Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. NCT of Delhi) and Anr.

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PETITIONER:

SATVINDER KAUR

RESPONDENT:

STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI) AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/10/1999

BENCH:

K.T. THOMAS & M.B. SHAH

FACTS OF THE CASE

According to the appealing wife, she wed Rajinder Singh, the second respondent, on December 9, 1990.
She claims that the marriage happened in Delhi, where her parents also resided. On December 19, 1991, a daughter was born to the couple. The woman claims that she was expelled from her husband’s Patiala home on January 19, 1992, along with her 4-week-old daughter and nothing more than the clothes she was wearing at the time.
The wife filed a complaint (DD no. 18) at the Kotwali Police Station in Patiala on January 19, 1992, at 3:40 pm, citing several acts of torture and dowry demands against her husband and in-laws.
She then moved to live with her parents in Delhi, but her husband continued to make threats. She complained about her spouse to Delhi’s Women’s Cell on April 30, 1992.
Under Sections 406 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code [1], the Paschim Vihar police station in New Delhi filed FIR No. 34 of 1993 against Rajinder Singh (respondent No. 2) on January 23, 1993. The incident is alleged to have taken place on December 9, 1990, in Patiala. On February 4, 1993, Rajinder Singh was taken into custody in Patiala, and some goods were found. The Metropolitan Magistrate remanded him to judicial detention after he was presented to her. On February 9, 1993, he was ultimately granted bail and released.

HIGH COURTS DECISION

The husband (respondent no. 2) petitioned the Delhi High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code [2] to have FIR no. 34 of 1993 canceled after the FIR was lodged against him. He maintained that none of the grounds for an investigation or trial of an offense had any connection to Delhi and that the claims in the complaint were untrue and fabricated with malice.
On October 12, 1993, the High Court, however, dismissed his plea, ruling that the Delhi courts had jurisdiction to hear the case because the return of stridhan and accounting thereof was being sought there. This verdict was contested by the husband, and on April 4, 1995, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s ruling and remanded the case for further consideration of the issues submitted by the petitioner.

SUPREME COURTS DECISION

The Supreme Court observed that The High Court had merely examined the issue of territorial jurisdiction, and had not examined the merits of the case. Based on a memo entered at the Patiala Police Station, it appeared that the spouse had petitioned under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to have the proceedings canceled. The husband asserted that because the dispute was resolved out of court, criminal proceedings could not be started in Delhi.
The High Court did not, however, address the case’s merits in its order. [3]After hearing arguments from both parties, the High Court quashed the FIR because the investigating officer in Delhi lacked territorial authority. The Court also explained that the FIR could not be quashed based on the allegedly negotiated compromise between the parties on January 19, 1992, as it would depend on the proof offered by the parties about the in-laws’ return of the articles. This order is the topic of the current appeal, which was brought before the Supreme Court with special leave.
The appellant’s attorney contended that although the High Court had correctly ruled that the alleged settlement on January 19, 1992, could not be used as justification for voiding the FIR, it had made a critical error by concluding that the alleged reason for filing the FIR did not fall under the purview of the Delhi Police Station. The attorney also emphasized that the Supreme Court’s decision to remand the case was simply to review the impact of the claimed settlement, not to affect the High Court’s earlier ruling on territorial jurisdiction.

According to the FIR filed by the appellant on January 19, 1992, the respondent’s attorney claimed that the alleged offense occurred in Patiala and that the things given as part of the marriage were returned there. On the same day, a compromise was also noted at the Patiala Police Station. The attorney further emphasized that the appellant never asserted that she had not received back all of the dowry items or her Stridhan in her complaint to the DCP (Women Crime Cell), Delhi, on June 10, 1992.
The FIR filed by the appellant resulted in the harassment and incarceration of members of the respondent’s family, and the husband’s appeal under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the restoration of conjugal rights prompted the filing of the complaint. Other statements can be found in both the appellant’s response and the respondent’s affidavit. [4]
The justification offered by the appellant’s attorney, in our opinion, is sound. The question at hand is whether the High Court was correct to revoke the FIR based on the Delhi police station’s geographical jurisdiction. The SHO of the Paschim Vihar Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to look into the FIR filed by the appellant, as the alleged dowry items were given to the respondent in Patiala, and the cause of action for the offense under Section 498A IPC [5] arose in Patiala, according to the judge’s reasoning, which appears to have taken into account the provisions related to criminal trials. We think that the High Court’s conclusions are unlawful and mistaken because:

The judges contend that the High Court’s conclusions were erroneous for several reasons.

Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code [6] gives the Station House Officer (S.H.O.) the legal right to look into any cognizable case for which an F.I.R. has been filed.
Given the Investigating Officer’s territorial jurisdiction, there is no justification for interfering at this point of the investigation under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The Investigating Officer must file a report according to Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code [7] and send the case to the Magistrate qualified to take cognizance of the offense after concluding the investigation if they find that the cause of action for filing the F.I.R. did not arise within their territorial jurisdiction.

This is evident from the language of Criminal Procedure Code Section 156, which gives the police officer the authority to look into any cognizable offense.

The officer in charge of a police station has the authority to investigate any cognizable case without a Magistrate’s approval under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code.[8]This means that any matter that a court within the jurisdiction of that police station would have the authority to investigate or try following Chapter XIII of the Criminal Procedure Code may be investigated by the police officer. The clause further specifies that no action taken by a police officer in such a matter may ever be questioned because the officer lacked the authority to look into it. Any Magistrate qualified to act under Section 190 may also order such an investigation.
Even though territorial jurisdiction is crucial in identifying which police station has the power to look into a case, it shouldn’t be used as an excuse to cast doubt on a police officer’s ability to investigate Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code. No police officer’s actions can be questioned because they lacked the authority to conduct an investigation, according to subsection (2).
The outcome of the investigation must be submitted under Sections 168, 169, and 170. According to Section 170, the officer is required to forward the accused to a magistrate if there is sufficient proof or reasonable suspicion to do so. The FIR must be forwarded to the police station with jurisdiction if the investigating officer finds that the crime did not take place there. This does not, however, imply that a police officer can decline to file an FIR or conduct an investigation simply because it is outside of their purview.[9]
The Criminal Procedure Code’s Chapter XIII addresses the jurisdiction of criminal courts in investigations and trials. There is no absolute ban that an offense committed outside of the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, inquired about, or tried; rather, the provisions of this chapter give the court the authority to do so. The provisions under Sections 177 to 188 provide more information on this. For instance, Section 177 mandates that every crime must typically be investigated and adjudicated by the court where it was committed.[10]
When it is unclear which of several local areas an offense was committed, when an offense is committed in one local area and partially in another, when an offense is ongoing and is still being committed in more than one local area, or when an offense consists of multiple acts performed in various local areas, Section 178, which deals with the place of inquiry or trial, provides for these scenarios. In these circumstances, a court with jurisdiction over any of these local areas may investigate the offense or hold a trial.

The Criminal Procedure Code’s Sections 177 and 178 specify the location of the investigation and trial in criminal proceedings. Every offense must typically be investigated and adjudicated by a court in the local jurisdiction where it was committed, according to Section 177.
When it is unclear in which local area an offense was committed or if it was committed in more than one local area, Section 178 specifies the location of the investigation or trial. In certain situations, the investigation or trial can be handled by a court with authority over any of the pertinent local areas. So, it cannot be said that the investigating officer lacks territorial jurisdiction to look into a crime during the investigation stage.[11]

CONCLUSION OF THE CASE

The ability to halt criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code[12] should only be used in rare circumstances; it is emphasized in the conclusion. The integrity and veracity of the accusations mentioned in the complaint or the First Information Report should not be called into doubt by the court. The investigation process does not end with the filing of the FIR, so the court must proceed with extreme caution when considering whether to halt the investigation. At this point, the Court is unable to evaluate the evidence and reach a decision. The High Court should refrain from getting involved at first and let the legal process play out. The High Court’s decision to invalidate the FIR is overturned, and the probe Officer has been given instructions to wrap up the probe as quickly as feasible.

[1] (Indian Penal Code n.d.)

[2] (Indian Kanoon n.d.)

[3] (Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) … on 5 October, 1999 n.d.)

[4] (Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) … n.d.)

[5] (Section 498 A IPC n.d.)

[6] (Section 156 of CrPc n.d.)

[7] (Section 170 of CrPc n.d.)

[8] (Section 156 of CrPc n.d.)

[9] (What is zero FIR n.d.)

[10] (Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) on 5 October, 1999 2018)

[11] (Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) … n.d.)

[12] (The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 n.d.)