Smt. Asha Qureshi v. Afaq Qureshi, AIR 2002 MP 263

Smt. Asha Qureshi v. Afaq Qureshi, AIR 2002 MP 263

FACTS OF THE CASE

The marriage of both parties on January 23, 1990, in Jabalpur, in conformity with the “Act” is a fact that is beyond doubt. They spent nearly a year together as husband and wife. The parties’ relationships subsequently deteriorated, and they began to live apart. According to Sections 24 and 25 of the “Act,” the respondent filed a petition, asking for a declaration of their marriage’s nullity and a decree of nullity. The respondent/husband claimed that after the marriage on January 23, 1990, he came to know that the appellant/wife was previously married to a man named Motilal Vishwakarma. Prior to the marriage of the parties, Motilal Vishwakarma had already passed away. The respondent/husband further alleged that the appellant/wife had concealed the fact of her marriage to Motilal Vishwakarma and that he had consented to marry her under the impression that she was a virgin. The respondent/husband alleged that the appellant/wife had committed fraud against him by concealing the fact from him.

LEGAL ISSUES

1. Whether the appellant/wife suppressed the fact of her earlier marriage and she being a widow?
2. Whether the suppression of any material fact amounts to fraud under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872?
3. Whether the appellant obtained the consent of the respondent/husband for marriage by exercising fraud?
4. Whether the respondent is entitled to seek a decree of nullity of marriage under Section 25 of the Special Marriage Act?

ARGUMENTS APPELLANT

The appellant’s wife refused the charges listed above. She vehemently denied concealing any important information or engaging in dishonest behaviour. She claims that the respondent/husband was fully aware of the appellant’s status as a widow at the time of the couples’ marriage.

ARGUMENTS RESPONDENT

However, the knowledgeable Attorney representing the respondent/husband backed the contested decision. The knowledgeable attorney for the respondent/husband claimed that a crucial fact—her prior marriage—was never disclosed by her to the latter. It was argued that the respondent/husband would not have been married to the appellant if he had known about her prior marriage. Therefore, it was argued that the Trial Court was correct in concluding that the appellant’s wife committed deception in order to secure the respondent’s/husband’s consent to the marriage. According to Section 25 of the Act, which outlines the circumstances under which a marriage solemnised under the “Act” may be avoided, would be helpful.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Regarding point (1), it was noted that the appellant/wife never stated in her written statement that she had informed the respondent about her previous marriage. She only obliquely claimed that the respondent was aware of her status as a widow. However, it was not argued that she told the respondent about her previous marriage before being married to him.

It was noted that in her previous statement the respondent learned of her widow status by her neighbours, and that she afterwards claimed to have told the respondent of this information herself. As a result, the appellant’s claims seems unreliable.

Regarding points (2) and (3), it is clear from the facts that the appellant had been previously married and was a widow when she married the respondent. This was a significant truth that she never disclosed to the respondent. Additionally, it was argued that the respondent would not have established marital relations with her if he had known about her prior marriage, demonstrating that, in accordance with Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act of 1872, the respondent’s permission to marry was obtained via the use of fraud.

It is not necessary for there to be any express verbal deception for there to be fraud under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act. It suffices if the person deceiving intentionally persuaded the defendant to sign a contract by having him believe what they knew to be untrue.

Regarding question (4), any marriage solemnized under the Act shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity in the following cases:

If the marriage has not been consummated owing to the wilful refusal of the respondent to consummate the marriage, or 

In case at the time of marriage, the respondent was pregnant by some other person other than the petitioner, or

If the consent of either party to the marriage was obtained by coercion or fraud, as defined in Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act 1872,

Provided that, in the case specified in clause (ii), the Court shall not grant a decree unless it is satisfied:

That at the time of marriage, the petitioner was ignorant of the facts alleged.

Those proceedings were instituted within a year from the date of the marriage, and

That marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a decree.

JUDGEMENT

Therefore, it is evident from the foregoing that the appellant’s prior marriages and her status as a widow at the time of her marriage to the respondent constituted a substantial fact. The appellant did not tell her husband, the respondent, about it. As stated above, the omission of a crucial fact would constitute the practise of fraud. It should be noted in the facts that, according to Subsection (4) of Section 17 of the Contract Act, it is not necessary for there to be any express verbal deception for fraud to exist. It suffices if it shows that the person deceiving purposefully misled the defendant into signing a contract by having him think something they knew to be untrue. The facts and circumstances of the case also seem to indicate that the appellant had a responsibility and obligation to inform the respondent about her prior marriage. She has not done that. The respondent/husband claims that he would not have become legally married to the appellant if he had known that she was already married to someone else. Therefore, it is obvious that actively suppressing the information about her prior marriage and widowhood would constitute significant misrepresentation. Given the foregoing, the appellant is entitled to the nullity decree he has requested under Section 25(iii) of the “Act.” This justifies the impugned decree that the Trial Court issued in the manner described above.

REFERENCES

https://indiankanoon.org

https://lawplanet.in/asha-qureshi-v-afaq-qureshi-case-summary-2002/

This Article is written by Anish Kumar student of Presidency University, Bangalore; Intern at Legal Vidhiya.

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