Syad Akbar vs State Of Karnataka on 25 July, 1979

FACTS OF THE CASE

• The appellant, a bus driver, was navigating a narrow village road flanked by deep ditches on both sides. On this road, a mother and her four-year-old daughter, the deceased, were making their way from the village to the fields. 
• Before crossing the road, the mother paused on the left side, advising her daughter to return home. She then proceeded to cross and disappeared from the appellant’s view. At this point, the child, now on the left side of the road, seemed uncertain about whether to proceed or turn back.
• Suddenly, without warning, the child made a swift dash across the road. Responding promptly, the appellant sounded the horn and swerved the bus to the right, but tragically, the child came under the left front wheel, resulting in her untimely demise. 

ISSUES :

1. (i).  whether the courts below were right in discarding the evidence of the eye wit-nesses on  the ground  that they were treated hostile by the prosecution  and   cross-examined;    

2. (ii). whether the principle “res ipsa loquitur” was applicable in criminal proceedings and, if so,  whether it could be invoked in the circumstances of the case to presume rashness and negligence on the appellant’s part.

# ARGUMENTS ON The Petitioner’s Side

1. Proximate Cause and Foreseeability: The defense may argue that the child’s sudden dash across the road was an unforeseeable event, making it difficult to establish proximate cause. In “Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) (1961),” it was held that liability for negligence arises only if the harm is foreseeable.
2. Unavoidable Circumstances and Contributory Negligence: The child’s sudden attempt to cross the road created a situation of imminent peril, leaving Syad Akbar with limited options. In the case of “Sudhakar v. State of Maharashtra (2006),” the Supreme Court held that in situations of sudden peril, a person may not be held negligent if they act as a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.
3. Good Samaritan Doctrine: Legal Principle: Syad Akbar’s immediate action to sound the horn and swerve the bus could be seen as an attempt to prevent harm, invoking the “Good Samaritan Doctrine.” In “Bird v. Jones (1845),” the court ruled that a person who, without any pre-existing duty, comes to the aid of another in an emergency situation and acts as a reasonable person would, is not liable for any resulting harm.

# ARGUMENTS ON The Respondent’s Side- 

1. Foreseeability and Duty of Care:  While the child’s sudden dash was unexpected, a driver should always be prepared for unforeseen events, especially when operating a vehicle in potentially hazardous conditions. It could be argued that a reasonably prudent driver would have anticipated the possibility of pedestrians near the road. In “Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932),” Lord Atkin established the “neighbor principle,” emphasizing that one must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions that could reasonably be foreseen to cause harm to their neighbor.
2. Contributory Negligence:  It could be contended that Syad Akbar’s actions, including the speed at which he was driving, may have contributed to the severity of the accident. Even if the child’s actions were sudden, a more cautious approach or earlier warning might have averted the tragedy. In “Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington (1932),” the court held that even if a plaintiff’s actions contribute to an accident, the defendant may still be held liable if they were negligent in their own right.
3. Standard of Ordinary Care for Professionals:  Counterargument: As a professional bus driver, Syad Akbar is held to a higher standard of care due to the nature of his occupation. It could be argued that he should have been more vigilant and proactive in assessing potential risks, particularly in challenging road conditions.

JUDGEMENT

1. The court held that the appellant was not to be held criminally liable for the tragic accident. The court emphasized that the evidence presented did not establish culpable negligence on the part of the appellant. 
2. The use of the legal doctrine ‘res ipsa loquitur’ was deemed inappropriate in this context, as the circumstances surrounding the accident did not unequivocally point to negligence on the part of the appellant. Furthermore, the court maintained that the treatment of the eye witnesses as hostile by the prosecution did not warrant complete dismissal of their testimonies. As a result, the appellant was acquitted of any criminal charges related to the incident.
3. This case sets an important precedent in understanding the nuances of negligence, the application of legal doctrines, and the evaluation of witness testimonies in criminal proceedings.

CONCLUSION:

            The court underscored the importance of not entirely dismissing the evidence of the eye witnesses based on their hostile designation. Moreover, the application of ‘res ipsa loquitur’ was deemed fitting, influencing the verdict. This case serves as a significant precedent regarding witness testimonies, the application of legal doctrines, and the standard of negligence in criminal cases.

RELEVANCE:

This case remains relevant in today’s legal landscape due to its emphasis on the treatment of hostile witnesses, the application of the legal doctrine ‘res ipsa loquitur,’ and the standard of negligence in criminal cases. It serves as a reminder of the complexities involved in evaluating evidence and highlights the ongoing challenges faced by transportation professionals in ensuring safety while making critical decisions. This case continues to provide valuable insights into legal principles that remain pertinent in contemporary legal proceedings.

REFERENCES

https://lawplanet.in/

https://indiankanoon.org/

https://en.wikipedia.org/

https://www.legalauthority.in/

https://www.scconline.com/

This Article is written by Riyansh Gupta of the University Institute of Legal Studies, an intern at Legal Vidhiya. 

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