| CITATION | AIR 2010 SC 1974, (2010) 7 SCC 263 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT | 5th May 2010. |
| COURT | Supreme court of india |
| APPELLANT | Smt. Selvi & Ors. |
| RESPONDENT | State of Karnataka |
| BENCH | K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I. |
INTRODUCTION
The value of privacy is sometimes challenging to quantify but is essentially invaluable. Privacy, synonymous with a priceless asset, implies that personal matters should remain confidential, shielded from unwanted scrutiny. Even in instances where intrusion may seem justifiable or desirable, any breach of the right to privacy can result in immeasurable harm to the affected party.
A significant legal precedent addressing the constitutionality of various methods for collecting evidence is the case of Selvi Vs State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263. This case challenged the use of evidence-collecting techniques, arguing that such methods significantly impact the privacy rights of the accused, especially when these techniques are employed to extract statements from individuals who voluntarily choose not to assist law enforcement agencies in providing critical information related to a crime.
The judgment criticized the use of neuroscientific investigative techniques for extracting testimonials, deeming them in violation of Article 20(3) (Right to be protected against self-incrimination) and Article 21. Specifically, it was considered a breach of the accused person’s right to privacy. The ruling emphasized the mental privacy of the accused within the framework of the right to privacy in jurisprudence. Following this judgment, there has been a subsequent argument advocating for an extension of protection against self-incrimination to encompass the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. This extension is proposed to go beyond the confines of the courtroom and include the entire process of prosecution.
FACTS
In this particular case, the Supreme Court granted a special leave petition subsequent to receiving complaints about the unauthorized and non-consensual application of neuroscientific testing on suspects, witnesses, and accused individuals. The Court deliberated on the constitutionality of obtaining evidence through neuroscientific tests such as polygraph, BEAP, or “brain mapping.”
The polygraph test monitors physiological responses, including respiration, blood pressure, pulse, and galvanic skin resistance, with the aim of detecting lies or deception. The Court specifically examined the constitutional implications of utilizing neuroscientific tests like polygraph, BEAP, or “brain mapping” for evidence collection.
During the narcoanalysis test, sodium pentothal is intravenously administered, inducing a hypnotic trance that lowers inhibitions in the subject. The objective is to elicit information. The BEAP, on the other hand, analyzes brain activity in response to specific stimuli to determine the subject’s familiarity with certain information.
ISSUE
If the application of the contested techniques resulted in a violation of the “right against self-incrimination” safeguarded by Article 20(3) of the Constitution, it becomes imperative to assess whether these methods placed a justifiable constraint on “personal liberty” within the framework of Article 21 of the Constitution.
ARGUMENTS FROM PETITIONER SIDE
The petitioners argue that subjecting individuals to neuroscientific procedures under duress violates their right under Article 20(3) to “prevent self-incrimination.” Additionally, they posit that the scope of “personal liberty” in Article 21 has been broadened by the inclusion of “substantive due procedure.”
Furthermore, the petitioners claim that Article 21 encompasses a prohibition against harsh, inhumane, or humiliating treatment, asserting that compelling individuals to undergo the contested procedures would contravene this provision. Finally, they contend that the proposed strategies would infringe upon the test subjects’ rights to both physical and mental privacy.
The petitioners assert that the scientific validity of the examinations is questionable, emphasizing their confirmatory nature rather than exploratory. They argue that there is no basis to trust the evidence obtained through these procedures. To substantiate their claim, they rely on empirical studies that raise doubts about the reliability of the justifications provided for these techniques.
ARGUMENTS FROM RESPONDENT SIDE
The respondents contended that the utilization of these tests was essential for acquiring information to assist investigative authorities in evidence collection and crime prevention. Furthermore, they asserted that the administration of the tests did not inflict any physical harm, and the gathered data was exclusively employed for research purposes.
It was emphasized that the tests were intended solely for academic purposes and were explicitly not intended for use as evidence in a court of law. The respondents reiterated that their primary purpose was to aid investigative efforts and serve as a deterrent to criminal activities. Additionally, they maintained that the administration of these tests did not result in any physical harm to the subjects and that the collected data was strictly employed for research endeavors.
JUDGMENT
The court embarked on a meticulous examination of the evolution of the challenged law, its specific applications, methodologies, and the corresponding precedents in criminal justice and international law. Delving into the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3), the court concluded that compelling participation in neuroscientific tests would breach the prohibition on testimonial coercion.
The court further stipulated that, for the unimpeded conduct of neuroscientific tests, compliance with the requirements of “substantive due process” would be necessary in addition to those of Article 20(3). It ruled that inadvertently made comments had a higher likelihood of being untrue, thereby violating a person’s integrity and dignity. The right against self-incrimination, according to the court, aimed to ensure the reliability of testimony considered during trial.
Citing the interrelationship between the ‘right against self-incrimination’ and the ‘right to a fair trial,’ the court referred to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 1 SCC 248) to underscore that these rights, including substantive due process and the right to a fair trial, should be interpreted in tandem.
The court affirmed the decision in Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954 SCR 1077), emphasizing that Article 20’s protection against testimonial coercion applied universally to anyone accused of an offense. It clarified that the privilege against self-incrimination extended to all, encompassing those formally charged, suspects questioned in criminal cases, and witnesses apprehensive about potential criminal charges.
Acknowledging the argument presented by M.P. Sharma that being a witness applied to all voluntary activities, not limited to oral testimony, the court considered the standard set in State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad & Others ([1962] 3 SCR 10). It affirmed that imparting knowledge through oral or written statements affecting relevant facts would invoke the right under Article 20(3).
The court conclusively determined that the involuntary use of neuroscientific methods would result in testimonial reactions falling within the ambit of the right under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution.
While recognizing the applicability of laws of evidence in cases involving privacy issues, the court underscored that they could not serve as a basis for compelling individuals to surrender their privacy through physical invasion. It considered the abolition of self-incrimination as integral to “personal liberty” under Article 21, highlighting the intersection of Article 20(3) and the right to privacy. The court deemed it a violation of one’s right to privacy to subject them to such techniques against their will.
Tracing the development of the right to privacy, the court noted that the Indian Constitution did not explicitly mention a “right to privacy” comparable to the Fourth Amendment of the United States. It referenced key cases such as State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kharak Singh (AIR 1963 SC 1295), People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148, R. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Raj Gopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632. The court highlighted the significance of the Sharda v. Dharampal case (2003) 4 SCC 493, recognizing that the right to privacy could be curtailed in the face of conflicting interests.
In Sharda v. Dharampal, the court did not delve into Article 20(3) but focused on the distinction between testimonial acts and tangible evidence, taking into account contemporary circumstances. It concluded that the right to privacy, aimed at shielding the body and geographic locations from invasive state acts, should also consider the potential impact on Article 20(3).
The court unequivocally determined that subjecting individuals to the disputed practices infringed on their right to privacy. Additionally, it held that employing such tests against an individual’s will, even if they were not accused of a crime, would violate their Article 21 right to liberty and protection from humiliating and brutal treatment.
The court ruled that no tests could be conducted without the accused’s consent, which must be obtained in the presence of a judicial magistrate and the accused’s attorney. The resulting statement would not carry the status of a confessional statement but would be akin to a statement made to the police. The examination would be administered by an impartial organization, in the presence of a lawyer, and meticulously documented.
CONCLUSION
This legal case addresses a crucial issue of coerced testimony and introduces the concept of mental privacy for the first time. The ruling in this case transforms investigation techniques and extends the right not only to a witness in the courtroom but also to a person who is suspected or accused, thereby broadening the scope of protection against self-incrimination.
As a result of this case, it is now mandatory to obtain the consent of the individual for the administration of such scientific tests and to inform them about the procedure and potential consequences of the test. Consequently, this case stands as a landmark decision in the history of Article 20(3).
REFERENCES
1. https://www.legalserviceindia.com
3. https://papers.ssrn.com
Written by Mita Sarker an intern under legal vidhiya.
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