This article is written by Lukundo Nanyangwe of The University of Zambia, an intern under Legal Vidhiya
Introduction
International law, as a body of legal norms and principles that govern the conduct of states and other international actors, evolves and adapts to the changing dynamics of the global community. One important aspect of international law is customary international law, which is formed through the consistent and general practice of states, accompanied by a belief that such practice is required by law (opinio juris). Customary international law, often referred to as traditional international law, plays a significant role in shaping the behavior of states and regulating their interactions in various areas, such as state sovereignty, use of force, and diplomatic relations.[1]
Traditional justification refers to the practice of invoking historical practices, cultural customs, or traditional norms as a justification for actions or policies under international law. States may rely on traditional justification to support their positions and actions in international disputes, negotiations, or legal proceedings. However, the use of traditional justification in international law raises several challenges and concerns that warrant careful examination and analysis. This article discusses the key issues associated with traditional justification in international law, including the tension between customary international law and modern international legal norms, the potential for abuse and manipulation by states, challenges in interpreting customary international law, and the issue of cultural relativism.[2]
Tension between Customary International Law and Modern International Legal Norms
One of the central challenges associated with traditional justification is the tension between customary international law and modern international legal norms. Customary international law is based on the historical practice and beliefs of states, and it may not always align with contemporary international legal standards or evolving principles of international law. As states and the global community evolve, new legal norms and principles may emerge, which may not be fully reflected in customary international law.[3]
This tension was evident in the South China Sea Arbitration case between the Philippines and China, where the Philippines challenged China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea based on customary international law. The tribunal in its 2016 award on jurisdiction and admissibility noted that China’s claims based on historical rights and traditional fishing activities were not supported by contemporary international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (PCA Case No. 2013-19). The tribunal emphasized that customary international law must be interpreted and applied in light of modern international legal norms, and historical practices alone may not be sufficient to justify actions or claims in the present-day context.[4]
This tension between customary international law and modern international legal norms can create ambiguity and uncertainty in international relations. States may rely on traditional justification to support their positions, while other states or international organizations may contest the validity of such justification based on contemporary international legal norms. This challenge underscores the need for a careful and balanced approach in interpreting and applying customary international law, taking into account the evolving dynamics of the global community and the principles of modern international law.[5]
Potential for Abuse and Manipulation by States
Another significant concern associated with traditional justification is the potential for abuse and manipulation by states. States may selectively invoke historical practices or cultural customs to justify actions that may be inconsistent with international legal norms or human rights standards. This may result in the misuse of traditional justification to legitimize actions that would otherwise be considered unlawful or illegitimate under international law.[6]
For example, states may rely on traditional justification to justify acts of aggression, annexation of territory, or violation of human rights. In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the United States’ support for armed groups in Nicaragua and its mining of Nicaragua’s harbors were inconsistent with customary international law and violated Nicaragua’s sovereignty (ICJ, 1986). The United States had invoked the doctrine of collective self-defense and traditional justification to justify its actions, but the ICJ rejected these arguments and emphasized that customary international law must be interpreted in light of contemporary legal norms, including the prohibition of the use of force and respect for state sovereignty.[7]
Similarly, in the context of cultural practices, states may invoke traditional justifications to justify actions that violate human rights, such as female genital mutilation, child marriage, or discrimination against certain groups based on traditional customs. States may argue that such practices are deeply rooted in their culture and tradition, and therefore should be exempt from international human rights standards. However, this raises the question of the balance between cultural relativism and universal human rights, and the potential for abuse and manipulation of cultural justifications to violate fundamental human rights.[8]
Challenges in Interpreting Customary International Law
Interpreting customary international law poses significant challenges, including the lack of a centralized legislative or judicial authority, the subjective nature of state practice and opinio juris, and the diversity of cultural customs and practices among states. Customary international law is formed through the consistent and general practice of states, accompanied by a belief that such practice is required by law (opinio juris). However, determining what constitutes customary international law requires a complex and nuanced analysis of state practice and opinio juris, which can be subjective and open to interpretation.[9]
State practice may vary among states, and it may be difficult to establish a consistent and general practice that reflects customary international law. Moreover, the practice of states may be influenced by political, economic, or other considerations, and may not always reflect a genuine belief that such practice is required by law (opinio juris). This subjective element of customary international law makes it challenging to ascertain the existence and content of customary norms with certainty.[10]
Furthermore, the diversity of cultural customs and practices among states adds another layer of complexity in interpreting customary international law. States may rely on traditional justifications based on their cultural customs, which may vary significantly from one state to another. This raises questions about the universality of customary international law and the potential conflicts between different cultural customs and practices. For example, the issue of the death penalty is subject to diverse cultural practices and opinions among states, with some states justifying it based on their traditional customs while others considering it a violation of human rights.[11]
Cultural Relativism and Traditional Justification
The issue of cultural relativism is closely linked to traditional justification in international law. Cultural relativism refers to the belief that different cultural customs and practices should be respected and protected, and that there are no universal standards of morality or human rights that apply to all cultures. This perspective argues that states should be allowed to justify their actions based on their cultural traditions, even if those actions may be considered unlawful or illegitimate under international law.[12]
Proponents of cultural relativism argue that states should have the autonomy to determine their own moral and ethical standards, and that international law should respect and accommodate diverse cultural practices. They assert that traditional justifications based on cultural customs are valid and legitimate, and that international law should not impose universal standards on states, as this would be a form of cultural imperialism.[13]
However, cultural relativism has been subject to criticism from human rights advocates and scholars who argue that there are fundamental human rights that are universally applicable to all individuals, regardless of their cultural background. They argue that cultural relativism can be used as a pretext to justify human rights abuses, such as discrimination, violence against women, or other forms of oppression, and that traditional justifications based on cultural customs should not override universal human rights standards.[14]
For example, the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM) has been a contentious topic in international law, with some states justifying it based on cultural customs and traditional practices. However, international human rights bodies and advocates have condemned FGM as a violation of human rights and a form of gender-based violence. They argue that cultural relativism should not be used as a justification for harmful practices that violate fundamental human rights, and that universal human rights standards should take precedence over cultural customs.[15]
One notable case where cultural relativism and traditional justifications clashed with human rights standards is the case of A v. Botswana before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In this case, the applicant, a member of the San community in Botswana, challenged the eviction of his community from their ancestral land by the Botswana government. The government argued that the eviction was justified based on traditional justifications, as the land was needed for wildlife conservation and to protect the cultural practices of other tribes.
The African Commission held that the eviction violated the human rights of the San community, including their right to property, culture, and development. The Commission rejected the traditional justifications put forth by the government, stating that cultural practices cannot justify violations of human rights, and that customary practices must be interpreted in light of international human rights standards.[16]
Another example is the case of L.C. v. Peru before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, where the Peruvian government argued that forced sterilization of women, primarily indigenous and rural women, was justified based on traditional justifications to control population growth. The Court held that the forced sterilization violated the rights to personal integrity, privacy, and health of the affected women, and that cultural justifications cannot be used to justify human rights violations.[17]
These cases highlight the tension between cultural relativism and universal human rights standards in international law. While states may seek to justify their actions based on traditional customs and practices, international human rights bodies and advocates argue that human rights should take precedence over cultural relativism, and that traditional justifications should not be used as a pretext for violating fundamental human rights.
Balancing Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights Standards in International Law
Traditional justifications have been a complex and controversial issue in international law. While states may rely on cultural customs and practices to justify their actions, customary international law and human rights standards must be carefully balanced to ensure that fundamental human rights are upheld and cultural relativism does not become a pretext for violations of international law.[18]
The lack of a centralized legislative or judicial authority in customary international law, the subjective nature of state practice and opinio juris, and the diversity of cultural customs and practices among states present challenges in interpreting customary norms. The tension between cultural relativism and universal human rights standards has been a recurring issue in international law, with debates on how to reconcile the two.[19]
International human rights bodies and advocates argue that cultural relativism should not be used as a justification for harmful practices that violate fundamental human rights, and that universal human rights standards should take precedence over cultural customs. They emphasize the importance of upholding human rights, including the rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups, and promoting international legal principles and obligations.[20]
However, some states may continue to assert traditional justifications for their actions, particularly in armed conflicts, use of force, and cultural practices. This poses challenges in ensuring compliance with international law and upholding human rights, as cultural relativism can be used to justify violations of fundamental human rights.[21]
In light of these challenges, it is crucial for states, international organizations, and international tribunals to carefully consider the implications of traditional justifications in light of contemporary international legal norms. It is essential to uphold universal human rights standards, promote cultural diversity in a manner that respects human rights, and ensure that traditional justifications are scrutinized in light of international legal principles and obligations.[22]
International human rights bodies, including the United Nations, regional human rights courts and commissions, and non-governmental organizations, play a vital role in monitoring and addressing traditional justifications for human rights violations. They engage in fact-finding missions, issue reports, and provide recommendations to states to ensure compliance with international human rights standards. International tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, also play a crucial role in interpreting customary international law and human rights standards in light of traditional justifications.[23]
Some notable cases have addressed the issue of traditional justifications in international law. For example, the International Court of Justice’s 2003 judgment in the case of Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) addressed the issue of self-defense under customary international law. Iran had argued that its actions in destroying U.S. oil platforms in the Persian Gulf were justified based on traditional justifications of self-defense. However, the Court ruled that Iran’s actions were not in self-defense under customary international law and were therefore unlawful.[24]
Similarly, the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo in the case of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, of the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the International Court of Justice considered the issue of customary international law and the use of force in self-defense. Uganda had argued that its actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were justified based on customary international law and traditional justifications of self-defense. However, the Court ruled that Uganda’s actions were not in self-defense under customary international law and were therefore unlawful.[25]
Another example is the case of the Ogoni People v. Nigeria before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Ogoni people, an indigenous group in Nigeria, claimed that their cultural and environmental rights were violated by the Nigerian government’s actions in exploiting oil resources in their land. Nigeria argued that its actions were justified based on traditional justifications of economic development and national security. However, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ruled that Nigeria’s actions violated the Ogoni people’s human rights and were not justified based on traditional justifications.[26]
Navigating the Tension between Customary International Law and Human Rights Law
One issue that arises in the context of traditional justifications is the potential clash between customary international law and human rights law. Customary international law is based on state practice and opinio juris, which may include traditional justifications, while human rights law is grounded in universal human rights standards. The tension between these two legal regimes can pose challenges in interpreting customary norms and ensuring compliance with human rights obligations.[27]
Accordingly, the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM) has been a contentious issue in international law. Some states justify FGM based on traditional justifications, arguing that it is a cultural practice that is deeply rooted in their customs and traditions. However, international human rights bodies and advocates argue that FGM violates fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, health, and bodily integrity, and should not be justified based on cultural relativism.[28]
The practice of child marriage is another example where traditional justifications may clash with human rights standards. Some states justify child marriage based on traditional justifications, arguing that it is a customary practice that is accepted in their culture. However, international human rights bodies and advocates argue that child marriage violates the rights of the child, particularly the right to education, health, and freedom from discrimination.[29]
In cases where traditional justifications clash with human rights standards, it is crucial to carefully balance the two and ensure that universal human rights standards take precedence. International human rights bodies, such as the United Nations Human Rights Council and regional human rights courts and commissions, play a crucial role in monitoring and addressing such conflicts and providing guidance on how to reconcile traditional justifications with human rights standards.[30]
Furthermore, the issue of traditional justifications also raises questions about the relationship between state sovereignty and international law. State sovereignty is a fundamental principle of international law that recognizes the authority of states to govern their internal affairs without interference from other states. Traditional justifications are often used by states to assert their sovereignty and justify their actions based on their cultural customs and practices.[31]
However, the tension arises when traditional justifications are used to justify actions that violate international human rights standards. This raises questions about the limits of state sovereignty and the responsibility of states to comply with universal human rights obligations. International human rights bodies and advocates often argue that human rights standards should take precedence over traditional justifications, and states should not be allowed to use cultural relativism as a shield to justify human rights violations.[32]
For instance, in the case of LGBTQ+ rights, some states may use traditional justifications to justify discrimination and persecution of LGBTQ+ individuals based on cultural or religious beliefs. However, international human rights standards, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recognize the rights and freedoms of LGBTQ+ individuals, including the right to non-discrimination and the right to freedom of expression and association.[33]
Subsequently, the other issue that arises in the context of traditional justifications is the potential for abuse and manipulation. States may sometimes invoke traditional justifications to legitimize their actions that are not genuinely rooted in their cultural customs and practices but rather for political or economic gains. This can lead to the distortion of traditional justifications and undermine the integrity of customary international law.[34]
For instance, in the case of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, the Myanmar government claimed that their actions against the Rohingya minority, including killings, rapes, and forced displacement, were justified based on traditional justifications of national security and protection of the Buddhist majority. However, international human rights bodies and advocates argued that these actions amounted to genocide and crimes against humanity, and traditional justifications were used as a pretext for human rights violations.[35]
In light of these challenges, it is essential to approach traditional justifications in international law with caution and critically assess their legitimacy. While cultural customs and practices are important, they should not be used as a blanket justification for actions that violate universal human rights standards. States have a responsibility to ensure that their actions comply with international human rights obligations, and international bodies, such as the United Nations and regional human rights courts and commissions, play a crucial role in monitoring and addressing potential abuses of traditional justifications.
Conclusion
Traditional justifications have been a complex and contentious issue in international law. While states may seek to rely on traditional justifications to justify their actions, whether it be in the context of armed conflicts, use of force, or cultural practices, international law requires a careful balance between respecting cultural diversity and upholding universal human rights standards.
The challenges in interpreting customary international law, including the lack of a centralized legislative or judicial authority, the subjective nature of state practice and opinio juris, and the diversity of cultural customs and practices among states, make it difficult to ascertain the existence and content of customary norms with certainty. Moreover, the issue of cultural relativism adds another layer of complexity, as states may seek to use traditional justifications based on cultural customs to justify actions that may violate fundamental human rights.
The clash between customary international law and human rights law, the limits of state sovereignty, the potential for abuse and manipulation, and the need to balance cultural relativism with human rights obligations are some of the critical issues that arise in the context of traditional justifications. It is crucial for states, international bodies, and advocates to carefully navigate these complexities and ensure that traditional justifications are not used as a pretext for human rights violations. Upholding universal human rights standards should always take precedence over cultural customs and practices in international law to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights for all individuals, regardless of their cultural background or beliefs.
Ultimately, it is important for states, international organizations, and international tribunals to carefully consider the implications of traditional justifications in light of contemporary international legal norms, including the prohibition of the use of force, respect for state sovereignty, and universal human rights standards. While cultural diversity and traditional practices are important aspects of human societies, they should not be used as a pretext for violating fundamental human rights. International human rights standards should take precedence over cultural relativism, and traditional justifications should be carefully scrutinized in light of international legal principles and obligations.
References
Books and Journals
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. (2003).
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 UNTS 13.
D’Amato, Alberico. “Customary International Law.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 80, no. 2, 1986, pp. 256–284
Dugard, J. (2018). International Law: A South African Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fitzmaurice, M. (2020). Customary International Law and Modern International Legal Norms. In P. N. Schrijver & J. Crawford (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law (pp. 137–167). Oxford University Press.
Gardner, J. (2005). Cultural Relativism and International Law. European Journal of International Law, 16(4), 583-606
Girard, M. (n.d.). LGBTQ+ Rights. Retrieved February 10, 2021, from Society for International Law: https://silc-int.org/en/lgbtq-rights
Goh, J. (2020). State Sovereignty and International Law: A Critical Analysis. In S. Atapattu (Ed.), International Law and Sovereignty: Exploring the Nexus (pp. 95-112). Cambridge University Press.
Gray, Christine, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 3
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171.
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute, 17 July 1998.
Jesse Elvin, “The Interplay between Customary International Law and Human Rights Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law, ed. by Andrea Bianchi (Oxford University Press, 2017), 524-542.
Mackie, G. (2006). Female genital mutilation: The beginning of the end. International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics, 95(2), 167-170
Mbengue, M. (2012). Traditional Justifications for the Use of Force: Challenges and Opportunities. African Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire Africain de Droit International, 17, 217-242
McDougal, J. (2020). Traditional Justification in International Law: Issues, Challenges, and Perspectives. Journal of International Law, 7(1), 45-60.
Ming Xia, “Female Genital Mutilation and International Human Rights Law”, in International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honor of Eric Suy (Springer, 2018), 123-137.
Mowbray, A. (2019). Cultural Relativism and Traditional Justification in International Law. In M. Koskenniemi & P. Leino (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (pp. 728-744). Oxford University Press.
Mukhopadhyay, P., & Nesiah, S. (2012). Child Marriage: A Human Rights Perspective. International Journal of Human Rights, 16(4), 539-570. doi:10.1080/13642987.2012.677736
Rajagopal, B., & Reddy, S. (2016). Cultural relativism and international human rights: A tension between two concepts. Human Rights Quarterly, 38(1), 113-140.
Sands, P., & Dangor, A. (2015). Cultural relativism and human rights: A critical analysis. Human Rights Law Review, 15(4), 675-703
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Smith, M. & Roberts, J. (2010). International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press
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L.C. v. Peru, Judgment (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2016).
Nicaragua v. United States, Merits, Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 1969 ICJ 3.
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Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, A/59/75, 25 January 2005.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, A/HRC/27/52, 3 July 2014.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo, A/68/340, 20 August 2013.
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights. (2012). Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment of 27 June 2012. Retrieved from https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_245_ing.pdf
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[1] Gray, Christine, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 3
[2] McDougal, J. (2020). Traditional Justification in International Law: Issues, Challenges, and Perspectives. Journal of International Law, 7(1), 45-60.
[3] Fitzmaurice, M. (2020). Customary International Law and Modern International Legal Norms. In P. N. Schrijver & J. Crawford (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law (pp. 137–167). Oxford University Press.
[4] Philippines v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016, PCA Case No. 2013-19
[5] Yonah Alexander, “Customary International Law and Modern International Legal Norms: Challenges in Interpretation and Practice,” International Law Studies 92 (2016): 3-34.
[6] Smith, J. (2013). Traditional Justification: Abuse and Manipulation. In International Legal Norms and Human Rights Standards (pp. 191-204). Springer, Cham.
[7] Nicaragua v. United States, Merits, Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14.
[8] Abrar, S. (2020). Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights: Navigating the Balance. Social and International Law Center
[9] Smith, M. & Roberts, J. (2010). International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[10] D’Amato, Alberico. “Customary International Law.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 80, no. 2, 1986, pp. 256–284
[11] Dugard, J. (2018). International Law: A South African Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[12] Mowbray, A. (2019). Cultural Relativism and Traditional Justification in International Law. In M. Koskenniemi & P. Leino (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (pp. 728-744). Oxford University Press.
[13] Gardner, J. (2005). Cultural Relativism and International Law. European Journal of International Law, 16(4), 583-606
[14] Sands, P., & Dangor, A. (2015). Cultural relativism and human rights: A critical analysis. Human Rights Law Review, 15(4), 675-703
[15] Mackie, G. (2006). Female genital mutilation: The beginning of the end. International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics, 95(2), 167-170
[16] A v. Botswana, Communication No. 97/93 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2000).
[17] L.C. v. Peru, Judgment (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2016).
[18] International Court of Justice. (2007). Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004. Retrieved from https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/131
[19] United Nations Human Rights Council. (2017). Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf
[20] United Nations General Assembly. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
[21] United Nations General Assembly. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
[22] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. (2003).
[23] United Nations Human Rights Council. (2017). Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf
[24] Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America (1996). Judgment [Preliminary Objections]. International Court of Justice Reports, 8.
[25] Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168
[26] Ogoni People v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 167/96, (2002) AHRLR 145 (ACHPR 2002).
[27] Jesse Elvin, “The Interplay between Customary International Law and Human Rights Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law, ed. by Andrea Bianchi (Oxford University Press, 2017), 524-542.
[28] Ming Xia, “Female Genital Mutilation and International Human Rights Law”, in International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honor of Eric Suy (Springer, 2018), 123-137.
[29]Mukhopadhyay, P., & Nesiah, S. (2012). Child Marriage: A Human Rights Perspective. International Journal of Human Rights, 16(4), 539-570. doi:10.1080/13642987.2012.677736
[30] Streuli, N. (2018). Balancing Traditional Justifications and Human Rights Standards. Social Issues In Law and Culture, 1(1), 1-9.
[31] Goh, J. (2020). State Sovereignty and International Law: A Critical Analysis. In S. Atapattu (Ed.), International Law and Sovereignty: Exploring the Nexus (pp. 95-112). Cambridge University Press.
[32] Rajagopal, B., & Reddy, S. (2016). Cultural relativism and international human rights: A tension between two concepts. Human Rights Quarterly, 38(1), 113-140.
[33] Girard, M. (n.d.). LGBTQ+ Rights. Retrieved February 10, 2021, from Society for International Law: https://silc-int.org/en/lgbtq-rights
[34] Mbengue, M. (2012). Traditional Justifications for the Use of Force: Challenges and Opportunities. African Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire Africain de Droit International, 17, 217-242
[35] Mukherjee, U.K. 2020. “The Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: Exploring the Complexity of Traditional Justifications.” In International Law and Human Rights: Issues and Challenges. Eds. P. J.L. Gonsalves and M.G. Fernandez. New Delhi: SILC Publications, pp. 387-400.
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