CASE ANALYSIS – STATE OF GOVERNMENT V/S RANGASWAMY 1952

CITATION	1952CRILJ1191, AIR 1952 NAGPUR 268
DATE	SEPTEMBER 26, 1952
COURT NAME	HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
PLANTIFF/ PETITIONER	STATE GOVERNMENT
DEFENDANT /RESPONDENT	RANGASWAMY
JUDGES	NOT MENTIONED

INTRODUCTION

The case of State Government vs. Rangaswamy (1952) is a significant one in the context of Indian constitutional law. It revolved around the question of whether the state government could terminate a government employee without adhering to the procedural protections outlined in the Constitution. The focus was on the interpretation of the clauses pertaining to public service and safeguarding government employees against arbitrary termination, as per Article 311 of the Indian Constitution. The ruling highlighted the necessity of due process in disciplinary proceedings involving public servants and reinforced that such actions must align with constitutional protections to ensure fairness and justice. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case of State Government vs. Rangaswamy (1952) pertains to the termination of a government employee, Rangaswamy, and the legal concern regarding whether this dismissal breached the constitutional protections outlined in Article 311 of the Indian Constitution. Here are the main facts of the case:

In this case the accused claimed he spotted a hyena from a distance of 152 feet and fired in that direction. However, it was later discovered that he had actually shot a person. He argued that due to the rain, he genuinely believed it was a hyena and that he fired the shot to protect those nearby. The court concluded that he was entitled to the protection offered under section 80, as there were no reasonable expectations of anyone else being present in the vicinity where the shot was discharged, which led to the death of an individual.

Rangaswamy served as a government employee under the State Government. As part of his responsibilities, he was required to maintain certain standards of conduct and discipline as expected from someone in public service. The State Government chose to terminate Rangaswamy from his role due to alleged misconduct. However, this dismissal was executed without adhering to the procedural protections mandated by the Indian Constitution for the dismissal of government workers.

ISSUES

Whether Rangaswami’s actions constituted criminal negligence under Section 304A IPC, warranting his conviction for causing death by an act of negligence.

Whether the sentence imposed under Section 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act should be enhanced based on the circumstances of the case.

JUDGEMENT

The individual in question, Rangaswami. J.C.O. from the Ammunition Depot in Amla, was charged under Section 304 A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act. He was acquitted of the first charge by the First class Magistrate in Betul, but found guilty and fined Rs. 20/- for the violation of Section 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act. The Madhya Pradesh State Government has since appealed against his acquittal and has also submitted a request for a harsher penalty under the Indian Arms Act.

2. On the morning of July 9, 1950, while the respondent Jemadar Menon (D.W. 1), Subedar Chaitnath, Subedar Thadius, and J.S.O. Verma were engaged in a card game at J.S.O.’s quarter No. 11, the respondent stepped outside to relieve himself. Upon returning shortly after, he mentioned that the hyena which had been spotted nearby the previous day had returned; he pointed out a moving figure near a tree approximately 200 feet away. They all assumed it was either a tiger or a hyena, prompting Jemadar Menon to alert the Ordance Officers Gulabsingh and Gurumukhsingh about the supposed tiger near the J.C.O.’s quarters.

3. The Ordnance Officers took their guns and, due to Gulabsingh’s lack of experience as a hunter, he handed over his loaded 12 bore gun to the respondent. The respondent approached the object from one side, while Gurumukh Singh and Chaitnath came at it from the opposite direction. Shortly thereafter, the respondent fired at the object from 158 feet away, which was followed by a horrifying cry of a human in distress. When the respondent and the others rushed over, they discovered a man lying on the ground in serious condition; Major M.T. Chati, the Station Commander, arrived and confirmed the man was dead. He subsequently sent the report to the police station, where it was received by K.K. Baxi, the station officer.

4. After the identification of the body as Kachrya and the inquest was completed, the corpse was transferred to Betul, where Shri S.S. Soni, an Assistant Medical Officer, conducted the autopsy. He determined that Kachrya had been shot through the right side of the chest, three inches below the armpit, with a bullet from the 12 bore gun that the police had collected, with the bullet exiting between the 9th and 10th ribs on the left side of his back.

5. The location of the shooting was part of a designated area that was auctioned once a year for grass cutting and removal, but Kachrya’s contract with the Garrison Engineer in Amla had expired on May 31, 1950. Shri H.G. Raghavachury confirmed that from June 1, 1950, Kachrya or anyone else was not authorized to cut or remove grass from that area until the following auction in July 1950, which was after the shooting incident. Shridhar, Kachrya’s partner in the grass cutting, acknowledged that their contract had concluded prior to Kachrya’s death. He also confirmed that entry to the area was prohibited without a pass, and that the passes issued to Kachrya and himself had been returned upon the termination of their contract.

6. During the examination, the respondent acknowledged that he fired at the object with Gulabsingh’s gun because he believed it was the same hyena that had been spotted near his quarters the previous day. He also mentioned that it was raining at the time of the shooting and argued that he did not expect anyone to be present in that location, claiming that the object he aimed at had a brown cover; in essence, he contended that Kachrya’s death resulted from an accident.

 7. The prosecutorial evidence, which included testimony from station officer K.K. Baxi, indicated that light rain was occurring at the relevant time, the sky was cloudy, there was no sunlight, and visibility was limited. Bushes surrounded the area where Kachrya was shot, and he was wearing a gunny bag at the time. In fact, the gunny bag, discovered beneath the body, was stained with blood and bore a tear that suggested the bullet had passed through it. A hyena had been seen wandering in the area the day before; that morning, when the respondent informed his companions that it had reappeared, they looked at the object in question and believed it to be a wild animal.

8. Jemadar Menon (D.W. 1) and Subedar Chaitnath even thought it was a tiger; the former reported this to Ordnance Officer Gurumukhsingh. Moreover, it is evident from Special Officer H.S. Verma testimony that he shared the belief of the respondent, Jemadar Menon, and Subedar Chaitnath, as demonstrated in the following excerpt: “Upon observing the object, I did not perceive it to be a human being. It appeared that some brown-colored animal was moving. Based on its movements, I suspected it might be a wild animal. All other members of the party present also saw it.” Four officers, all with presumably above-average vision, believed the object to be a wild animal, yet they still did not fire a shot at that time. In fact, the respondent and Subedar Chaitnath left the quarters to verify their assumption and upon returning, they informed Special Officer H.S. Verma and others that the object in question was indeed a wild animal. At that point, everyone was convinced that it was not a human being, and they were so concerned that they sent Jemadar Menon to the bungalows of the Ordnance Officers to retrieve their guns for the purpose of shooting the wild animal.

9. Additionally, the area where the incident occurred was not one where the respondent could have reasonably expected to encounter a human being. The contract between Kachrya and his colleagues for cutting and removing grass had, as previously mentioned, ended on May 31, 1950, with the subsequent auction taking place after the event. The passes issued during the contract’s duration had been returned once it was terminated. Since the incident happened in a zone that required passes, Kachrya did not have the right to be there or to graze his animals at that time. However, testimony from Shridhar indicated that despite this, their cattle were grazing in the military area; indeed, Shri S.G. Raghavachury stated that such grazing was forbidden at all times.

10. In the famous case of Empress of India v. Idu Beg 3, Straight, J. distinguished between criminal rashness and criminal negligence as follows…criminal rashness involves engaging in a dangerous or reckless act while being aware that it is so and that it may lead to injury, without intending to cause harm or knowing that it is likely to occur. The wrongdoing consists of taking the risk of performing such an act with carelessness or indifference to the potential consequences. Criminal negligence is the significant and blameworthy failure to provide reasonable and proper care and precaution to prevent harm to the public at large or an individual specifically, which, in light of all circumstances related to the charge, was an essential duty that the accused should have fulfilled.

11. Holloway J. in Reg. v. Nidamarti 7 Mad HCR 119 stated that Culpable rashness means acting with awareness that harmful and illegal outcomes may ensue but with the hope they will not, often accompanied by the belief that sufficient precautions have been taken to avert those outcomes. The blame arises from acting despite this awareness. On the other hand, culpable negligence entails acting without awareness that adverse and illegal effects will follow, yet in situations that reveal a failure to exercise the necessary caution, implying that had caution been observed, awareness would have existed. The blame arises from neglecting the civic duty of being circumspect.

REASONING

The court determined that the actions of the accused were unintentional and that he had implemented appropriate safety measures given the situation. The court highlighted that the accused genuinely believed it to be a hyena and acted in self-defence to safeguard himself and others.

CONCLUSION

It was believed that there is no justification for increasing the penalty given under Section 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act. The respondent had a technical responsibility under that section, but nothing beyond that; all he did was borrow a gun for a short period to kill what he believed to be a wild animal that posed a threat to him and his companions. The request to increase the sentence is therefore denied. The criteria we agree upon are respectful, and applying them to the current case leads us to the conclusion that the respondent was justly acquitted of the offense under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code. The facts mentioned clearly indicate that the level of care and caution exercised by him was what a reasonable and prudent individual would deem sufficient given all the circumstances involved. The entire incident was simply an accident, and he was safeguarded by the provisions of Section 80 of the Indian Penal Code. The use of an unlicensed firearm does not negate his entitlement to that protection; in the case of King Emperor v. Timmappa, a Division Bench determined that using an unlicensed gun does not prevent a defendant from seeking immunity under that section of the Indian Penal Code. Consequently, the appeal against the acquittal was dismissed, and the trial Magistrate’s ruling is affirmed.

REFRENCES

• https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1128871/ (last visited 12 March 2025)
• https://www.thelextimes.com/understanding-the-concept-of-accident-under-section-80-ipc/ (last visited March 12 2025)
• https://lawfyi.io/tag/the-state-government-vs-rangaswami/ ( last visited March 10 )
• Holloway J. in Reg. v. Nidamarti 7 Mad HCR 11
• Empress of India v. Idu Beg 3, Straight, J.

This article is written by Nidhi Mishra student of CMP Degree College Allahabad University Intern at Legal vidhiya.

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