Sudesh Kedia Vs. Union of India [April 09, 2021]

CITATION	2021 INSC 245
DATE OF JUDGMENT	09th April 2021
COURT	Supreme Court of India
APPELLANT	Sudesh Kedia
RESPONDENT	Union of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Mr. Justice L. Nageshwar Rao of the bench comprising: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nageshwar Rao and Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat

INTRODUCTION

In this case, appellant Mr. Sudesh Kedia, a businessman, faces accusations under Sections 120B/414/384/386/387 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC) combined with Sections 17/18/21 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as well as Sections 25 (1B)(a)/26/35 of the Arms Act and Section 17 (1)(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment (CLA) Act. The FIR accuses him of being an operative/functionary of the terrorist gang TPC, alleged to extort levies from coal merchants, transporters & contractors. An application for bail was dismissed by the Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge NIA at Ranchi on 14.02.2020. Subsequently, the High Court dismissed the criminal appeal made by the Appellant and upheld the Special Judge’s order from 14.02.2020.

Fact of Case

1. The appellant is dissatisfied with the order from the Court of Judicial Commissioner-cum-special Judge, National Investigating Agency at Ranchi.
2. The special court did not accept the submission made on behalf of the appellant that he was merely a victim forced to pay levies.
3. The court was convinced by the prosecution’s argument that beyond meeting members of the terrorist organization, the appellant also remitted substantial sums to them.
4. An appeal against this judgment was also dismissed by the High Court on 24.06.2020.
5. The High Court found ample material suggesting he maintained constant contact with members of this group for his business operations, indicating a probable case of terror funding.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether payment of extortion money amounts to terror funding under UAPA?

CONTENTIONS OF APPEALENT

1. The appellant claimed that Subhan Miyan demanded money from him to ensure smooth operations for his transport company M/s Esskay Concast & Minerals Pvt Ltd.; he admitted to meetings and significant payments.
2. He revealed that he transports coal for GVK Power and Godavari Commodities and attended multiple meetings with TPC leaders to pay levies from his current account.
3. He argued that while accused only for making levy payments to TPC to keep his business running smoothly, he is not affiliated with TPC & should not be charged with terror funding; further stating that charges are unsubstantiated by evidence in terms of Section 17 UA(P) Act.

CONTENTIONS OF REPONDENT

1. According to the prosecution, the Appellant was providing financial support to TPC and the material gathered during investigation discloses that the Appellant has committed offences under Section 17 of the UA (P) Act.
2.  It was submitted that the judgment of the High Court does not warrant any interference as the Appellant was in constant touch with the members of the organization (TPC) which shows his involvement with the terrorist gang. 
3. Section 43-D (5) mandates that a person shall not be released on bail if the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima facie true. Apart from the other offences, the Appellant is accused of committing offences under Section 17, 18 and 21 of the UA (P) Act. 
4. According to the prosecution, he has entered into a conspiracy with the other members of the organization to strengthen and promote the activities of the organization. Further, an amount of Rs. 9,95,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakh and Ninety-Five Thousand only) was seized from the Appellant’s house, making him liable for punishable under Section 21 of the Act.

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court has overturned the High Court’s judgment and the Special Court’s decision, which had asserted that the Appellant maintained ongoing contact with other accused individuals. In the Appellant’s statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC, he disclosed that he was called to meet A-14 & other organization members regarding payments made by him. Initially, we are not convinced that a case of conspiracy is established solely based on the Appellant’s meetings with these organization members.

The Supreme Court noted that Rs. 9,95,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakh and Ninety-Five Thousand only) was confiscated from the Appellant’s residence. The Appellant clarified that this amount was withdrawn from the bank for employee salaries and other expenses. The Supreme Court does not concur with the prosecution’s claim that these funds constitute terror financing. At this juncture, it cannot be concluded that the seized amount stems from terrorist activities. Furthermore, there is no accusation that the Appellant received any illicit funds.

After an exhaustive review of both parties’ arguments and careful examination of the evidence presented, we find that a prima facie case against the Appellant regarding the alleged offenses has not been substantiated. It is important to note that these findings are solely for the purpose of granting bail to the Appellant and should not influence the trial court’s proceedings during trial.

ANALYSIS

In the National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali case, the Supreme Court examined the criteria under Section 43(5)(D), noting that a judge must be convinced by the proviso to subsection (5) that there are fairgrounds to assume the claim against the accused is either prima facie true or false. The court must document its findings, showing fair reasons to believe that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offense.

There exists a difference between being satisfied that there are fairgrounds to assume an accused is not guilty and having reasonable grounds to believe that a charge is prima facie true under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. “Prima facie true” implies that the evidence compiled by the investigating agency in the initial report should stand unless contradicted, clarified, or disproven by other evidence, which on its surface shows involvement in the specified crime.

If left unchallenged or unrefuted, this evidence should independently suffice to establish a fact or chain of facts constituting the alleged offense. In one sense, judicial satisfaction is lighter because it requires ruling only that the charge is prima facie true, unlike determining an accused’s innocence as mandated by other special enactments. Regardless, for concluding there are fair reasons to believe in a prima facie true claim against an accused, this standard of satisfaction is lighter than for considering discharge applications or framing charges concerning crimes under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision, stating that the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case against the appellant for the alleged offenses. The court found that the seized funds from the appellant’s residence did not constitute terror financing, and there was no evidence of the appellant receiving illicit funds. Therefore, the appellant was granted bail, and the findings should not influence the trial court’s proceedings.

REFERENCES

1. https://www.supremecourtcases.com/sudesh-kedia-v-union-of-india/
2. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/78195091/
3. https://www.lawinsider.in/news/sc-grants-bail-to-uapa-accused-says-payment-of-extortion-money-does-not-amount-to-terror-funding

This Article is written by Aditya Kumar student of Graphic Era Hill University, Dehradun Uttarakhand (GEHU); Intern at Legal Vidhiya.

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