State of Rajasthan Vs. G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544

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Citation	AIR 1959 SC 544
Date of Judgement	16 December 1958
Court	Supreme Court of India
Appellant	The State of Rajasthan
Respondent	Shri G. Chawla and Dr. Pohumal
Bench	Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Das, S.K., Gajendragadkar, P.B., Wanchoo, K.N., Hidayatullah, M.
Referred	Sec 432 of CrPC and Article. 132 (the Constitution of India)

ABSTRACT –

The Ajmer Legislative Assembly passed the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act in 1952. According to Section 21 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951, the Ajmer Legislative Assembly was given the authority to pass laws for the whole or any portion of the State with regard to any of the issues listed in the State List or in the Concurrent List. The respondents were charged with violating the terms of the permit issued for the use of sound amplifiers under Section 3 of the Act.

The judicial commissioner of Ajmer ruled on a reference made according to Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the Act fell under Entry No. 31 of the Union List and not Entry No. 6 of the State List as stated by the State, and as a result, it violated the authority of the State Legislature.

Consequently, the Act was largely within the authority granted by Entry No. 6 and possibly Entry No. 1 of the State List and did not fall within Entry No. 31 of the Union List, even though the amplifier, the use of which is regulated and controlled, is an apparatus for broadcasting or communication. It was held that the impugned Act’s core purpose was to control the use of amplifiers in the interests of health as well as tranquilly. The Act therefore violated the State Legislature.

INTRODUCTION –

December 16, 1958. HIDAYATULLAH, J., gave the court’s judgement.The State of Ajmer originally filed this appeal, but once the States were redistributed, the State of Rajasthan has taken its place. It was submitted in opposition to the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer’s judgement, which determined that this Court could hear the appeal in accordance with Article 132 of the Constitution. The Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952 (Ajmer 3 of 1953), often known as the Act, was passed by the Ajmer Legislative Assembly and signed into law by the President on March 9, 1953.

FACTS –

The respondents successfully challenged this Act before the learned Judicial Commissioner, who determined that it exceeded the authority granted to the State Legislature by Section 21 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (49 of 1951), and was consequently beyond the scope of the State Legislature’s authority.

The first respondent was granted a permit to use sound amplifiers on May 15 and 16, 1954, and the respondents (who were not present at the hearing) were charged under Section 3 of the Act for violating those requirements. They were accused of having amplifiers that were calibrated to be audible from more than 30 yards away (condition #1) and that were mounted higher than 6 feet off the ground (condition #2). The Sammelan’s sound amplifiers were being operated by the second respondent at the time of the breach with consent.

On a reference made according to Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer determined that, contrary to the State’s assertion, the essence and content of the Act came within Entry No. 31 of the Union List and not Entry No. 6 of the State List. In accordance with Article 246(4) of the Constitution, Parliament had the authority to enact legislation for any area of Indian territory that was not covered by Parts A or B of the First Schedule, regardless of whether the issue was one that was listed on the State List.

The Government of Part C States Act of 1951, Section 21, established:

Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Legislative Assembly of a State may undertake laws with regard to any of the matters listed in the State List or in the Concurrent List for the whole or any part of the State.
Nothing in subsection (1) shall derogate from the power granted to Parliament by the Constitution to make laws with regard to any matter for a State or any part thereof.

ISSUES –

Whether there was a breach of current legislation by the use of sound amplifiers in the state?

COURT –

In Subramanyam Chettiar v. Muthuswamy Goundan, Gwyer, C. J. made the following ruling:

“It must inevitably occur from time to time that legislation, while ostensibly dealing with a subject in one list, touches also on a subject in another list, and the various provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a significant number of statutes being declared invalid because it may appear that the legislature enacting them legislated in a forbidden sphere.

Therefore, the Judicial Committee has established a regulation whereby the challenged statute is evaluated to determine its “pith and substance,” or its “true nature and character,” in order to discover whether it constitutes legislation with regard to topics in this list or that. The Judicial Committee specifically endorsed and applied this dictum in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee (1) (1878) 3 App. Cas. 889. (2) [1940] F.C.R. 188, 201.v. Bank of Commerce, Ltd., Khulna (1), and this Court has previously expressed the same opinion.It is also widely accepted that the authority to legislate on a subject of legislation also includes the authority to legislate on a related issue that can be seen to be fairly included in the authority granted.

As a result, it becomes important to carefully consider the Act’s provisions and construction. The preamble of the Act states that the control of the use of sound amplifiers is the aim. The title, scope, start date, and interpretation of the Act are all covered in the first section. It doesn’t reveal its meat and potatoes.

The last two sections outline penalties for using sound amplifiers without permission and police officers’ rights to make arrests without a warrant. The second part, which contains the legislation’s core provisions, determines whether they are constitutional or not. That section forbids the use of any sound amplifier in any location, whether public or private, save for those times and locations and subject to those conditions that may be allowed, by order in writing, either generally or in any case or class of cases, by a police officer not below the rank of an inspector. However, it exempts the use of a sound amplifier that is a component part of a wireless apparatus that is duly licenced under any law in effect at the time from the prohibition.The use of an external sound amplifier that is not a part of a wireless equipment, whether in a public setting or elsewhere, without the written consent of the designated authority and in contempt of the usage restrictions is prohibited. It does not forbid the use of a sound amplifier that is a component part of a wireless apparatus in a location other than a public space.

CONCLUSION –

When looking at the Act as a whole, we believe that the legislation’s core falls under the authority of Entry No. 6 and, potentially, Entry No. 1 of the State List. It also does not attempt to encroach on the territory of Entry No. 31, despite the fact that it indirectly refers to a topic covered there. The legislation’s goal and purpose provide the link between it and the State List. The ownership and possession of amplifiers was not subject to any legislation under Entry No. 31 of the Union List, and since there was no mention of repugnance or an occupied area, we have no qualms about concluding that the Act is fully covered by the first cited Entry and potentially the other in the State List.

Respectfully, the Judicial Commissioner’s order must be overturned since it cannot be upheld. We grant the appeal, overturn the judgement, and deem the Act to be wholly outside the purview of the State Legislature in all of its components. We do not order a new trial because the case is over four years old, and we note that the State has stated it would not pursue criminal charges against the respondents as a result of the decision under appeal being reversed. This remark was made in front of us during the hearing. Hence the Appeal is accepted.

In this case, the Apex Court held that “the power to legislate on a topic includes the power to legislate on an ancillary matter which can be said to be reasonably included in the topic”.

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