CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT 1971

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the many facets of contempt of court, including its historical origins, the judiciary’s broad authority to deal with it, and the delicate relationship between using that authority and the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. Contempt of court, a legal notion intended to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings, has changed over time, posing complex difficulties at the confluence of legal authority and individual liberty. The research examines historical changes, recognises the subtleties of disrespectful behaviour, and critically assesses the compromise reached between upholding the democratic requirement of free expression and upholding the dignity of the courts.

KEYWORDS

Contempt of Court, Free Speech, Article 19, Freedom of Speech, Civil Contempt, Criminal Contempt, Power of Contempt.

INTRODUCTION

Contempt of court, a complex legal notion strongly ingrained in the foundation of judicial authority, is critical to preserving the dignity of court proceedings. This paper aims to clarify the nuances surrounding contempt of court by exploring its historical foundations, the significant authority that the judiciary possesses to suppress contemptuous behaviour, and the difficult balancing act that must be performed in order to reconcile these authorities with the basic right to free speech. Through historical analysis, we can obtain a contextual understanding of the ways in which the legal and socio-political environments of various eras have influenced the evolution of contempt laws across time.

The examination of the power of contempt, as it is particularly granted to the courts, illuminates the means by which the judiciary protects its credibility and guarantees the uninterrupted execution of justice. Despite its strength, this power must be carefully calibrated to avoid any abuse or encroachment on personal freedoms.

A complex interaction of legal concepts is introduced by the connection of contempt of court and freedom of speech. We must strike a careful balance in order to preserve both the courts’ authority and the highly valued freedom of speech as we negotiate this complex dynamic. The tension that arises when attempting to navigate the complexities of contempt law is highlighted by the necessity to maintain the integrity of legal procedures while still allowing for strong public conversation.

This paper conducts a thorough examination of India’s Contempt of Court Act 1971, identifying opportunities for revision that could help ensure the peaceful coexistence of democratic values and judicial power.

CONTEMPT OF COURT

Contempt is defined as the state of being despised, humiliated, or dishonoured. In a similar vein, it might be said that any misconduct, wrongdoing, or action that undermines the credibility, authority, or integrity of the court constitutes contempt of court. These offences could involve tampering with witnesses, disobeying orders, disrupting the proceedings, hiding evidence, disobeying a court order, or, more recently, disparaging or tweeting about a Supreme Court judge.

Article 215 and Article 129 of the Indian Constitution grant the High Court and Supreme Court the authority to penalize for contempt, respectively. The Contempt of Court Act, of 1971 is the principal source of the legal framework that regulates acts of contempt in the Indian context. These articles are reinforced by the amendments made to the Act. This act’s Section 2 separates contempt into two categories:

i) Civil Contempt: As defined in Section 2(b), civil contempt is the act of disobeying a court’s order, decision, decree, or case.

ii) Criminal contempt is addressed in Section 2(c) and is defined as “the publication (whether by words, written or spoken, by visible representation, by signs, or by any other means) of any matter of any other act which causes scandal in the court, creates doubts about any legal proceedings, or interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct any legal proceeding.”[1]

The Allahabad High Court made it clear in Vijay Pratap Singh v. Ajit Prasad[2] that there is a difference between civil and criminal contempt. In civil contempt, the goal is to compel the violator to act in the other party’s best interest, whereas in criminal contempt, the action is taken as a means of punishing the offending party by interfering with the regular course of legal proceedings and undermining the court’s authority. On the other hand, if a court orders the person who is in civil contempt to pay a fine or serve time in jail for not fulfilling their responsibility, that civil contempt eventually converts into a criminal contempt. Such disdain is sometimes referred to as sui generis since it is neither exclusively civil nor exclusively criminal in character.

There may not always be a clear distinction between criminal and civil contempt, and they are frequently regarded as synonymous. Civil contempt occurs when a private party fails to follow a court order established for their benefit. On the other hand, if the contemnor combines disobedience of the order with court defiance and behaves in a way that resembles abstraction or meddling with the courts of justice, his contempt is mixed and resembles a civil contempt between him and his opponent.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Indian contempt of court laws originated with British rule in the country. This started with an undelivered ruling by J. Wilmot in 1765, where the judge declared that the authority of contempt of court was required to uphold the dignity and majesty of judges and to defend their authority.[3] In the Surendranath Banerjee[4] case, the Privy Council noted that a high court’s authority to penalize for contempt stems from its existence or formation. It is not a power that the law has granted it. The Contempt of Court Act was created in 1926 in order to penalise contempt of inferior courts and to provide openness surrounding the concept of contempt of court. The Contempt of Court Act of 1952 replaced the previous Act, which did not include contempt of inferior courts such as Chief Courts and Judicial Commissioner’s Court.

The Contempt of Courts Act of 1926 and the Contempt of Courts Act of 1952 both lacked a definition of contempt. Regarding the law of contempt, the High Courts and the Supreme Court adopted basic common law principles; however, the severity of the penalties imposed by those courts was constrained by those Acts[5]. The Court recognised in Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose[6] that the authority of contempt punishment was “arbitrary, unlimited, and uncontrolled,” and that it should be “exercised with the greatest caution.”

In accordance with the recommendations of the committee led by H.N. Sanyal, the Act of 1952 was once more superseded by the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. This was carried out as a result of the Contempt of Court Act, 1952’s inadequate, ambiguous, and vague provisions.

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was passed in an attempt to legitimise the concept of justice and in a very practical manner. Its purpose is to punish anyone who obstructs the judiciary’s ability to provide justice to the people. Everybody has the right to an impartial, impartial trial free from any form of discrimination in a functioning legal system. Therefore, it is intended that any behaviour that undermines the judicial concept of justice be penalised in accordance with the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

POWER OF CONTEMPT

The Indian public has great trust in the judiciary, which is primarily responsible for enforcing the law. The primary goal of granting courts contempt authority is to preserve the courts’ majesty, dignity, and public perception of them. There would be major consequences for our nation’s legal system if such trust and confidence were permitted to be undermined. The law of contempt gives the courts the power they need to thwart unjustified assaults or initiatives that aim to subvert the rule of law.

The purpose of the 1971 Contempt of Courts Act was to dispel any lingering questions regarding the authority of a High Court. The law of contempt is not so much the judge occupying the seat of justice as it is the keeper of that seat. This idea was strengthened by J. Hadi Hussain’s opinions in Nasir Uddin Haider[7], which said that the goal of contempt jurisdiction is to preserve the public’s perception of the law courts’ majesty and dignity. The trust placed in the justice system is broken and an offender must be punished if, through his defamatory remarks or writing, the general public comes to regard the judge as unfit to perform their judicial duties.

The Act’s title frequently misleads people into believing that this piece of legislation tends to keep judges and the legal profession above the law by protecting them. Since the judiciary serves as both the prosecutor and the adjudicator, it frequently results in this legislation being hidden as a shield to shield the courts from outside criticism. If this were the case, it would essentially amount to an abuse of the judiciary’s authority and a disregard for the basic notion of justice that it is meant to uphold. Protecting the public is the primary goal of the contempt law’s punishment, not shielding the court or any particular judge from a repeat of the attack. Contrary to popular belief, the act in question is not under the jurisdiction of the judiciary’s excess power. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the courts’ authority and jurisdiction under this act are limited to extra-ordinary jurisdiction, which serves as a check on the judiciary.

In Mohammed Yamin v. Om Prakash Bansal[8], the Supreme Court already ruled that the hall of justice is not a separate virtue. In actuality, justice needs to be audacious, unrestricted, and open to public examination in order to radiate its pure brilliance. Therefore, a judgement cannot be regarded with contempt if someone criticises certain open features of it, such as the interpretation of the law, the severity of the sentence, etc. On the other hand, it would be going too far if there was an attack on judges’ integrity by blaming them for being incompetent, arbitrary, or lacking in personal integrity.

Since the Contempt of Court Act of 1971, judicial decisions have demonstrated the judiciary’s radical viewpoint. The only things deemed repugnant were the careless and dishonest claims[9], use of unbridled languages[10], and the despicable claims of corruption[11]. In these situations, the court determined that the remarks were discourteous not only due to their propensity to create a scandal or undermine the court’s authority but also because they were inherently derogatory, unethical, and disrespectful. The court has consistently established rulings that support the judiciary as the main pillar.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND CONTEMPT OF COURT

Freedom of speech is the foundation of all other constitutional rights. Article 19 (1) (a) guarantees the freedom of speech, but it is also subject to the reasonable restriction outlined in Article 19 (2). The constitution lists eight different justifications for appropriate limitations. Broadly speaking, no freedom can be wholly unfettered or absolute.

Lord Salmond in Attorney General v. British Broadcasting Council[12] observed that, “The description contempt of court no doubt has a historical basis, but it is nevertheless misleading. Its object is not to protect the dignity of the court, but to protect the administration of justice”.

Article 19 and the contempt of court provisions are inherently vague and ambiguous. The two most intriguing Supreme Court interpretations of this can be observed. A petition was filed against the Union Minister in P.N. Dua vs. P. Shankar[13], alleging that the judges are biassed in favour of the wealthy, bankers, and zamindars. However, he was found not guilty of the crime. The Honourable Supreme Court noted that constructive criticism does not indicate disobedience to the court and should be accepted as long as it does not interfere with the administration of justice. However, in the case of E.M.S. Namboordripad vs. T. Narayan[14], the petitioner, who was the Kerala Chief Minister at the time, claimed that the judges had a bias in favour of the wealthy and was found in contempt of court under the Act. This means that the legislation regarding contempt is ambiguous and has no clear cut limits.

One of the most understudied aspects of Article 19 is the aspect of contempt. It is often questioned whether clause (2)’s limitations are so onerous as to restrict the applicability of section (1). In contempt cases, the judge serves as both the accuser and the prosecution. He or she also determines whether the case falls under the purview of contempt or not. It is against the natural justice concept, or “Nemo Judex In Causa Sua.” Occasionally, this unalienable right to judges is exploited to suppress the freedom of reasonable and fair criticism of the judiciary, regardless of the benefits to the judiciary’s improved operation.

Although the judiciary has unrestricted inherent power, it is their responsibility to display restraint, set aside personal grudges, and act in a way that best serves the institution as a whole. Paradoxically, the Indian court is empowered to determine whether or not criticism of them will erode public confidence in the system. The Supreme Court filed contempt charges in the matter of Re: Arundhati Roy vs. Unknown[15], claiming that she had damaged the judiciary’s reputation by using derogatory epithets in front of the court. The Court stated that Roy, who is not a party to the case, is attempting to distort the truth and inciting the community to stage protests in opposition to the previously issued ruling. But Roy refused to back down during the trial, standing by the rights of the Narmada River inhabitants to peacefully protest and her own as an Indian citizen to voice her disapproval of the ruling and create a common cause against it. She was subsequently fined Rs. 2000 and given a one-day term of simple imprisonment. The courts’ intolerance is a devastating blow to democracy. All forms of totalitarian control are harmful, and the Judicial Dictatorship is no exception. The purpose of the introduction of the contempt statute was to preserve public confidence in the judges’ judgements and regard for them. The court’s shoulders ought to be broad enough to brush these little matters aside and concentrate on the bigger picture.

The Prashant Bhushan Case[16], the most recent and contentious contempt case, saw the Supreme Court declare advocate on record, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, guilty of contempt of court due to his tweets. One of these tweets from 2009 included accusations of corruption against the judiciary. His most recent tweet was on Shri Sharad A. Bobde, the Chief Justice of India now serving, who was riding a pricey motorbike while disregarding the Covid norms and the Supreme Court was under lockdown, depriving citizens of their right to seek justice. In addition, he questioned the performance of the previous four Chief Justices and asserted that they had destroyed democracy. He was found guilty and fined Re. 1 by the Supreme Court, who took suo moto cognizance of the matter. Mr. Bhushan responded back, saying that his tweets were nothing more than constructive criticism and that a phoney apology would undoubtedly amount to contempt. He denied having apologised for any of his tweets.

The court’s ability to punish individuals who disparage its jurisdiction is now exercised differently and selectively. The protocol is imperious. Consequently, there are disparate aftereffects, which call into question the judiciary’s authority and dignity.

According to Section 5 of the Act, providing factual reporting of the concerns or offering fair criticism do not count as contempt of court. Following the Act’s 2006 Amendment, the telling of the truth was permitted as a defense, but only if it was done so in good faith or with consideration for the greater good of society, as was decided in the case of Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association v. R.K. Jain[17]. The respondent in Re: M.K. Tayal vs. Unknown[18] released an essay claiming that the CJI Y.K. Sabharwal bench’s decision to seal shops and other businesses in the case was made to benefit Justice Sabharwal’s sons. He insisted that he was telling the truth and even offered proof of it. Despite this, the respondent was found guilty of contempt of court, claiming that the publishing damaged the reputation of the court and that the truth cannot be defended because it is not done in the public interest or with good intentions.

It is important to note that the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act, which judges frequently abuse, is to defend the honour of the courts rather than the people. They often try to preserve their self-respect under the garb of disdain, which undermines the act’s fundamental intent. The so-called contempt proceedings, which are meant to penalise the real critics and feed the judges’ inflated egos, are killing constructive criticism, which is the lifeblood of democracy. Judges must remember that the use of power is intended to shield the reputation of the legal system rather than to uphold the honour of any one judge.[19]

ANALYSIS

Effective criticism is necessary for an effective democracy. In the real spirit of free speech, one cannot be threatened with contempt while using their right to free speech. If the judiciary doesn’t improve the existing problems by punishing people who speak out against its orders, then it is just like a dictatorship. A nation that has been silenced loses its ability to see and becomes a puppet of the powerful, which destroys democracy as it truly exists.

The country needs to understand that, amid this chaos surrounding contempt and freedom, both clauses are extremely important. For example, freedom of speech carries international responsibility due to its constitutional significance, while contempt is necessary to uphold the judiciary’s dignity. It is important to realise that there is a very thin line separating “court” from “judges,” and that judges frequently employ the weapon of contempt to defend their personal dignity rather than that of the courts. In the same way, there’s a thin line separating disrespect and criticism. The goal is not to repeal contempt statutes, but rather to recognise that the law shouldn’t be so ambiguous as to encompass judges’ and courts’ authority.

The country need a clear, liberal, and appropriate law to uphold the dignity of the judiciary and to permit pertinent and constructive criticism of judges, their decisions, and their conduct, all of which contribute to the smooth operation of democracy. Judges are held in the highest regard and are responsible for enforcing the law and punishing offenders; nevertheless, this does not mean that they are infallible or immune to criticism.

CONCLUSION

Contempt jurisdiction protects the rule of law and ensures fair and consistent administration of justice. The judiciary is granted authority by the Constitution, and all governmental power is vested in a trust. The judges must pay for any betrayals of this confidence. The legal system is a great and eternal institution. Judges should be held accountable if they carelessly damage the reputation of the legal system. The nation’s faith is upheld by the judiciary, a generous, graceful, and majestic authority. However, the judiciary must answer for its actions if it undermines the rights of the broader public.

An upright, moral, and knowledgeable character is a judge’s greatest weapon. If there is a more precise contempt legislation, then no judge will likely need the contempt power. The goal of the contempt law is not to uphold the legitimacy of judges or to arrogantly denounce a valid critique.

Furthermore, in order to preserve the supremacy of the rule of law, the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 needs to have its jurisdiction clearly defined because it is currently unclear in a number of legal areas. The presence of the rule of law is essential for a democracy to function properly. Therefore, in order to preserve the dignity of the judiciary, changes to the definition of contempt of court are once again necessary. The political landscape altered significantly between the time the contempt law was introduced and the present, so the law needs to be adjusted accordingly. The Judges get praise and criticism, much like any other public institution. Strong criticism and inspection are important to strengthen and improve the functioning of the courts.

REFERENCES

Surepalli Prashanth, Contempt of Court: An Analysis, INT’l J.L. MGMT. & HUMAN. 1378 (2023).
Satakshi N. Dixit, Contempt of Court, 4 INT’l J.L. MGMT. & HUMAN. 1756 (2021).
Contempt of Court: Does Criticism Lower the Authority of the Judiciary?, Economic and Political Weekly (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.epw.in/engage/article/contempt-court-does-criticism-lower-authority.
Sneha Chatterjee & Sayanika Dey, Contempt of Court: Power of Judiciary vs. Right of Citizens, 21 SUPREMO AMICUS [109] (2020).
Vishad Srivastava, Critical Analysis of Contempt Laws in India, 2 INDIAN J. INTEGRATED RSCH. L. 1 (2022).
B. Shravani, Constitutional Validity of Section 2(C)(I), Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: A Critical Analysis, 3 NYAAYSHASTRA L. REV. 1 (2022).
Contempt of Court, SCC Blog (Oct. 9, 2021), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2021/10/09/contempt-of-court-2/.

[1] 274th Law Commission of India Report, Review of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

[2] AIR 1966 All. 305.

[3] Markandey Katju, It’s time to amend law on contempt of court, Times of India, (July 29, 2014).

[4] ILR 10 Cal 109.

[5] M. Jagannadha Rao, The Law of Contempt in Light of Sahara v. Sebi, National Law School of India Review , 2013, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 1-26 (2013), https://www.jstor.org/stable/44283619.

[6] 1913 SCC Online Cal 443.

[7] AIR 1926 All. 623 at 625.

[8] 1982, Cr. L.J. 322 (Raj.).

[9] State of U.P. v. Das Vidhi 1973 Cri.L.J. (Allahabad High Court) 1271

[10] S.C. Tyagi v. N.C. Gupta 1974 Cri. L.J. (Allahabad High Court) 428.

[11] State of U.P. v. Narendra Pal Singh 1990 Cri.L.J. (Allahabad High Court) 1637.

[12] (1981) A.C. 303.

[13] 1988 (3) SCR 547

[14] 1971 (1) SCR 697

[15] AIR 2002 SC 1375

[16] Re: Prashant Bhushan vs. Unknown; 2020 SCC Online SC 588

[17] (2010) 8 SCC 281

[18] 2007 (98) DRJ 41

[19] AIR 1998 SC 1895

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