VENNETI SUNDARA RAMA RAO v. CHAMARTI SATYANARAYANAMURTI

VENNETI SUNDARA RAMA RAO v. CHAMARTI SATYANARAYANAMURTI

FACTS OF THE CASE

By his first marriage, Venneti Govindaraju had a son named Veera Bhadraraju, as well as two grandchildren named Harigovind and Sundararama Veera. Govindaraju was predeceased by Bhadraraju and his mother. In his old age, Govindaraju married a woman named Bangaramma as his second wife, which caused commotion and conflict in this lowly household. The two latter, however, remained joint in estate as Govindaraju and his two grandchildren, Harigovind and Sundararama, were estranged from one another. On November 14, 1937, Harigovind passed away. He left behind a widow, the first defendant, and a little daughter who is not a party to these proceedings. Despite Sundararama’s opposition and disapproval, the widow adopted the second defendant on May 9, 1938, with the assent of Govindaraju, her husband’s grandfather. Sundararama now questions the legality of the adoption on the following grounds: Due to the fact that the dead Harigovind and the plaintiff Sundararama were one and the same person, the adoption could not have been lawful without the agreement of the former. The plaintiff in this instance was within her rights to refuse permission. The widow had no right to leave the joint family, of which her husband was a part at the time of his death, and rely on the approval of a divided sapinda, namely, her father-in-law’s father, even assuming without agreeing that the plaintiff’s rejection of consent was unlawful. Before the bench evaluates the propriety of the plaintiff’s permission being refused for the adoption, it will be practical to address the later portion of the case.

LEGAL ISSUES

This case serves as a reminder of the urgent need to codify this area of Hindu law in order to prevent the time-consuming and expensive litigation that has frequently preceded adoptions.

ARGUMENTS

This case serves as a reminder of the urgent need to codify this area of Hindu law in order to prevent the time-consuming and expensive litigation that has frequently preceded adoptions. It should be rather obvious that she won’t be allowed to adopt with the approval of her husband’s divided kinsmen even if the coparceners incorrectly decline their permission because doing so would mean forcing a coparcener into the joint family against their choice. This is a legitimate interpretation of the law, according to the appellant. In the course of this judgement, the authorities cited by the knowledgeable author to support his conclusion will be reviewed. If he passes away without having any children, his widow may introduce such a coparcener via adoption, against the preferences of the remaining coparceners, provided she receives her husband’s consent. Without her husband’s consent, she must obtain his free consent to what is universally regarded as a virtuous and honourable act. This is required not because, as I will attempt to demonstrate, adoption has an impact on the rights of 26 other cohabitants, but rather because of her alleged dependence on the male members of her husband’s family. 

JUDGEMENT

The majority of the case law has been used to create the law of adoption, which has very little textual support.  Western attorneys once referred to the Hindu Law of Inheritance as a law of inheritance of the offerings of the deceased. It took a later age to recognise that the Mitakshara law’s controlling principle of succession was consanguinity or blood kinship. Regarding adoptions, court opinion has fluctuated for a while between the secular and religious justifications and outcomes of adoption as a test of its legitimacy. Their Lordships must have had some of their own prior statements in mind while making these observations. The law was for a long time in flux regarding many issues relating to the adoption of a Hindu widow, such as the restrictions on the use of the power of adoption by a widow, the mode and manner of consulting sapindas, the consequences of the refusal of consent by one or more sapindas, the justifications for a sapinda’s proper refusal of consent, the impact of adoption on antecedent alienations by the widow, and so on. Hindu commentators perceived significant merits in someone like Coke, the Commentator on Littleton, as noted by Holloway, J. The Hindu legalists initially got over the prohibition on women acting independently by themselves by claiming that the problem was fixed by her father-in-law’s approval of her adoption. The next step was to rule that the other kinsmen’s approval was adequate and that the reference to the father-in-law’s permission was only indicative and not complete. The Hindu attorneys of a century ago came to the conclusion that a Hindu widow who did not have her husband’s permission might adopt a son with the approval of her husband’s gnatis or kinsmen in the Dravida nation. As a result, the legislation was changed to reflect the present beliefs and practises of the populace. The main issue is that, although adoption being a praiseworthy act in and of itself, the widow was only permitted to adopt by the husband with his consent, or in the absence of that, with the consent of his father or another gnatis. Hindu women are not as dependant today as they were during the reign of Yajnavalkya. The religious motivation is also not particularly evident in contemporary adoptions, which are more often undertaken to divert the line of succession or to rid an heir of property that has already passed to them than to ensure the soul of the departed rests in peace. The permission of kinsmen seems to be necessary by reason of the assumed inability of women for independence, rather than the requirement of securing the approval of all those whose potential and reversionary interest in the estate would be negated by the adoption. No matter if a family is whole or fractured, adoption is done for the widow’s late husband’s spiritual benefit. In each scenario, obtaining outside consent is required due to women’s alleged inability. Her personal dependency is unaffected by the division, nor does it grant her the independence to change the succession to the estate she possesses as the Inert husband’s widow on her own terms by making an adoption. Even according to the Judicial Committee, the approval of the widow’s father-in-law—her “natural guardian and venerable protector”—alone is sufficient to legitimate her conduct, and the other family members’ consent is not required regardless of whether the family is divided or undivided. When a Hindu widow adopts a child, she is using a power that only she has. The sapinda’s consent is only necessary due to her alleged inability to act independently; it is not necessary due to how adoption would affect coparceners’ or reversioners’ property rights. Early decisions confused the two factors, but later judgements by the Judicial Committee separated them and established the law in the sense that property factors are equally important in an undivided family as they are in a divided family, and in both cases, the nearest sapindas must be consulted before the adoption can proceed. If the appellant’s attorney’s argument were adopted, the outcomes would be abnormal. Consider two unbroken brothers A and B’ who both left widows after passing away without having children. In accordance with the Hindu law as it existed prior to the new legislation, the inheritance would go to the widow of the final surviving coparcener. The intact family no longer has any male coparceners. Is it correct to say that neither widow can adopt without the divided sapindas’ permission in such a situation? Does the fact that she travels outside the joint family render any adoptions she makes with this permission invalid? If the appellant’s position is adopted, it would amount to a rejection of the right to adoption in those situations for which it was principally designed. The Bench does not distinguish between a situation in which the surviving coparcener is insane and consequently unable to provide his permission and one in which he is unreasonably withholding it. In any scenario, the widow’s decision to leave the home and approach the estranged sapindas for permission is justified. The father-in-law’s father, according to the court, serves as the widow’s “venerable protector” and “guardian” in a similar capacity. The argument might potentially be made on a wider scale. Once it is acknowledged that a widow’s adoption of her deceased husband’s son is a meritorious act, that its propriety must be determined from a religious or spiritual perspective, with the issue of property succession being a secondary consideration, and that the consent of the widow’s father-in-law or, in his absence, the consent of sapindas is necessary due to the presumption that a woman is incapable of taking independent action, it seems to me that the principle which underlies these considerations. The plaintiff may not have made his lone kid available for adoption in such broad terms because doing so is discouraged by Hindu law and public opinion. The widow did indeed fill this role.  In the second instance, there were two sapindas, each of whom had several sons, and an offer of one of each sapinda’s sons was made. According to the ruling, the sapindas had every right to refuse to grant their consent to the adoption of a stranger or a sapinda who was more removed from them than their sons. The closest sapindas’ unwillingness to agree on the basis they indicated was deemed appropriate, and the widow’s adoption overriding their objections was found to be illegitimate. The issue that would emerge if each of the two sapindas required the adoption of his own son as a condition of his agreement is not addressed by Their Lordships. Although he was hopeful of producing more male descendants, the plaintiff in this case only had an only son at the time in question. If this is the case, then the circumstances of the current case are very different because the next reversioner in this case does not have a son, and if he did, the widow would be entitled to object that the adoption of an only son was improper, so it would never be necessary for him to wait for the birth of a second son before he could properly insist upon this condition. The bench in this matter believes that the plaintiff in this instance was, in these circumstances, not driven by lawful motivations in withholding his permission. This decision was made by the learned Judge whose judgement is now the subject of an appeal. The widow was therefore justified in ignoring the plaintiff’s rejection. The paternal grandpa of her departed husband, Govinda Raju, would undoubtedly be the closest sapinda at that time, and his approval was sufficient to allow her to legally adopt a child. As a result, this Letters Patent Appeal is unsuccessful and must be dismissed with costs.

CITATIONS

VENNETI SUNDARA RAMA RAO v. CHAMARTI SATYANARAYANAMURTI- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71027/ 

This analysis is written by Kavya Tiwari, intern under Legal Vidhiya.

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