Felthouse v. Bindley (1862)

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Citation	142 ER 1037, [1862] EWHC CP J35
Date of Judgement	8^th July 1862
Court	Court of Common Pleas
Case Type	Adequate Communication in contract
Appellant	Paul Felthouse
Respondent	Bindley
Bench	Willes J, Byles J and Keating J
Referred

Facts of the case

Paul Felthouse, a London-based builder, sued Mr. Bindley. He was hoping to purchase a horse from his nephew John Felthouse.

Blindly made an offer to purchase a horse from his nephew, but there was a mismatch in the price as blindly offered less than the nephew wanted. As a result, the uncle wrote in his written declaration that “if I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mine at £30 15s.”

John, his nephew, did not respond to him and was occupied working on his Tamworth farm, but he instructed William Bindley, his auctioneer, to reserve the horse, meaning not to sell it.

However due to a mistake the horse was sold by the auctioneer and brought much more money than the uncle had given.

The auctioneer quickly noticed his error and wrote to the Mr blindly expressing regret for the mistake. In his essay, he also said, “Instructions were given to me to reserve the horse,” but everything was done unintentionally.

Later, the nephew also wrote to his Mr blindly, objecting about the auctioneer’s carelessness as he had already been informed that the horse had been sold. He added that he will make an effort to get the horse back from the buyer.

When uncle Felthouse realized that the horse had sold, he sued the auctioneer, Bindley in torts of conversion which means using someone else’s property inconsistently with their right, with it necessary to show that the horse was his property, in order to prove that there was a valid contract

Since the nephew did not express accepting the complainant’s offer, Mr. Bindley contended that there was no legal contract for the horse.

Issues raised in court

As William Bindley was sued for conversion, which requires the plaintiff to establish his ownership of the horse, this case raises the question of whether or not there was a legitimate contract between the plaintiff, Paul Felthouse, and the defendant. The issue of whether silence or a refusal to reject an offer constitutes acceptance is also brought up by this case.

Arguments presented in court

Arguments present by plaintiff :- The plaintiff claimed that the agreement was valid. The fact that the nephew intended to sell the horse and that he chose not to respond to his uncle’s letter indicates that he would accept the offer (as stated in the letter). From Nephew’s perspective, acceptance was inferred. Later, Felthouse argued that the horse had become his property as per the terms of the contract. Due to the conversion of the same in his name, Bindley was responsible.

Arguments presented by defendant :- John Felthouse failed to inform his uncle of his acceptance, according to the defendant, who claimed that there was no contract in place. Paul Felthouse, the plaintiff, cannot sue for tort of conversion because the horse was not his property.

It was discovered that the uncle and his nephew had no written agreement over the horse. Due to two requirements for the contract, First, acceptance must be informed to the offerer. There is no acceptance of the offer because silence does not constitute acceptance. It is important to be explicit when accepting an offer. The nephew intended to sell the horse, but he didn’t let his uncle know that he had done so.

Judgement

In this instance, it was decided by the court that the Felthouse and his nephew had no agreement over the horse. The offer had not been accepted, silence did not constitute acceptance, and another person cannot impose an obligation. Any acceptance of an offer must be made known in a concise manner. There was no contract of sale, notwithstanding the nephew’s intentions to sell the horse to the complainant and his expressed desire. Therefore, the nephew’s silence on the complainant’s offer did not constitute an acceptance of it.

The lead judgment was given by Willes J, who said: “I believe that the rule to enter a nonsuit should be made absolute. John Felthouse, the plaintiff’s nephew, had owned the in dispute horse. The plaintiff and his nephew related had a talk about the former’s acquisition of the horse in December 1860. Although the nephew claimed to have sold the horse for 30 guineas and the uncle appears to have thought he had purchased it for £30 at the time, there was obviously no complete bargain.”

Justice Willes was in agreement with Justice Byles and Justice Keating. Justice Keating went on to say that “in so far as the uncle and the auctioneer are concerned, the only issue we have to decide is whether the horse was the plaintiff’s property at the time of the sale on February 25. My impression is that nothing had been done to transfer ownership of the property from the nephew to the plaintiff at that point. Before that day, the nephew’s acceptance of the proposal had not been binding.

Conclusion

Even though the nephew later wrote to apologize for the error, the court did not believe that his actions in trying to prevent the horse from being sold implied that he intended to accept his uncle’s offer. As a result, it was unclear whether his silence in response to the offer was intended to be taken as acceptance. This can be questioned because it’s difficult to see how there could have been more convincing proof that the nephew really intended to sell, but on the other hand, there are numerous circumstances in which it would be unwelcome and confusing for silence to be taken as approval. Therefore, in Felthouse case, there would have been a contract if the nephew had stated that his uncle may take the offer is accepted if he heard nothing further. The Honorable Court ruled that there was no agreement between the complainant and his nephew over the horse. The offer had not been accepted, silence did not constitute acceptance, and another person cannot impose an obligation. Any acceptance of an offer must be made known in a concise manner.

References

This article is written by Sushmita Singh of Lloyd School of Law, Intern at legal vidhiya