted. Therefore, it is argued, at the very least, the appellant deserves the benefit of the doubt.
As it was contended that it was an accidental fire, when the deceased screamed, the appellant tried to extinguish the fire, while extinguishing the fire the appellant also got burn injuries in his right hand. Therefore the act of appellant does not fall under clause fourthly of section 300 IPC.

CONTENTIONS RAISED BY RESPONDENT:

Learned counsel for the respondent contented that High Court have re appreciated and correctly reversed the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court.
The High Court should not ordinarily set aside the trial court’s acquittal order when there is a possibility of two contrary outcomes. In evaluating an acquittal ruling the court must take into account all the information and evidence to determine whether trial court’s order was erroneous or otherwise unsupportable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record. In this case the high court has not exceeded its jurisdiction under section 378 of CrPc.
The dying declaration (Exhibit P5) was reliable and sufficient to convict the accused as it was supported by medical evidence and burn injuries sustained by the deceased. Therefore the accused was not entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Even in the unlikely event that the accused did not intend to cause the death of the deceased, their actions would nonetheless come under clause fourthly section 300 IPC, which deals with actions that pose an immediate risk of death. Any typical person would recognize that it is extremely risky to pour kerosene over someone and then light her with a matchstick; there is a high likelihood that this act would result in injuries or even death.

JUDGMENT:

In this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court Held that the findings recorded by the High Court are reasonable enough, as the High Court has stated its reasoning to believe dying declaration (Exhibit P5) which is supported by medical evidence and injuries sustained by the deceased. Therefore the High Court has not committed an erroneous mistake while reconsideration /re appreciation of the entire evidence on record. The High Court has also noted that the second dying declaration is trustworthy and that the account included in it is backed by the facts, which include the deceased’s injuries and the fact that no stove was discovered at the scene, it was also found that if it was an accidental fire then the deceased would had injuries on her lower body but injuries were found on upper limbs of body hence the kerosene was poured on her. Therefore the defence came out with a false case of accidental fire which was not supported by any evidence.

The court also held that each dying declaration must be evaluated separately based solely on its own merits and evidentiary value; one cannot be disregarded based only on the contents of another.

The Court held that section 300 clause fourthly of IPC, this clause only applies to the actus reus and mens rea of the initial act, which is deemed to be immediately dangerous to the knowledge of the accused to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, so the convict’s reversing his intention and attempting to save the victim’s life is beyond contemplation. This section doesn’t cover the purview of withdrawal of intention. Merely because he tried to extinguish the fire doesn’t take the case out of the clutches of clause fourthly section 300 IPC.

ANALYSIS:

In this case, the Supreme Court re appreciated the evidence which were already appreciated by both the trial court and the high court and found that the High court’s decision to convict the accused in this instance was based on correctly appreciated evidence. Moreover, the Supreme Court clarified that the High Court had the power to re-evaluate the evidence under section 378 CrPC, if the stance taken by the Trial Court is irrational. In this case if the Trail Court had appreciated and evaluated the multiple dying declarations which were contrary to one another individually then there wouldn’t have been an appeal to the High Court. The Court clarified that the dying declarations are to be supported by circumstances and evidence, not just because the dying declaration made initially will undoubtedly be real and the second declaration will be influenced or affected. Moreover because of this case the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of evidence evaluation and clarified if there are multiple dying declarations then those are to be evaluated separately and not together.

The Court found that, as stated in this case, “excuse for incurring risk” This shows us that there may be a conscience at work and that, despite the fact that the intent to kill the victim may have come from a spur of the moment, it reverses itself when the perpetrator tries to undo his actions by trying to save the victim from certain death. This act does not logically follow from the murderous intentions which the perpetrator had previously. Hence in this case section 300 clause fourthly IPC was applied.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the accused, Nagabhusan for the offences of dowry death (Section 30o clause four of IPC) and cruelty (Section 498A of IPC). In such cases the Court emphasised the importance of comprehensive understanding of the behaviour and statements made by the deceased and other witnesses, the judgement reaffirmed the principles of evidence evaluation in case of multiple dying declarations.

REFERENCE:

Written by Purva Kamlesh Todankar. College: VES College of Law. Course: B.A LLB an Intern under Legal Vidhiya

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