B.S. MURTHY & Ors. Vs. A. RAVINDER SINGH & Ors.

INTRODUCTION

The case of R. Jankiammal vs S.K. Kumaraswamy (D) Thr. Lrs. involves a legal dispute that was presented before the Supreme Court of India, dealing with issues of property rights and inheritance. The parties in this case are R. Jankiammal (the appellant) and the legal representatives of S.K. Kumaraswamy (the deceased respondent). The central question in this litigation revolves around the validity and enforcement of property claims, with the appellant challenging the decisions made in lower courts regarding the ownership and distribution of certain assets. The case delves into the application of inheritance laws, property rights, and the interpretation of legal provisions pertinent to the distribution of property upon the death of an individual. The Supreme Court’s judgment in this case aims to clarify the legal standing of the parties involved and provide a resolution to the longstanding dispute.

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. In O.S. No. 37 of 1984, an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 was filed on 06.08.1984, signed by both the plaintiff and defendants. The application listed properties from Schedule ‘A’ to Schedule ‘J’ and allocated them to various family members. The Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore passed an order on 06.08.1984 to prepare a decree based on the compromise petition.He was promoted over the years, reaching the position of Assistant Superintendent of Posts in 2008, which is a Group-B Gazetted cadre post.
2. The plaintiff presented five witnesses, with Somasundaram as PW.1, and filed Exhibits A-1 to A-55. The defendants presented four witnesses, including Janakiammal as DW.2 and S.K. Kumarasamy as DW.1, with Exhibits B-1 to B-104 marked for the defendants and Exhibits X-1 to X-27 marked through witnesses.
3. Janakiammal claimed that the properties she inherited from her late husband Rangasamy and those purchased after his death were unfairly allocated to D-1 and D-4’s branches without giving her any land. The shares were also allotted to D-2 and D-5, who had no pre-existing rights. Janakiammal and her son Somasundaram received only shares of the Vasudeva mills, a sick company, while the consent decree showed no representation for D-8 due to the absence of a Vakalatnama.
4. Defendant No.1 alleged that an agreement on 08.03.1981 required the plaintiff to pay Rs. Seven Lakhs to D-4 and D-1 to pay Rs. Four Lakhs to D-4, but these claims were disputed as imaginary stories. The Tatabad house purchased in 1978 with joint family funds was excluded from O.S. No. 37 of 1984, and Janakiammal’s insurance money was given to Defendant No.1 for business purposes. The High Court did not consider Janakiammal’s plea properly.
5. It was argued that the compromise decree was unfair and obtained through fraud. The bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A does not apply when fraud is involved. The suit O.S. No. 37 of 1984 was based on an illusory cause of action. The Tatabad house, not included in the 1984 suit but in Suit No. 1101 of 1987, made the latter suit for a share in the Tatabad house maintainable. The plaintiff, a Textile Engineering graduate, claimed Vasudeva Industries was not a family concern and never a profit-making venture.
6. The house at Tatabad, included as Item No.10 in Schedule C in Suit No. 1101 of 1987, was purchased using funds from Swamy and Swamy Plantations, a family business. The branches of Rangasamy in the company had over one-third shares, entitling all branches to shares in the Tatabad house. The exclusion of the Tatabad house in Suit No. 37 of 1984 rendered the suit for its partition in Suit No. 1101 of 1987 fully maintainable. Both lower courts erred by not granting the plaintiff a share in this house.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the compromise decree passed on 06.08.1984 in O.S. No. 37 of 1984, which allocated various properties to different family members, was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, particularly considering the lack of representation for D-8 and the alleged absence of a Vakalatnama.
2. The fairness of the property allocation in the compromise decree, particularly whether Janakiammal and her son Somasundaram were unjustly deprived of immovable property, and if the shares were unfairly allocated to D-2 and D-5, who had no pre-existing rights.
3. Whether Suit No. 1101 of 1987, filed for a share in the Tatabad house purchased in 1978 with joint family funds and excluded from O.S. No. 37 of 1984, was maintainable, given the alleged illusory cause of action in the earlier suit and the specific provisions under Order XXIII Rule 3A.
4. Whether Suit No. 1101 of 1987, filed for a share in the Tatabad house purchased in 1978 with joint family funds and excluded from O.S. No. 37 of 1984, was maintainable, given the alleged illusory cause of action in the earlier suit and the specific provisions under Order XXIII Rule 3A.

CONTENTIONS OF APPEALING

1. On 19.01.1984, C. Senthil Kumaravel, defendant No.6, filed O.S. No.37 of 1984 seeking partition and the allocation of 1/6th share, claiming joint family status among the plaintiff and defendants Nos.1, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 10. Janakiammal was impleaded as defendant No.8.
2. The High Court upheld the compromise decree dated 06.08.1984, ruling it valid and finding no evidence of fraud. It rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the decree was signed under misrepresentation regarding personal guarantees for loans.
3. The appellant likely asserted that the circular’s stipulations regarding CVO involvement applied primarily to Group ‘A’ officers and that the respondent, being a Group-B officer, was not strictly bound by these procedural requirements.
4. The house at Tatabad, purchased with joint family funds and included in the subsequent Suit No.1101 of 1987, was not listed in O.S. No.37 of 1984. This exclusion was significant because the property was acquired from family funds, warranting a share for all branches.
5. The plaintiff’s counsel argued that the compromise decree deprived the plaintiff of valuable properties, providing only worthless shares, and the subsequent suit aimed to declare the decree void due to alleged fraud and misrepresentation.

CONTENTIONS OF REPONDENT

1. On 06.08.1984, the plaintiff was taken to court by D-1 and asked to sign the compromise application. D-1 assured the plaintiff that since the plaintiff and D-10 had given personal guarantees for a loan from Punjab National Bank for Vasudeva Textiles Mills, their names should not appear on any immovable property to protect the family assets. D-1 assured the plaintiff that his rights to the property would not be affected by the compromise decree and that the decree would not be enforced.
2. Shri Nagamuthu, senior counsel for defendant No.11, supported the judgments of the lower courts. He stated that starting in 1989, shares of the mill were sold, with defendant No.1 purchasing them. The compromise decree dated 06.08.1984 was implemented, and by 1994, all shares of the mill had been transferred, with defendant No.11 and other defendants being transferees of these shares.
3. Notably, none of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. The second defendant filed an appeal on 27.08.2001 shortly after the decree but did not pursue the application before the court that issued the consent decree. This appeal was deemed non-maintainable due to the explicit prohibition in Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
4. Shri Nagamuthu emphasized that the compromise decree was acted upon, evidenced by the sale and transfer of mill shares, reflecting the finality and implementation of the decree among the involved parties.

JUDGEMENT 

1. The pleadings regarding the plaintiff’s and defendant No.1’s claims over the house property in question are reflected in Original Suit (O.S.) No. 1101 of 1987.
2. The concept of reunification is described, where separated family members, through affection, live together again and are termed reunited.  When two coparceners reunite through affection, they share in each other’s properties mutually.
3. It is concluded that the three branches (K. Rangasamy branch, S.K. Kumarasamy branch, and S.K. Chinnasamy branch) have an equal share in the Tatabad residential property (Item No.X of Schedule ‘B’ in O.S. No. 1101 of 1987).
4. It is declared that the plaintiff (defendant No.7), defendant No.1, and defendant No.4 are each entitled to a 1/3rd share in the Tatabad property.

ANALYSIS

1. Order XXIII Rule 3 allows for the compromise of a suit. A 1976 amendment added a proviso and an explanation to the rule.The rule states that if a suit is adjusted by a lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties, the court shall record the agreement and pass a decree accordingly. The proviso states that if there is a dispute about whether an adjustment or satisfaction has been reached, the court must decide the question. No adjournments are granted for this unless the court records the reasons for the adjournment.
2. Rule 3A was added by the 1976 amendment, which bars any suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.
3. The legislative policy aims to provide a mechanism for dispute resolution to restore peace in society and bring finality to litigation, while also providing higher forums for appeal/revision. Rule 3A reinforces this policy by barring suits to set aside a decree based on an allegedly unlawful compromise, ensuring disputes end without further litigation
4. Rule 3 emphasizes that only lawful agreements or compromises can be recorded by courts. Agreements void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act are not lawful.Sections 10, 13, and 14 of the Indian Contract Act define free consent and the conditions under which it is not free, such as coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. Section 19 states that agreements made without free consent are voidable at the option of the aggrieved party.

CONCLUSION

The case revolves around the validity of a compromise decree dated 06.08.1984, which is challenged on grounds of alleged fraud and misrepresentation. The core issue is whether the compromise, which led to the decree, was lawful as per the Indian Contract Act and Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court concluded that the compromise decree is binding, as the grounds for challenging its lawfulness were not sufficiently proven. Additionally, the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII prevents setting aside the decree based on these allegations. Consequently, the court upheld the compromise while granting a preliminary decree for the partition of a specific property not included in the original compromise. This decision aims to resolve the long-standing family dispute, emphasizing finality in litigation and adherence to lawful agreements.

REFERENCES

1. SCC
2. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/8344139/
3. https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/r-janakiammal-vs-sk-kumarasamy-ll-2021-sc-280-395841.pdf

This Article is written by ASTHA SINGH student of USLLS (GGSIPU) ; Intern at Legal Vidhiya.

Disclaimer: The materials provided herein are intended solely for informational purposes. Accessing or using the site or the materials does not establish an attorney-client relationship. The information presented on this site is not to be construed as legal or professional advice, and it should not be relied upon for such purposes or used as a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney in your state. Additionally, the viewpoint presented by the author is of a personal nature.

Admin