DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. RAJ SINGH

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DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. RAJ SINGH

CITATION	Civil Appeal No. 1555 of 2022
DATE OF JUDGMENT	16^th February, 2022
COURT	The Supreme Court of India
APPELLANT	Arjun S/O. Ramanna @ Ramu
RESPONDENT	IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd.
BENCH	Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay S. Oka

INTRODUCTION

Delhi Development Authority Vs. Raj Singh [December 09, 2022] is a case decided by the Supreme Court of India on the issue of land acquisition under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 2013’). The main question was whether the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 1894’) were deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act 2013, if the compensation was not paid to the land owners. The Supreme Court held that the land acquisition did not lapse, as the compensation was deposited in the treasury by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) before the commencement of the Act 2013, and the land owners refused to accept the same. The Supreme Court overruled the judgment of the High Court of Delhi, which had declared the land acquisition to be lapsed on the ground that the compensation was not actually paid to the land owners. The Supreme Court relied on its Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. (2020) 8 SCC 129¹, which had clarified the meaning and scope of Section 24 of the Act 2013. The Supreme Court also observed that the DDA had taken possession of the land in question on 19.01.2006, and therefore the land owners had no right or interest in the land after that date.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The facts of the case Delhi Development Authority Vs. Raj Singh [December 09, 2022] are as follows:

The land in question, measuring 12 bighas and 8 biswas, was situated in village Sultanpur Dabas, Delhi.
The land was acquired by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) for the planned development of Delhi under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act 1894).
The notification under Section 4 of the Act 1894 was issued on 24.08.1989 and the declaration under Section 6 was made on 30.03.1990.
The award under Section 11 was passed on 31.03.1992, determining the compensation at the rate of Rs.1,50,000 per bigha.
The DDA released a sum of Rs.10 crores to the Land and Building Department on 28.08.1990 in respect of the land acquired.
The Land Acquisition Collector deposited the compensation in the treasury on 30.03.1992, as the land owners refused to accept the same.
The DDA took possession of the land on 19.01.2006 and utilized it for the construction of a metro depot.
The respondent, Raj Singh, who claimed to be one of the land owners, filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi in 2015, seeking a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the Act 2013).
The High Court allowed the writ petition and held that the land acquisition had lapsed, as the compensation was not paid to the land owners or deposited in the court.
The DDA challenged the High Court’s order in the Supreme Court, relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129¹, which clarified the meaning and scope of Section 24 of the Act 2013.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order, holding that the land acquisition did not lapse, as the compensation was deposited in the treasury by the DDA before the commencement of the Act 2013, and the land owners refused to accept the same.

ISSUES RAISED

The main issues raised in the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Raj Singh [December 09, 2022] are:

Whether the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act 1894) were deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the Act 2013), if the compensation was not paid to the land owners.
Whether the deposit of compensation in the treasury by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) before the commencement of the Act 2013, as the land owners refused to accept the same, amounted to payment of compensation under Section 24(2) of the Act 2013.
Whether the possession of the land by the DDA on 19.01.2006 and its utilization for the construction of a metro depot extinguished the right or interest of the land owners in the land.

CONTENTIONS OF APPEALENT

The contention of the appellant, Delhi Development Authority (DDA), in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Raj Singh [December 09, 2022] was as follows:

The DDA contended that the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act 1894) did not lapse under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the Act 2013), as the compensation was deposited in the treasury before the commencement of the Act 2013, and the land owners refused to accept the same.
The DDA relied on the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129, which clarified the meaning and scope of Section 24 of the Act 2013, and held that the deposit of compensation in the treasury by the acquiring authority, as the land owners refused to accept the same, amounted to payment of compensation under Section 24(2) of the Act 2013.
The DDA also contended that it had taken possession of the land in question on 19.01.2006, and utilized it for the construction of a metro depot, and therefore the land owners had no right or interest in the land after that date.

CONTENTIONS OF REPONDENT

The contention of the respondent, Raj Singh, in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Raj Singh [December 09, 2022] was as follows:

The respondent claimed to be one of the land owners whose land was acquired by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) for the planned development of Delhi under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act 1894).
The respondent challenged the validity of the land acquisition proceedings on the ground that they were deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the Act 2013), as the compensation was not paid to the land owners or deposited in the court.
The respondent relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183¹, which held that the deposit of compensation in the treasury by the acquiring authority, as the land owners refused to accept the same, did not amount to payment of compensation under Section 24(2) of the Act 2013.
The respondent also contended that the DDA had not taken actual physical possession of the land in question, and that the land owners continued to have right or interest in the land.

JUDGEMENT

Delhi Development Authority Vs. Raj Singh [December 09, 2022] is a recent Supreme Court judgement on the issue of land acquisition under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the Act 2013). The main question before the court was whether the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act 1894) were deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act 2013, if the compensation was not paid to the land owners or deposited in the treasury.

The court held that the land acquisition proceedings did not lapse under Section 24(2) of the Act 2013, as the compensation was deposited in the court by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) before the commencement of the Act 2013. The court observed that the expression “paid” in Section 24(2) of the Act 2013 includes deposit of compensation in the court, and that the land owners cannot take advantage of their own refusal to accept the compensation. The court also noted that the DDA had taken possession of the land in question in 2006, and that the land owners had not challenged the land acquisition till 2016. The court therefore set aside the judgement of the Delhi High Court, which had declared that the land acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act 2013.

The judgement of the Supreme Court is significant as it clarifies the interpretation and application of Section 24(2) of the Act 2013, which has been a contentious provision in many land acquisition cases. The judgement also reaffirms the principle that the land owners cannot frustrate the land acquisition process by refusing to accept the compensation or by filing belated challenges. The judgement also upholds the public interest involved in the development projects undertaken by the DDA.

The judgement of the above case is a recent Supreme Court decision on the issue of condonation of delay in filing a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The court held that the High Court erred in condoning a huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the second appeal, as no sufficient cause was shown by the appellants. The court observed that the appellants had not explained the delay for the period after 15.03.2017 till June, 2021, and that the orders passed by this Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020, for extension of the period of limitation, did not apply to the second appeal. The court therefore set aside the order of the High Court and dismissed the second appeal as barred by limitation.

ANALYSIS

The case analysis of the above case is as follows:

The main issue in the case was whether the High Court was justified in condoning a huge delay of 1011 days in filing a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in condoning the delay, as no sufficient cause was shown by the appellants. The court applied the principles laid down in various precedents, such as Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, and P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, to decide whether the delay was condonable or not.

The court observed that the appellants had not explained the delay for the period after 15.03.2017 till June, 2021, and that the orders passed by this Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020, for extension of the period of limitation, did not apply to the second appeal. The court also noted that the appellants had not filed any application for condonation of delay before the High Court, and that the High Court had suo motu taken up the matter and condoned the delay without giving any reasons.

The court also considered the fact that the respondent had already obtained a decree in his favour from the trial court and the first appellate court, and that the second appeal involved a substantial question of law. The court held that the appellants had failed to show any bona fide or exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, and that the High Court had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in condoning the delay.

The court therefore set aside the order of the High Court and dismissed the second appeal as barred by limitation. However, the court also imposed costs of Rs. 25,000 on the DDA for its casual approach in the matter, and directed it to pay the same to the respondent within four weeks.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of the above case is that the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and dismissed the second appeal as barred by limitation. The court also imposed costs of Rs. 25,000 on the DDA for its casual approach in the matter, and directed it to pay the same to the respondent within four weeks. The court held that the appellants had not shown any sufficient cause for the delay of 1011 days in filing the second appeal, and that the orders passed by the court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 did not apply to the second appeal. The court also upheld the decree in favour of the respondent passed by the trial court and the first appellate court.

REFERENCES

This Article is written by Shamyana Parveen student of Bikash Bharati Law College, Kolkata, West Bengal; Intern at Legal Vidhiya.

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