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MOBARAK ALI VS. STATE OF BOMBAY
Citation1957 AIR 857, 1958 SCR 328
Date of Judgment6 September 1957
CourtSUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
Case TypeINDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
AppellantMobarak Ali Ahmed
RespondentThe State of Bombay
BenchJustice Jagannadhadas, B.; Justice Imam, Syed Jaffer; Justice Menon, P. Govinda
Referred“all persons whether Indian or Foreigner shall be held liable for any offense or whoever commits such offense which is contrary to the Indian Penal Code on the Indian soil shall be punishable under the provisions laid in the Indian Penal Code”.Section 2 ( Indian Penal Code)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The owner of Colonial Limitada, the Export-Import Trader Co. where the complainant-respondent of this case works, was contacted by Jasawalla, an agent of the export-import trader, to import rice because it was in short supply in the Goa region. Later, the complainant was connected to the trader in Karachi, Pakistan, who is the accused-appellant and the only exporter of rice. The agreement to trade rice from Karachi, Pakistan to Goa, India was reached by means of multiple letters and telegrams between the two parties. Under the terms of their agreement, they were to buy 1200 tons of rice for 51 pounds a ton and give the appellant-accused a 25% advance payment. In order to trade and make payments, the appellant and respondent exchanged a number of letters and telegrams. Sadly, the appellant misrepresented the situation and used deceit to persuade the complaint to pay the greater sum even though the consignment was still insufficient to do the work. Under such an impression, the respondent/complainant paid the total amount of Rs. 8,1000, Rs. 2,30,000, and Rs. 2,36,900, respectively, but the appellant did not initialize the shipping consignment. The appellant made comments regarding the disclosure of the letter of credit, the non-acceptance of money by a guaranteeing bank of Pakistan, and other issues on several occasions. The unethical actions of the Appellant alarmed the Complainant, who expressed worries in one of the letters and requested that the Appellant initialize the shipping consignment as soon as possible and reimburse the paid advanced if the Complainant failed to comply. The complaint and the appellant terminated their contract after the complainant waited for months to receive the consignment and none of them received a response from the other.

ISSUES:

1. Is it possible for a foreign nationalist to be prosecuted or punished under the Indian Penal Code for any crimes he may have committed in India?

2. Can a foreign nationalist who is brought up through the extradition process be tried for a different claimed offense if there is a trial ongoing for that foreign nationalist?

3. The applicability of letters sent and received as a means of communication when conducting business.

4. Given that there are three more co-accused(s) who were present at the scene of the alleged offense, can sections 420 and 34 of the IPC constitute a credible charge against the appellant?

ARGUMENTS:

First, the appellant-accused in the aforementioned instance, Mubarak Ali Ahmed, is a Pakistani nationalist who lives in Karachi and, as a result, never entered India during the time of commission and so did not commit any crime, according to the learned counsel representing the appellant. Secondly, the L.C. contended and cited Section 3(2) of the English Extradition Act, 1870, which states that a criminal who is on the run and has been apprehended under this act for a specific offense ought not to face trial for that offense until and unless he has been granted the chance to return. Thirdly, irrelevant alleged facts are contained in the evidence, including letters and telegrams, that were presented in trial court. Finally, since there were three accused parties jointly alleged in this case, and the appellant was in Karachi, Pakistan, at the time of the offense and not in Bombay, India, the charge of section 420, which denotes cheating and 34 common intention, does not fit to be framed against the appellant. Instead, the appellant relied on the aphorism mentioned in Shreekanitah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay.

JUDGEMENT:

  1. On the first issue, the apex court noted that the appellant’s L.C. had only argued that the appellant should have been present when the offense was committed and that his absence would bar him from trial under the IPC. In response, the court declared that the appellant’s physical presence does not invalidate or prevent him from being tried in a criminal proceeding. Section 2 of the Indian Penal Code states that anyone who violates its provisions, whether they are Indian or not, will be held accountable. This case falls under the purview of Sections 3 and 4, which deal with extraterritorial jurisdiction and extension, respectively.
  2. In order to prove the second point, the highest court determined that the appellant was turned over in accordance with the Fugitive Offenders Act, which does not contain any comparable provisions and supports the idea that new trials should be held to establish the legality of an offense. It cited a number of cases to support this conclusion, including Prabhu v. Emperor, Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The King, and H.N. Rishbud v. The State of Delhi.
  3. Regarding the third question concerning the reliability of the evidence so produced, consider the following two factors: letters and telegrams.   
  1. Telegrams and letters that the agent or the party filing the complaint received: In this first case, the appellant’s signature is attached to the letters he submitted, confirming the veracity of the evidence. As stated in sections 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act, there is no dispute of such a fact or piece of evidence that qualifies as direct evidence or good evidence.
  2. Letters and telegrams from the agency or the complainant that the appellant received: The letters were presented by the complainant or their representative in their original format, as the court noted. The letters’ authenticity and accuracy were validated and maintained their real hold. In a similar vein, both the complainant and the appellant contributed to the telegrams that were transmitted. The Indian Evidence Act’s section 88’s presumption of validity presented no compelling reason for the court to take it into consideration.
  3. On the fourth issue, the Supreme Court held that the Appellant’s Law Office had used an aphorism in their argument, which the Court deemed inappropriate for this particular case. It is evident from the evidence that the main offense was committed by the appellant, and the conviction under section 420/34 of the IPC supports these findings and can be traced back to the Willie Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh case.

REFERENCES:

  1. Shivam Jaiswal, “Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs State of Bombay, 1957: Foreign Nationals under the Grip of IPC,” Tfipost.Com, December 20, 2022, https://tfipost.com/2022/12/mobarik-ali-ahmed-vs-state-of-bombay-1957-foreign-nationals-under-the-grip-of-ipc/#:~:text=In%20Bombay%2C%20he%20was%20tried,committing%20the%20crime%20within%20India
  2. Nirnesh Rajendra Naidu, “Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. The State of Bombay,” Law Times Journal, October 6, 2020, https://lawtimesjournal.in/mobarik-ali-ahmed-vs-the-state-of-bombay/.

 This Article is written by Anmol Singh of the Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia, Intern at Legal Vidhiya.


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