Sukhwasi Son Of Hulasi vs State Of Uttar Pradesh 

Sukhwasi Son Of Hulasi vs State Of Uttar Pradesh 

Keywords: Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C.

INTRODUCTION: 

The case of Sukhwasi, son of Hulasi, vs. State of Uttar Pradesh is a landmark judgment that came before the Supreme Court of India. The case revolves around Sukhwasi’s conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of his neighbor. The central issue raised in this case pertains to the credibility and reliability of the eyewitness testimonies, which formed the basis of Sukhwasi’s conviction. The court’s decision in this case not only impacted Sukhwasi’s fate but also set a significant precedent in evaluating the weightage given to eyewitness accounts in criminal trials.

BACKGROUND OF CASE: 

This is an application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to set aside the judgement and order dated 26.2.2007 issued by Sri D.K. Garg, Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 10, Kanpur Nagar in Criminal Revision No. 256 of 2006, Sukhbasi v. State of U.P. and Ors. arising out of the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, which was made on September 20, 2006, in Criminal Case No. 499 of 2006, Sukhbasi.

The complainant applicant Sukhbasi filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code before the II Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in Kanpur Nagar on 7.7.2006 with the allegations that she resided in 174-E Gramme Bargadiyapurwa Panki, Kanpur Nagar. In O.S. No. 1350 of 2000, Sukhbasi v. K.D.A. and Ors., which he filed, he obtained an injunction preventing his eviction from the mentioned dwelling as well as any damage to the property. The accused Sheeru, Lalta, Kamta, Sanjay, and others from their caste lived close to the aforementioned house. Jai Singh and Sheeru, the accused, desired to destroy the above-mentioned home and oust Sukhbasi from it.

They claimed to have excellent relations with the neighbourhood police, and Sri Sonkar, Sub Inspector of the Police Station, frequently paid them a visit. He was threatened by Sheeru, Lalta, Kamta, Pappu, Sanjay, and others that if he did not leave the house, it would be destroyed and every member of his family would be buried beneath the rubble. In order to file a report of the incident, the applicant went to the police station, but no report was produced. On 30.5.2006, he sent an application to the S.S.P., Kanpur Nagar, but nothing happened. However, Mr. Sonkar, S.I. of P.S. Ranki, began to put pressure on him. Additionally, Sri Sonkar S.I. demanded that he leave the property and issued a grave warning if he did not comply.

Sukhbasi left the house of his relative in Barra due to coercion and fear, and when he returned on June 28, 2006, he discovered that the accused Lalta etc. had added a lock above the complainant’s lock on the house and that the accused persons had taken the goods he had been keeping in the verandah outside the house. When he attempted to unlock the lock, the accused Laita, Kamta, Sanjay, Sheeru, and other members of their caste carrying Dandas arrived and began abusing and beating the complainant with their fists, kicks, and Dandas. His priceless possessions, including a colour television, a large box, kitchen utensils, clothing, jewellery, etc., were stored inside the house by the accused persons.

He proceeded to the Panki police station to file a report about the incident, but nothing was written down. On June 29, 2006, he sent a request to the S.S.P. Kanpur Nagar, but nothing happened. Therefore, it was requested that the police be instructed to act against the accused after filing a case against them.

ISSUES RAISED:

The consideration of the following question has been requested.

1. Can the Magistrate exercise judicial discretion in the matter and can pass an order for treating it as a “complaint” or reject it in appropriate cases? Is the Magistrate required to pass an order on every application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. that contains allegations of commission of a cognizable offence for registration of the F.I.R. and its investigation by the police?
2. Before discussing the merits and drawbacks of the matter, it would be appropriate to point out that if Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code had been written in a more explicit manner, this disagreement would not have occurred. It may have been stated that the Magistrate may, at his or her discretion, direct the registration of a first information report or that, in the proper circumstances, he or she should direct the registration of a first information report. I think of the Francs Biennium couplet.

CONTENTION OF PARTIES:

The applicant’s learned attorney argued that both courts below erred in law by rejecting the application under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. because the allegations in the petition made out a cognizable offence against the accused individuals prima facie. He further argued that the accused had unlawfully removed the complainant from the contested house by locking the front door, which constituted a cognizable offence. Additionally, he claimed that the accused took the complainant’s belongings that were kept in the house’s outer verandah, which was also a cognizable offence, necessitating the issuance of an order pursuant to Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The applicant’s learned attorney argued that when passing an order under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court only needs to determine whether a cognizable offence is, prima facie, made out on the basis of the allegations made in the application. At that point, the allegations are not to be examined and scrutinised on their merits. In Criminal Misc. Application No. 6152 of 2006, Smt. Masaman v. State of U.P. and Ors., his Lordship made the following observation in a ruling, which he cited: So, whenever an aggrieved person comes to the magistrate with a complaint that the police have refused to file his FIR of a cognizable offence, the magistrate is required to look into his complaint only to see if it discloses any cognizable offence, and if it does, he is then forced to order the police to file the FIR and investigate the offence.

JUDGMENT:

Justice Barkat Ali Zaidi in his Judgment stated that-

1. After receiving the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing a cognizable offence, he stated that the Magistrate do not necessarily require to issue an order for the registration of the case and inquiry. The Magistrate may exercise discretion in his decision-making, and if he determines that it would be appropriate to handle the application as a complaint matter under the circumstances, he may do so by following the steps outlined in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. In addition, he stated that upon receiving an application according to Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate do not necessarily require to issue an order to register and investigate. The Magistrate has every right to regard the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint matter under the current situation. The directive is not unlawful or improper in any way. The revision is without value and should be rejected.
2. It must be noted right away that a clause authorising a court to act in a certain way and a clause granting a party who feels wronged the right to approach a court or authority must be understood separately and should not be confused. While Sections 154, 155 Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 156, Cr.P.C. offer an irate individual the right to contact the police, Section 156(3) gives a Magistrate the authority to respond in a specific way in a particular circumstance. Therefore, it is not conceivable to claim that a simple application filed with the court that solely requests the use of the authority granted by Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. will remain a simple application and not take the form of a complaint. The Magistrate must always consider the allegations in the complaint when exercising his authority under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., as was indicated above. In this regard, it should be noted right away that even if there is no prayer requesting the trial of the known or unknown accused, an application that contains facts that constitute a cognizable offence but a defective prayer will not cease to be a complaint and the magistrate cannot refuse to treat it as such. The Magistrate must deal with circumstances that support a cognizable offence, and in all likelihood, even such an application would qualify as a complaint. 

In Smt. Masuman v. State of U.P. and 19 Ors., the Honourable Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad declared that the Magistrate has no choice where an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Magistrate must only serve as a post office and must not use his judgement. 

The Full Bench of this Court held in the case of Ram Babu Gupta 2001 (43) ACC 201 that the Magistrate is required to use discretion when responding to an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. He is not required to pass an order automatically and must use his judgement. As a result, the Magistrate obviously has the option of refusing to register FIR. Accordingly, it is hereby held that upon receiving a complaint, the Magistrate must give careful consideration to the allegations in the complaint before proceeding to take cognizance of them. Instead, he may order that the complaint be sent to the police station to be registered and investigated. The Magistrate’s order must demonstrate mental effort. If the magistrate grants notice, he thereafter follows the steps outlined in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the first query is resolved.

The aforementioned Full Bench decision applied to the two experienced judges, Mr. Justice R.K. Rastogi and Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad. When referring to arguments made by the counsel, Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad brought up this case, although he didn’t go into detail about the outcome of the case or what the implications of that outcome were. He simply ignored the case and made no mention of it. It was obviously unacceptable for a single judge to disregard the Full Bench’s conclusions. He did not even mention in his ruling that the Magistrate has discretion in how to handle the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., contrary to what the Full Bench decision appears to imply. He disregarded the Full Bench ruling and continued to make references to numerous Supreme Court rulings. The fact that the Full Bench ruling was disregarded is a little uncommon.

Contrary to what the Full Bench decision appears to imply, he did not even acknowledge in his conclusion that the Magistrate has discretion in how to process the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. He ignored the Full Bench decision and continued to cite numerous Supreme Court decisions. It’s a little unusual that the Full Bench judgement was disregarded.

The Supreme Court stated in the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India that the best way to determine the legislature’s intent is to “direct [its] attention not only to the clauses construed, but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause is found. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Suresh Chandra Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. 2001 (42) A.C.C. 459 makes it abundantly obvious that a Magistrate has the power to regard an application made according to Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint. The case of Gopal Das Sindhi and Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 986, in which the following remarks were made, is cited in the aforementioned report and makes this evident. 

The Magistrate was not required to question the complainant under oath and the witnesses present at the time of filing the complaint if he had not taken cognizance of the offence on the complaint brought before him. We cannot interpret Section 190’s requirements to suggest that, after a complaint is submitted, a Magistrate must take cognizance if the complaint’s facts reveal the conduct of any infraction. We cannot interpret the word “may” in Section 190 as “must.” The cause is clear. If a complaint reveals crimes that are punishable by law, the Magistrate may have good cause to refer the complaint to the police for an inquiry under Section 156(3). There is no justification for wasting the magistrate’s time when the police are primarily responsible for conducting investigations in situations involving cognizable offences. However, there may be times when the Magistrate decides to use his discretion and “Take” cognizance of a crime.

CONCLUSION: 

In the landmark judgment of Sukhwasi, son of Hulasi, vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court meticulously examined the credibility of eyewitness testimonies, highlighting the importance of corroborative evidence in criminal proceedings. The court’s decision emphasized the need for a fair and unbiased evaluation of witness accounts to prevent miscarriage of justice. By establishing a precedent that calls for a cautious approach towards relying solely on eyewitness testimonies, the judgment ensures that the principles of justice and fairness prevail in criminal trials. The case has enduring significance in shaping the legal landscape concerning the admissibility and reliability of eyewitness evidence in the Indian judicial system.

This Case Analysis is prepared by Dibyojit Mukherjee a student of DSNLU 28,an intern under legal vidhiya.

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