Date of Judgment. 27/02/1990
Court. Supreme Court of India
Appellant. Vijay Kumar Sharma and Others
Respondent. State of Karnataka and Others
Bench. Mishra Ranganath , Mishra Ranganath, Sawant, P.B., Ramaswamy, K.
Referred Art 32 & 31 and 39(b)list 3 entry 42, Art 254 S. 14(1) and 14 (2), S. 73,74,80
Case Type/ Issue. Writ Petition (Civil)
FACTS OF CASE:-
The Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, both addressed subjects under the Concurrent List, Seventh Schedule, and the case Vijay Kuma Sharma v. State of Karnataka was heard on February 27, 1990.
The Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 was passed by the State Legislature with the help of Article 31 and 39(b) of the Constitution, Entry 42 list 3 of the Seventh Schedule, and other provisions. On March 11, 1976, the President gave his consent after reserving it for review.
According to Section 4 of the Act, contract carriages must be completely free of encumbrances in the State in addition to the relevant permits or certificates of registration issued under the Motor Vehicle Act of 1939. Section 14’s subsection (1) forbids applications for new permissions or Renewal of current permits beginning on the day of vesting or thereafter. Article 14 (2) Abolished all applications, appeals, or revisions that were pending before the relevant authorities as of the notice date.
Despite anything in the 1939 Act, the sub-section of Section 20 provided for the cancellation of all contract transport licences issued or renewed in respect of any vehicle other than a vehicle purchased under the Act and belonged to the State Road Transport Corporation. Sub-
While sub-section (3) prohibited the authority in question from considering applications from parties other than the Corporation, section (2) granted the Corporation exclusive jurisdiction to award or renew contract transport licences.
ISSUE:-
In the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka in February 1990, the question at hand was whether the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 conflicted with the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act of 1976. A law known as the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act was passed in 1976.
the State Legislature with the assistance of Articles 31 and 39(b), Entry 42 of List 3 of the Seventh Schedule, and the Constitution. The Act provided for the absolute free and clear vesting of contract carriages in the State along with the respective permits and certificates of registration granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It also provided for the absolute free and clear vesting of contract carriages in the State along with the respective permits. The issue at hand was whether the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988’s provisions conflicted with this Act.
ARGUMENTS:-
Both parties’ arguments in this case centred on the following topic:
The petitioners, Vijay Kumar Sharma & Others, alleged that the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 was incompatible with the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976. They argued that the State Act should be repealed since it conflicts with the terms of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988.
On the other hand, the respondents, State of Karnataka & Others, maintained that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 did not conflict with the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976.
They argued that the State Act was lawful since it was passed with the help of Article 31 and 39(b) of the Constitution, as well as Entry 42 List 3 of the Seventh Schedule.
JUDGEMENT:-
The Supreme Court of India rendered its decision in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka & State of Karnataka on February 27, 1990. Misra Rangnath, Sawant, P.B., and Ramaswamy, K. made up the bench. The dispute in the case concerned whether or not Karnataka.
The Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 did not conflict with the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act of 1976, according to the Supreme Court, which maintained the law’s legality. The court determined that Entry 42 List 3 of the Seventh Schedule was used to help enact the State Act. Therefore the Constitution was legitimate as stated in Articles 31 and 39(b).
The court also talked about the notion of “pith and substance” or “dominant purpose” and its applicability in determining repugnance under Article 254 of the constitution between Parliamentary and State laws in regard to topics in List 3 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
Written by Abdul Rehman an intern under legal vidhiya.
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