STATE OF KARNATAKA V. KRISHNAPPA (2000)

CITATION	(2000) 4 SCC 75
Date	March 30, 2000
Plaintiff/petitioner/appellant	State of Karnataka
Defendant /Respondent	Krishnappa
Name of Court	Supreme Court of India
Judges	A . A.S., R Lahoti, S Variava & A.S. Anand, C.J

INTRODUCTION

 Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanising act, is an unlawful intrusion of the right to privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity – it degrades and humiliates the victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. It runs foul of the constitutional guarantee to the dignity of the human person. The courts are therefore, expected to deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely.”

The landmark case of State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa,  adjudicated by the Supreme Court of India on March 30, 2000, addresses the critical issue of sentencing in rape cases, particularly involving minors. The case revolves around the appellant, Krishnappa, who was convicted for the heinous crime of raping an eight-year-old girl under Section 376 IPC. 

The Supreme Court in this case dealt with the sentencing of the Respondent, who was convicted of raping an eight year old girl. The trial court had sentenced the Respondent to ten years of rigorous imprisonment after considering the facts of the case, including socio-economic, familial and other conditions attached to the Respondent. However, the High Court of Karnataka reduced this sentence to four years after noting the Respondent’s dependents, alcohol dependence, and socio-economic status. 

The Supreme Court noted the serious nature of the offence, and how severely it impinged on the rights of the victim. The Court further noted the significant impact sexual violence has on a woman, including the dehumanisation it perpetrates and the negative ramifications on a victim’s rights to privacy and dignity. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court’s considerations did not constitute either special or adequate reasons for reducing the sentence as required by Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and restored the sentence imposed by the trial court.

FACT OF THR CASE

The Respondent entered the house of the victim’s family in an intoxicated state, and attempted to rape her mother, who escaped. He then raped the eight year old victim and assaulted her father, who came to find her subsequently. The Respondent was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years by the trial court. On appeal, the Single Judge bench of the High Court of Karnataka refused to interfere. However, the Division Bench of the High Court on a subsequent appeal reduced the sentence to four years of rigorous imprisonment by reiterating the same facts considered by the trial court including the considerations that the accused was an “unsophisticated and illiterate citizen belonging to weaker section of society”, had an old mother, wife and children dependent on him, and was a chronic addict to drinking and that he had raped the victim under intoxication. An appeal before the Supreme Court was filed against the High Court’s order. 

ISSUES 

1. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court had recorded adequate and sufficient reasons to reduce the mandatory sentence of ten years initially awarded to the Respondent under Section 376 of the IPC to four years of rigorous imprisonment.

2. Should the High Court have interfered with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court by reducing the sentence for the offence under Section 376 IPC from 10 years R.I. to 4 years R.I?

JUDGEMENT 

The Court noted the gravity of sexual violence and observed that, “sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act, is an unlawful intrusion of the right to privacy and sanctity of a female.” It further noted that it was important for courts to deal sternly and severely with sexual violence to deter further commission. 

The Court cited the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh ((1996) 2 SCC 384) to highlight that “a rapist not only violates the victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault- it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with 

utmost sensitivity.”

The Court noted that Section 376(2) of the IPC prescribes minimum imprisonment of ten years for the rape of a child under twelve years of age with a proviso vesting discretion in the court to impose a lesser sentence for “adequate and sufficient reasons to be mentioned in the judgment.” The Court held that the legislative mandate was clearly laid out in the provision and observed that determining the question of sentencing in a rape case could not depend upon the victim or the social status of the accused and it could only be influenced by the “conduct of the accused, the state and age of the sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the

criminal act.” criminal act.”  

The Court also cited A.P. vs. Bodem Sundara Rao (1995) 6 SCC 230) to highlight the importance of imposing adequate sentences to prevent injustice to the victim as well as society. The Court held that the trial court had given “sufficient and cogent reasons” for sentencing the accused to ten years of rigorous imprisonment based on his being a married 49 year old man who cruelly victimised an “innocent helpless girl of 7/8 years”. It further held that there was no justification for the High Court to reduce that sentence and that the High Court’s considerations did not constitute either special or adequate reasons for reducing the sentence under section 376(2) of the IPC. The Court held that the High Court’s casual approach evidenced a lack of sensitivity towards the victim and the society and restored the sentence passed by the trial court.

REASONING 

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the provisions of Section 376(2) IPC, which mandates a minimum of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for rape, especially when the victim is a minor under twelve years of age. The High Court’s reduction of the sentence to four years was scrutinized against this statutory framework. The Supreme Court highlighted that while the proviso in Section 376(2) allows for lesser imprisonment under “adequate and special reasons,” such discretion must not undermine the legislative intent behind the stringent punishment for sexual crimes against children.

The High Court’s rationale for reducing the sentence considering the appellant’s age, social status, addiction, and family responsibilities was deemed insufficient and not in alignment with “special and adequate reasons.” The Supreme Court emphasized that sentencing in rape cases must primarily reflect the severity of the offense, the harm inflicted on the victim, and societal condemnation, rather than the perpetrator’s personal circumstances.

The Supreme gave consideration to provisions of Section 376(2) IPC which reads, thus,:  whoever, commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; Shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a terms which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine:

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years.

A perusal of the above provision shows that the legislative mandate is to impose a sentence, for the offence of rape on a girl under 12 years of age, for a term which shall not be less than 10 years, but it may extend to life and also to fine. The proviso to Section 376(2) IPC, of course, lays down that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than 10 years. Thus, the normal sentence in a case where rape is committed on a child below 12 years of age, is not less than 10 years R.I. though in exceptional cases for special and adequate reasons” sentence of less than 10 years R.I. can also be awarded. It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principle matter to which it stands as a proviso particularly in such like penal provisions. The Courts are obliged to respect the legislative mandate in the matter of awarding of sentence in all such cases. Recourse to the proviso can be had only for” special and adequate reasons” and not in a casual manner. Whether there exist any “special and adequate reason” would depend upon a variety of factors and the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be Laid down in that behalf of universal application.

The approach of the High Court in this case, to say the least, was most casual and inappropriate. There are no good reasons given by the High Court to reduce the sentence let alone “special or adequate reasons”. The High Court exhibited lack of sensitivity towards the victim of rape and the society by reducing the substantive sentence in the established facts and circumstances of the case. The Courts are expected to properly operate the sentencing system and to impose such sentence for a proved offence, which may serve as a deterrent for the commissions of like offences by others.

CONCLUSION 

The Supreme Court’s decision in State Of Karnataka v. Krishnappa serves as a pivotal affirmation of the judiciary’s role in upholding the law’s integrity, especially in cases of sexual violence against minors. By rejecting the High Court’s reduction of the sentencing below the statutory minimum, the Supreme Court reinforced the imperative to prioritize victim justice and societal deterrence over the offender’s personal circumstances. This judgment not only strengthens the enforcement of stringent penalties under Section 376 IPC but also underscores the judiciary’s commitment to combating sexual crimes with the seriousness they warrant. For legal practitioners and future litigants, this case exemplifies the paramount importance of adhering to legislative directives in sentencing, ensuring that justice prevails in the face of heinous offenses.

The Supreme Court referenced several key precedents to reinforce its stance on sentencing in rape cases such as is seen in the  State Of A.P v. Bodem Sundara Rao (1995) 6 SCC 230: This case emphasized the societal condemnation of crimes against women, advocating for appropriate punishment to serve as a deterrent. The Court in this case enhanced the sentence from four to seven years to reflect the gravity of sexual violence.

State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384: Highlighted the profound psychological and physical trauma inflicted by rape, underscoring the need for the judiciary to handle such cases with utmost sensitivity and sternness.

These precedents collectively underscore the judiciary’s responsibility to impose stringent penalties in cases of sexual violence, especially against vulnerable victims like minors.

The judgment of the supreme in this case has the lasting impact of reinforcing the sanctity of legislative mandates in sentencing, particularly under stringent laws like Section 376 IPC. By upholding the trial court’s original sentence, the Supreme Court sends a clear message against judicial leniency in sexual violence cases involving minors. It underscores the judiciary’s duty to prioritize the victim’s rights and societal justice over mitigating factors related to the offender’s background. This decision serves as a precedent, guiding lower courts to adhere strictly to statutory punishments unless exceptionally justified by the circumstances.

REFERENCE 

Supreme Court of India: Digital Supreme Court Reports.

https://supremetoday.ai/doc/judgement/00100004418

This article is written by AKOGWU AGADA JOSHUA, student of University of Nigeria Nsukka; an intern under Legal Vidhiya.

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