
CITATION | 2022 SC 284 |
DATE OF JUDGEMENT | 15 MARCH, 2022 |
COURT | SUPREME COURT OF INDIA |
APPELLANT | ABHAY JAIN |
RESPONDENT | THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN |
BENCH | JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT & JUSTICE VINEET SARAN |
INTRODUCTION
This case is an overview of the fact that a Judicial Officer cannot be prosecuted merely for negligence. If he does not have corrupt intention, then mere negligence shall not be counted as a part of negligence. Abhay Jain who was a judicial officer in the year 2013 had been discharged from his service in the year of 2016. This occurred when a complaint had been passed against him that he had passed an order of bail with some malicious and ulterior motives but it was stated by him that it was mere negligence on his part and that there was no extraneous consideration on his part.
FACTS OF THE CASE
In 2013, Mr. Abhay Jain, the appellant, began serving as a judicial officer. After passing the 2013 District Judge Examination, he was named a District Judge in 2013.
At first, he was placed on a two-year probationary term. He was then designated as BHARATPUR’s Additional District & Sessions Judge No. 2. He was then named Sessions Judge of the BHARATPUR Anti-Corruption Department and Presiding Officer of a Labor Tribunal. The incident in question occurred in the Anti-Corruption Department during his tenure as a session judge.
Three people were arrested in a bribery case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:
K. K. Jalia, the Municipal Corporation Chairman, who was accused of accepting a bribe of Rs. 5 lakhs; Alimuddin, the Chairman of the Municipal Corporation, who was accused of accepting a bribe of Rs. 10 lakhs; and Irfan, a non-official who was also allegedly involved in the case. On March 2, 2015, the appellant’s predecessor denied the bail of both Alimuddin and K. K. Jalia. On February 23, 2015, a charge sheet was filed against each of the three accused. On April 27, 2015, K. K. Jalia requested bail for the second time in the appellants’ court, and he was granted it.
On April 27, 2015, the appellant was requested by the High Court to provide feedback regarding the bail decision of K. K. Jalia, a co-accused. Even though the High Court had rejected the bail, the appellant had nonetheless granted it. The appellant gave his reasons as follows: he felt that there must have been a change in circumstances because the High court’s order was not presented to him. The appellant further claimed that the High Court had granted bail to the two other co-accused, to whom he had denied it.
The Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court directed a departmental investigation after taking the explanation into consideration. The investigation against the appellant was then concluded on May 2, 2016. The department did, however, retain the authority to reopen the same. The appellant’s disciplinary proceedings were closed by the High Court on May 5, 2016. Angry over the 27.01.2016 order, the appellant on May 18, 2016, filed a Writ Petition with the Rajasthan High Court.
The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the appellant’s Writ Petition against the order dated 27.01.2016 with an order dated 21.10.2019. The appellant, who was offended by the aforementioned High Court Order dated October 21, 2019, filed this appeal through a Special Leave Petition.
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether there was misconduct on part of the judicial officer?
- Whether the judicial officer was liable for negligence or malicious intentions and it was lawful to discharge him from his office?
CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT
- The appellant’s learned senior counsel, Mr. P.S. PATWALIA, has argued that the investigation against the appellant that was started with a memo dated August 7, 2015, serves as the basis for the contested discharge order of the High Court rather than the appellant’s “unsatisfactory performance,” as required by Rules 45 and 46 of the RJS Rules. Consequently, it has been argued that the termination/discharge order is punitive in nature and violates Article 311(2) of the Indian Constitution. The learned Senior Counsel emphasized remarks and observations from the appellant’s Annual Confidential Reports (abbreviated “ACR”) to support the aforementioned submission.
- Additionally, the learned Senior Counsel has argued that there was no legitimate complaint filed against the appellant. Regarding the three complaints that the respondent has cited, it is important to remember that: (1) the appellant was never informed of these complaints during his employment; (2) even after the first two complaints, dated 07.02.2014 and 21.04.2014, the appellant was promoted to the next higher position as District Judge in the Labor Court; and (3) two of the three complaints pertain to 2014 and were filed and closed before the Higher Judicial Committee meeting, so they could not have served as the foundation for the Higher Judicial Committee’s decision.
- Furthermore, Mr. PATWALIA has stated that the entire recommendation of the Higher Judicial Committee is predicated on the issuance of the bail order dated April 27, 2015, and that no defect was discovered in the appellant’s record. The appellant’s disciplinary inquiry judge was a member of the Higher Judicial Committee, which was tasked with making recommendations regarding the dismissal or confirmation of judges. This was another point brought up by the learned counsel. In addition, it has been argued that the High Court should have given some justification for its statement that the termination order was not based on the charge of misconduct relating to the bail order in the contested order.
CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT
- While it is true that the appellant was the subject of disciplinary proceedings regarding the bail order dated April 27, 2015, the learned senior counsel representing the respondent has argued that the proceedings were closed on May 5, 2016, with the option to reopen them. Only a discharge simpliciter order was approved in the interim. It has been argued that this Court has held in the past that an employer may lawfully issue a simple termination order without it being considered a punitive termination, even in cases where a departmental inquiry has been initiated.
- The learned Senior Counsel was also satisfied that the appellant’s reliance on the court’s ruling in Pradip Kumar (above) is misplaced because the court determined in that case that the discharge therein violated the guidelines established by the relevant statute. Furthermore, it was argued that, in that instance, the Court was not presented with any evidence indicating that the officer was not otherwise qualified to continue.
- The fact that this Court ruled that an employer has the right to declare that he would not continue to employ a worker who is the target of accusations that the employer has no interest in investigating was also a source of satisfaction.
In Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State AGRO Industries Corporation Ltd. [(1999) 2 SCC 21], this court’s ruling was cited. It was decided that:
Even in the event that a charge-memo is issued, a reply is obtained, and an enquiry officer is appointed in the course of a routine departmental inquiry.
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court stated that a judicial officer cannot be subject to disciplinary action just because he issued an incorrect order. The Bench made it clear that incompetence alone does not qualify as misconduct. The Bench cited the ruling in Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India [(2013) 9 SCC 566] and noted that the ACRs had not been sent to the Judicial Officer in a timely manner. The Court stated that a Judicial Officer must be informed of each ACR entry within a reasonable amount of time. The Court also noted that a judge may make mistakes early in his career that he would be less likely to make as he gets more experience. In these situations, it’s important to consider whether the officer intended to commit any corruption. The appellant’s termination was mentioned by the court as a form of discipline. Even though the Officer might have been careless, the Court noted that this would not qualify as misconduct. One cannot classify simple carelessness as misconduct. Finally, the Bench pointed out that nothing in the record indicated the appellant was at fault for subpar performance as required by Rules 45 and 46 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.The appellant was entitled to the protections outlined in Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the court noted. Additionally, there had been no credible complaint made against the appellant.
ANALYSIS
A judicial officer cannot be subject to disciplinary action just because he issued an incorrect order, according to the Supreme Court. The Bench ruled unequivocally that carelessness alone does not qualify as misconduct. The Bench made note of the fact that the ACRs had not reached the Judicial Officer in a timely manner and cited the ruling in Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India [(2013) 9 SCC 566]. The Court ruled that a Judicial Officer must be informed of each ACR entry in a timely manner. The Court also noted that during the early years of their employment, judges might make certain mistakes; however, these mistakes would lessen with experience. If the Officer had any corrupt intentions, that is what should be noted in these kinds of situations. The appeal was dismissed as a form of discipline, the court noted. The Officer may have been careless, but that carelessness does not equal misconduct, the Court noted. Something is not wrong when it’s just carelessness. Last but not least, the Bench observed that nothing in the file indicated the appellant was subject to unsatisfactory performance as required by Rules 45 and 46 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.As per Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the appellant was entitled to the protection that the court noted. The appellant had also not been the target of any credible complaints.
CONCLUSION
As a result, the Court reversed the High Court’s decision and ordered the appellant to be reinstated. The Supreme Court rendered an important and praiseworthy decision. Since judicial officers are also people, mistakes can happen to them. Bringing charges against them for mistakes they made or incorrect decisions they made would have created a very dangerous precedent. In this case, the Supreme Court correctly sided with the Judicial Officer.
REFERENCES
- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/155486886/
- https://www.indianconstitution.in/2022/03/abhay-jain-vs-high-court-of-judicature.html
This Article is written by Druti Dutta, student of Symbiosis Law School, Noida; Intern at Legal Vidhiya.
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