
| CITATION | 2022 INSC 257 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT | 3rd March, 2022 |
| COURT | SUPREME COURT OF INDIA |
| APPELLANT | SUKHDARSHAN SINGH |
| RESPONDENT | STATE OF PUNJAB |
| BENCH | K.M. JOSEPH AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ. |
INTRODUCTION
The case of “Sukhdarshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2022” pertains to the suspension of Sukhdarshan Singh from his job as a Clerk in the State Transport Department, arising from two separate cases of criminal charges filed against him. The case involves interpretation of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1970 and the extent of the powers defined in the Rules with regard to suspension and termination of employees and specifically renumeration for the period out of service.
FACTS OF THE CASE
- The Appellant was a Clerk in the State Transport Department. On 2nd September 1986, a criminal case for embezzlement was filed against him. The chargesheet for the same was made in 1988. He was suspended in connection with this case with effect from 2nd September 1986.
- While under suspension, another case was filed against him under sections 307 and 506 of the IPC under FIR No. 51/1995. The appellant was convicted by the trial court in this case on 17th September 1996 under section 324 read with section 506 of the IPC. He filed an appeal against this conviction.
- After six years, on 24th July 2002, the appellant was served a show cause notice under Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970. He replied to the notice yet was terminated from employment by order dated 13rh March 2003.
- As regards to the embezzlement case, the Judicial Magistrate acquitted the appellant on 22nd December 2006.
- In the appeal arising from FIR No. 51/1995, the High Court sustained the conviction but reduced the sentence under Section 324 to the period undergone and ordered a sentence of one month for offence under Section 506. This judgment was dated 09.04.2008.
- The appellant filed another appeal against his termination order dated 13th March 2003 which was disposed of on 29th January 2009. The appellate authority set aside the termination order and declared the suspension period as Dies-Non period and decided that nothing will be given to the appellant for the aforementioned period.
- The appellant filed a civil suit against this order and demanded the pay denied to him with 12% interest. The court decreed that the order of termination and the subsequent appeal decided by the appellate authority, to the extent where pay has been denied, is illegal, arbitrary and against the rules. The appellant was still denied salary for the period for which he had undergone imprisonment.
- The first appeal by the respondent-State was unsuccessful. The second appeal was allowed by the High Court where it ruled that as there had been only a reduction in sentence and not acquittal and hence the appellant is not entitled to monetary benefit.
- Thereafter, the appellant filed a review asserting that the court had erred in applying Rule 7.3 of the 1970 Rules when actually Rules 5, 13 and 15 should apply. He argued that he was placed under suspension on the first FIR in the embezzlement case for which he was acquitted and not the later FIR. The court ruled that the appellant was still under suspension till 13th March 2003 and allowed the review petition to the extend that a wrong provision (Rule 7.3) was quoted in the judgement which was sought to be reviewed.
- The present case is an appeal by the appellant against both – the original judgement by the High Court allowing the second appeal and the review.
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether the appellate authority was within its powers to deny salary to the appellant?
- Whether the appellant was entitled to salary for the period out of service?
CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT
- The counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellate authority, after setting aside the termination order, went out of its limits and acted illegally in denying the appellant the salary for the period under suspension.
- The counsel asserts that it is settled law that once the termination is set aside, the employee must get all the benefits.
CONTENTIONS OF REPONDENT
- The Advocate General for the respondent-State argues that the reliance on Rule 15(v)(f) of the ‘1970 Rules’ by the High Court was inappropriate, suggesting that the court misapplied or misunderstood this rule and that Rule 7.3 of the Rules was correctly applied in the original judgment, attempting to strengthen this argument by referencing Rule 7.3-B.
- He emphasizes that the appellant’s guilt was established in the trial court, where convictions under Section 324 and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) were secured. The High Court, on appeal, confirmed these convictions but reduced the period of imprisonment.
- The counsel asserts that the appellant should continue to be under suspension based on an earlier suspension order, suggesting a continuity of the appellant’s suspended status.
JUDGEMENT
The Court ruled that denying salary to the appellant was beyond the power of the appellate authority. The court considered Rule 7.3, emphasizing that it deals with situations where an employee succeeds in an appeal or other remedies after termination, determining how the period before dismissal is to be reckoned. The court acknowledged Rule 7.3-B, stating that it appears to be intended for cases where an employee is reinstated after suspension without further progression to penalties. It contrasts with Rule 7.3, which addresses cases of reinstatement after success in appeal proceedings. The court highlighted that when an employee succeeds in higher forums, the authority has the discretion to determine the entitlements for the period out of service as provided in Rule 7.3. The court considered Rule 15(v)(f), which provides for an order regarding whether the period from suspension or dismissal to reinstatement should be treated as a period spent on duty. It emphasized that it does not automatically entitle the employee to claim salary for the entire period.
The court upheld the trial court’s decree, finding that the condition imposed by the first appellate authority, denying salary and treating it as dies non, cannot be sustained. It also rejected the direction by the trial court and the first appellate authority to pay the appellant salary for the entire period out of service. The High Court’s judgment, which did not address these aspects, was set aside. The court modified the judgment, setting aside the decree directing payment of salary for the period the appellant was kept out of service. A decree was issued instructing the second respondent to consider how the period until the appellant’s reinstatement should be treated and to undertake this assessment within three months. The civil appeals were allowed, and the impugned judgment was set aside and modified as detailed above.
ANALYSIS
- Dies-Non Period – A “dies-non period” typically occurs when an employee is suspended, terminated, or faces disciplinary actions. During this period, the individual is not actively contributing to their job responsibilities, and their status is somewhat suspended. As a result, the employee does not receive compensation for the specified duration.
- Denial of Salary Beyond Authority – The court ruled that denying salary to the appellant for the period under suspension was beyond the authority of the appellate authority. It emphasized that such denial exceeded the power conferred upon the authority.
- Discretionary Power under Rule 7.3 – The judgment highlighted the discretionary power conferred by Rule 7.3, stating that when an employee succeeds in higher forums, the authority has the discretion to determine the entitlements for the period out of service.
- Modification of Previous Orders – The court modified the previous orders, setting aside the condition of denying salary and the direction to pay salary for the entire period. It instructed the second respondent to consider how the period until the appellant’s reinstatement should be treated.
CONCLUSION
In a decisive judgment, the court clarified that the denial of salary to the appellant was beyond the authority of the appellate body. Emphasizing the discretionary power under Rule 7.3, the court underscored that the authority, upon an employee’s success in higher forums, has the discretion to determine entitlements for the period out of service. The judgment modified prior orders, rejecting the denial of salary and the directive to pay for the entire period. Instead, it instructed the second respondent to reassess how the period until the appellant’s reinstatement should be treated within a specific timeframe. This nuanced decision reflects a careful balance between legal principles and practical considerations in the realm of employment disputes.
REFERENCES
This Article is written by Astha Samal student of National Law University Odisha; Intern at Legal Vidhiya.
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