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Case Analysis of X v. High Court of M.P

Facts

  1. On August 1, 2011, the petitioner was appointed 2nd to 1st Additional District and Sessions in Gwalior by Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Services at District Entry Level.
  2. She was given numerous tasks and assessed C/good in 2013 and B/very excellent in 2014. Justice ‘A’ backed the petitioner after the District and Sessions Judge (“D & SJ”) evaluated him.
  3. Justice “A” sexually assaulted her thereafter. She complained on July 3 and was relocated from Gwalior to Sidhi on July 7. On July 8, 2014, the petitioner received the transfer order.
  4. The petitioner requested an eight-month extension in Gwalior from the MP HC’s then-Registrar General (“RG”) on July 9, 2014, so her daughter may finish class XII. July 11, 2014, denied her request. The petitioner, uninformed of the denial of her first representation, submitted her second representation on 11 July 2014, requesting alternate assignment to Sehore, Raisen, Dewas, or Ujjain so her daughter may finish her schooling. It was likewise refused on 14 July 2014.
  5. On July 15, 2014, the petitioner resigned, which the Madhya Pradesh Law and Legislative Affairs Department accepted on July 17. On July 18, 2014, she learned her resignation was accepted.
  6. The petitioner requested review of the circumstances under which she was forced to retire on August 1, 2014.
  7. In this writ case, the petitioner did not allege sexual harassment by Justice ‘A’ and instead focused on the erroneous transfer order.

Issues 

  1. Whether the order that transferred the petitioner from Gwalior to Sidhi was lawful.
  2. Legality of the rejection of the petitioner’s representation
  3. Whether the petitioner’s resignation can be deemed voluntary or whether it was forced by dire circumstances.

Contentions 

Plaintiff 

Smt. Indira Jaising argued that the MP High Court was bound by the Transfer Guidelines/Policy of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh adopted on 12 January 2012 (the “Transfer Policy”). She said that the Transfer Policy requires yearly transfers by March 15 and allows Judicial Officers to join by April 1 to align with school terms. According to the Transfer Policy, a Judicial Officer’s usual stay at a posting is 3 years, and 6 months or longer is considered a year. Since the petitioner had served over 2 years and 6 months, she might have been moved in March 2014. The petitioner was moved midterm on July 7, 2014. It is proposed that Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy allows midseason transfers on restricted conditions. Smt. Jaising argued that the petitioner had no reasons under Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy. Smt. Jaising added that the Transfer Policy allows a Judicial Officer to stay over the prescribed period if his/her daughter is studying at the place of his/her current posting and is in the final year of the Board Examination or University Examination and the Educational Institution does not have a girls’ hostel. She further argued that the petitioner’s transfer violated Clause 16 of the Transfer Policy since a Judicial Officer must first travel from Category ‘A’ city to ‘B’, then ‘C’, ‘D’, then ‘A’. The petitioner was relocated straight from Category ‘A’ to ‘C’ city. The learned Senior Counsel argued that the JIC’s findings showed the petitioner’s transfer violated the Transfer Policy.

Smt. Jaising further said that the petitioner’s transfer was based on the then-D & SJ, Gwalior’s complaint, not administrative reasons. The petitioner was transferred after the then D & SJ, Gwalior complained, according to the JIC. According to the JIC, the transfer was exclusively based on the complaint filed by the then D & SJ, Gwalior.

Smt. Jaising further argued that the Transfer Committee did not take the petitioner’s claims seriously based on the then-Judge’s JIC testimony. Smt. Jaising argued that the petitioner’s resignation was compelled and hence a constructive dismissal.

Defendant 

Shri Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General for the respondents, said that the JIC did not find sexual harassment by the petitioner. He argued that the findings were recorded on 15 December 2017 and cannot be disputed in ancillary processes like this one.

Shri Mehta said that the JIC’s conclusions on the petitioner’s transfer being irregular are within its “Terms of Reference,” yet the transfer might be improper. He argued that even if the petitioner’s transfer order was irregular or mala fide, it cannot be challenged in the present proceedings because it was not challenged at the time. He argued that “coercion resulting in resignation” is a notion evolved in western labour law and that such reliefs may only be given if leading evidence proves it.

The learned Solicitor General said that the petitioner’s lone claim of compulsion is that she resigned due to a midterm transfer order. Transfers are service, he claimed. He argued that a midseason move is not “coercion” to retire. He argued that a person must prove, through cogent evidence, that not only was unbearable pressure built, but that it was intended to force an employee to quit.

He said the petitioner did not allege such conditions. He argued that under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, such a conclusion is impossible.

Shri Mehta argued that a Judicial Officer delivering justice would not be able to use such a plea. He submitted that the Judicial Officers are trained to be independent, fearless, no impulsive and to act in accordance with law and as such, the concept which applies to a workman cannot be applied to a Judicial Officer. He said that the petitioner’s sexual harassment claims were made after she quit. Shri Mehta said that any current choice would have far-reaching consequences. He argued that if this Court considers midterm move and difficult family circumstances “coercion” to quit, it would open the floodgates of litigation. If this Court takes such a perspective, all similarly situated Judicial Officers would make such a plea since every Judicial Officer has some kind of uncomfortable family issue. He stated that if such a position is embraced, it would have far-reaching repercussions on the operation of the District Judiciary.

Shri Mehta said that the MP High Court Full Court had unanimously rejected the petitioner’s reinstatement request on many occasions. He argued that the JIC’s reinstatement remarks were beyond its “Terms of Reference,” hence the MP High Court’s Full Court correctly rejected the petitioner’s claim. He contended that if a unanimous decision taken by the Full Court of the MP High Court is interfered with by this Court, it would not only stigmatise the persons manning the institution but the entire institution.

Shri Mehta said that he is making his comments as an Officer of the Court, not on behalf of the MP High Court. He said the petitioner is arguing that the MP High Court as an institution conspired to force her departure. He argued that if the petitioner’s contention is adopted, it would have devastating implications.

Shri Mehta argued that this Court may only review a High Court Full Court’s ruling. He argued that this Court cannot hear a High Court Full Court appeal. Only the rarest instances would allow intervention.

Judgement 

Issue 1

The Court made the following findings with respect to the petitioner’s transfer:

In response to the Judges Inquiry Committee (“JIC”), the then-Judge on the Transfer Committee acknowledged that there were more openings at the four positions sought by the petitioner in her second round of representation than there were at Sidhi at the time of the transfer. However, the need for an additional judge at Sidhi prompted the relocation of the petitioner, therefore the decision was taken in the public interest or in the administration’s best interest.

Midterm transfers are possible if the performance of the Judicial Officer in question falls below the minimum standards established for that position. In this instance, this does not hold true. Based on the evaluation completed by the erstwhile D & SJ, Gwalior on 15th January 2014 for the assessment year 2013, the petitioner has been rated as performing at a “very good” level. The second basis for transferring a Judicial Officer is included in Clause 22 of the transfer policy, which states that a transfer may be undertaken if there are sufficient reasons to initiate an investigation against that individual.  The same is not true in this instance.

A Judicial Officer must be moved from a Category ‘A’ city to a Category ‘B’ city, from a Category ‘C’ city to a Category ‘D’ city, and from a Category ‘D’ city to a Category ‘A’ city, as outlined in the transfer rules. However, the petitioner was moved immediately from the Category ‘A’ city of Gwalior to the Category ‘C’ city of Sidhi.

This Court ruled in Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India and Others ((2009) 2 SCC 592) that an order of transfer, which is an incident of service, should not be interfered with unless mala fide, which can be either “malice in fact” or “malice in law,” is found to have been committed.  There can be no legal basis for a transfer order if the court decides it wasn’t based on any relevant evidence. 

The Court ruled that the petitioner’s 8 July 2014 transfer order was not issued in the public interest or in the interest of administration. The then D&SJ of Gwalior filed a formal complaint that ultimately led to the transfer. Therefore, the transfer order constitutes “malice in law,” since it was issued without regard to the Guidelines established in the transfer policy and instead was based on the then-D & SJ of Gwalior’s unproven charges.

Issue 2

Regarding the petitioner’s attorney, the court made the following observations:

The transfer policy allows the petitioner to request continued service at her current posting or alternative posting locations. At the very least, the subject shall be assessed in light of the terms of the transfer policy where the transfer policy specifies a basis on which the representation is to be made.

Since the petitioner’s daughter was about to take the Board Exam in its final year, she was entitled to have her case taken seriously.  After her daughter’s school year ended, the petitioner was prepared to comply with the transfer order.  The first appeal was shot down since the Transfer committee had already recommended the petitioner’s transfer on administrative grounds of his or her behaviour and demeanour at a meeting held on July 7, 2014.

The petitioner has submitted two separate documents, each with a unique set of demands, concerned about her daughter’s future schooling, she appealed again, first for retention in Gwalior and again for posting in any of the four previously mentioned locations. On the other hand, “she said representation was made almost on identical grounds as were made in the first representation, which was already rejected on 11th July 2014,” as the Registrar General ruled on July 14. 

The Court has reached a verdict that these claims are not supported by the evidence. The petitioner had a reasonable expectation of being evaluated for an alternative posting in accordance with the transfer rules in the event that her request for retention was denied. In his response to the JIC, the former judge on the transfer committee also admitted that he had not seen the petitioner’s annexures, which were submitted with their legal brief. Article 14 of the Constitution of India prohibits arbitrary, illogical, and unreasonable behaviour. Therefore, the rejection of the petitioner’s submissions on July 9 and July 11 is legally ineffectual.

Issue 3

Regarding the petitioner’s resignation, the Court made the following observations.

The circumstances surrounding the resignation are relevant to determining whether or not the departure was voluntary.

The petitioner was given a number of tasks, and in 2013 and 2014, she received grades of C (good) and B (very good) for her efforts. There were no problems with the petitioner’s career.

The petitioner’s two daughters were both enrolled in classes in Gwalior.  Both students, one in third grade and one in twelfth, were taking FIITJEE prep courses. The petitioner had to find a way to combine her roles as a Judicial Officer and a mother while her husband was away in Delhi for work and to care for his ageing parents.

The order to transfer was received on July 8, 2014. There was her job as a Judicial Officer, on the one hand, and the potential for her daughter’s future education and profession to suffer, on the other, if she moved to the site of assignment in Sidhi.

In her resignation letter, the petitioner said that she could not risk her job to deny her daughter a good education and the opportunity to be an example to others. She said that she felt she had no choice but to retire because of the circumstances. At first glance, it looks like a mother triumphed against a Judicial Officer in a bloody struggle.

When a Judicial Officer with a solid reputation announces his or her retirement, senior judges in that court may seek to advise and encourage the officer to change his or her mind. It would not serve the best interests of either the Judicial Officer or the Judiciary to lose them without first providing them with therapy and a chance to reflect on their actions.  

In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India((1984) 2 SCC 141: 1984 SCC (L&S) 214), and Moti Ram v. Param Dev((1993) 2 SCC 725), the Court cited prior decisions. and restated that “in order to be considered a “resignation,” a statement must be made with the intention that it be treated as such and without conditions. The person retiring should do so voluntarily and without feeling pressured to leave their employment. The petitioner resigned out of exhaustion and indignation at the injustice being done by the Judiciary itself.

The petitioner’s departure as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Gwalior, which was effective as of July 15, 2014, was ruled by the court to be involuntary. With retroactive effect to July 15, 2014, the resignation was overturned, and the petitioner was granted continuation of service.

Conclusion 

This judgement acknowledges that in certain cases, a deserving professional’s resignation may be precipitated by an intolerable work environment or unfair treatment. It’s possible that plaintiffs in a similar position to X, but in private employment, will find relief thanks to the Court’s remark that the disagreement here was considered as an ordinary work-related concern.

Written by Samarth Agarwal


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