Balmukand v. Kamla Wati, AIR 1964 SC 1385

ABSTRACT – 

The appellant and the karta entered into a contract for the sale of property owned by a single Hindu family.This property was a small portion of a big piece of land that belonged to the family. The karta received an earnest money payment.Due to the sale deed not being executed by the karta, the appellant filed a lawsuit for particular performance. The other members of the karta, who are brothers, and who were of legal age to enter into the contract were also named as defendants in the lawsuit.

The lawsuit was opposed on the grounds that there was no legal justification for it and that the contract for the sale was not in the family’s best interests. Both the trial court and the High Court supported these claims.

It was argued before this court that even though there was no legal requirement, the transaction was for the family’s interest, and the karta as a cautious owner was allowed to enter into it for the family’s benefit.

The plaintiff has petitioned this Court using a certificate issued by the High Court under Article 133 of the Constitution after being outraged by the dismissal of his claim for specific performance.

FACTS – 

1. The plaintiff had 79/120th of the shares in the Kasra Nos. 494, 495, 496, 497, 1800/501, 1801/501, and 529, which were located in Batala’s Mauza Faizpur and were listed in the zamabandi of 1943–1943. He acquired the 23/120th piece of this land, which belonged to one Devisahai, on October 1, 1943. As a result, he acquired the 17/20th part of this land. 
2. The remaining 3/20th of the stake is owned by the joint Hindu family, of which Pindidas served as manager and whose members included his brother Haveliram Khemchand and Satyapal. The plaintiff claims that he bought the land from Devisahai for Rs. 175 per marla. The plaintiff wanted to buy the joint family of Pindidas and his brothers’ 3/20th share in order to increase the size of his property.
3. So, he (Plaintiff) approached Pindidas about it, and he agreed to sell the family a 3/20th part of the company for 250 rupees per marla.On October 1, 1945, Pindidas and (Plaintiff) signed a contract pertaining to this, and we gave him Rs. 100 as earnest money. 
4. All defendants resisted the lawsuit. On October 1, 1945, Pindidas and the plaintiff entered into a contract for the sale of some land, and Pindidas acknowledged receiving Rs. 100 as earnest money. However, in his opinion, that contract related to another piece of land, not the one that was the subject of the lawsuit.
5. He further argued that he lacked the authority to sign a contract on his brothers’ behalf, who are now respondents 13 to 15 in our case and defendants 2 to 4 in the lawsuit. The defendants 2 through 4 argued that even if Pindidas was established to be the karta of the joint family and had agreed to sell the land in question, the transaction was not legally binding on them because it was neither necessary nor for the benefit of the family. 

ISSUES – 

1. Is it correct that the particular performance lawsuit was dismissed by the High Court and the trial court?
2. Whether the karta is authorized to enter into such transactions?

JUDGEMENT –

The erudite Chief Justice stated: “The transaction entered into by a manager should not be of a speculative nature.”

“In exceptional circumstances, however, the court will uphold the alienation of a part of the joint family property by a karta for the acquisition of new property, as, for example, where all of the adult members of the joint family with the knowledge available to them and possessing all necessary information about the means and requirements of the family are convinced that the proposed purchase of the new property is for the benefit of the estate.”

The following case is Sital Prasad Singh v. Ajablal Mander, in which one of the issues that needed to be addressed was the manager’s authority to sell a portion of the joint family property in order to buy new property. It was determined in that case that the same standard applied to the transaction made by the manager of a joint Hindu family, namely whether the transaction was one that a prudent owner would make on a daily basis (1) I.L.R. 18 Pat. 306.

The learned Judges further ruled, in accordance with the stance adopted in the Allahabad case, that the phrase “benefit of the estate” has a broader meaning than only compelling necessity and is not restricted to transactions of a merely defensive nature.

CONCLUSION – 

In these circumstances we must hold that the courts below were right in dismissing the suit for specific performance. We may add that granting specific performance is always in the discretion of the court and in our view in a case of this kind the court would be exercising its discretion. right by refusing specific performance.

Without a doubt, Pindidas himself was obligated by the agreement he made, and the plaintiff would have qualified for relief under Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as follows:

“A party to a contract is not entitled to seek a decree for particular performance when he is unable to complete the entirety of his part of the contract and the part that must be left unperformed is a sizable amount of the whole or does not permit reimbursement in money. However, the court may, at the request of the other party, order the defaulting party to perform specifically as much of his part of the contract as he is able to do, under the condition that the plaintiff waives all claims to further performance and all rights to compensation for the shortfall or for any losses or damages he suffers as a result of the defendant’s default.

However, there is no assertion made by the plaintiff in the case at hand that he is prepared to pay the whole amount necessary to secure a judgement only against Pindidas’ interest in the property. As a result, the appeal is rejected and costs are assessed. Appeal is denied.

Written by Shashank Sandesh Verma an intern under legal vidhiya.

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