FACTS OF THE CASE
- The appellant herein has filed an appeal by special leave against the judgement and Order dated 17th January 2006 of the High Court of Gujarat. The High Court declined to interfere with the order dated 16th August, 2005, given by the First Class Judicial Magistrate, Sanand on a complaint filed by the appellant.
- The complaint was filed by the appellant against fourteen accused for alleged commission of offences under Sections 409 420, 406, 467, 468, 471, read with Section 120-B and 114 of the Indian Penal Code.
- The case of the appellant before the Magistrate is that it is running business of food products and had permitted M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory, wherein accused Mr. Jasvantbhai Somabhai Patel was one of the partners, to use the trademark “Ramdev” for seven years under agreement dated 4th June, 1990. However, M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory was closed on 30th May, 1994.
- Accused executed forged partnership documents with the help of other accused and thereby committed the alleged offences. Here in the appellant approached the Magistrate as the police refused to register a case and sought direction for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- However the Magistrate instead of directing investigation as prayed thought it fit to conduct further inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and sought report to the Police Sub-Inspector within thirty days. The grievance of the appellant before the High Court was that in view of the allegation that documents were in possession of the accused and were required to be seized, thus the Magistrate should have been ordered an investigation under Section 156(3) instead of conducting further inquiry under Section 202.
- Thus, there was non application of mind by the Magistrate and it was also submitted that even in the course of investigation for giving the report under Section 202, police is entitled to arrest the accused, but failed to do so.
- The High Court did not accept the stand of the appellant and declined to interfere with the order given by the Magistrate.
CONTENTION
- Contention on behalf of the Appellant before the Supreme Court was that the Magistrate and the High Court erred in declining to order investigation Under Section 156(3) which was necessary in view of the allegation of forgery of documents and stamp papers by the accused to create back dated partnership deeds by forging signatures of a dead person.
- Such documents being in custody of the accused could not be otherwise produced except on arrest in the course of investigation and in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Option of proceeding Under Section 202, as against Section 156(3), has to be exercised only when evidence has already been collected and what remained to be decided was whether there was sufficient ground to proceed.
- And thus appellant has filed an appeal by special leave against the judgement given by the High Court.
ISSUES
- Whether discretion of the Magistrate to call for a report under Section 202 instead of directing investigation 156(3) is controlled by any defined parameters?
- Whether in the course of investigation in pursuance of a direction under Section 202, the Police Officer is entitled to arrest an accused?
- Whether in the present case, the Magistrate erred in seeking report under Section 156(3)?
- PROVISIONS
The relevant provisions of Criminal Procedure Code are:
Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code have the provisions regarding the “Information to the police and their powers to investigate” and that of chapter XV is “Complaints to Magistrate”. Sections 156(3) and 202 are in chapter XII and XV respectively.
- 156- Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case.
- 202-Postponement of issue of process.
- JUDGEMENT/ ANALYSIS
To deal with the first issue as to whether the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3) or was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and what are the parameters for exercise of power under the two provisions.
Here in the case the contention of the appellant is that when there is allegation of forgery and discovery of documents is necessary, a Magistrate must order investigation Under Section 156(3) instead of proceeding Under Section 202. Nature of cases dealt with under Section 202 is cases where material available is not clear to proceed further. Here in the case has been held to be primarily of civil nature. The accused is alleged to have forged partnership. Whether such forgery actually took place, whether it caused any loss to the complainant and whether there is the requisite mens rea are the questions which are yet to be determined. The Magistrate has not found clear material to proceed against the accused.
In Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1, it was held that Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
In Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994) 4 SCC 260 it was ruled that, an arrest cannot be made on a mere allegation of offence against a person or in a routine manner. Constitutional rights of a person mandate that he not be arrested on simple suspicion of complicity in an offence. It cannot be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation is made as to the genuineness of the complaint.
In Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa (2013) 10 SCC 705, the court observed the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction Under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted.
Thus power under Section 202 is of different nature. Report sought under the said provision has limited purpose of deciding “whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding”. We answer the first question by holding that the direction Under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone instance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine “existence of sufficient ground to proceed”. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case.
To deal with the second question regarding the power of the police to arrest in the course of investigation under Section 202 with a view to give its report to the Magistrate to enable him to decide whether a case to proceed further existed. Careful examination of scheme of the Code reveals that in such situation power of arrest is not available with the police.
Nature of cases dealt with Under Section 202 is cases where material available is not clear to proceed further. The Magistrate is in session of the matter having taken the cognizance. He has to decide whether there is ground to proceed further. If at such premature stage power of arrest is exercised by police, it will be contradiction in terms.
In M.C. Abraham v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 2 SCC 649, it was observed that the arrest of an accused is a part of the investigation and is within the discretion of the investigating officer. Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for arrest by a police officer without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant. The section gives discretion to the police officer who may, without an order from a Magistrate and even without a warrant, arrest any person in the situations enumerated in that section. The police officer in the course of investigation can arrest any person who has been concerned with any cognizable offence or against whom reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned. Obviously, he is not expected to act in a mechanical manner and in all cases to arrest the accused as soon as the report is lodged. In appropriate cases, after some investigation, the investigating officer may make up his mind as to whether it is necessary to arrest the accused person. At that stage the court has no role to play. Since the power is discretionary, a police officer is not always bound to arrest an accused even if the allegation against him is of having committed a cognizable offence. Since an arrest is in the nature of an encroachment on the liberty of the subject and does affect the reputation and status of the citizen, the power has to be cautiously exercised.
In Emperor v. Bikha Moti AIR (1938) it was held that when a Magistrate has referred a complaint to the police for investigation under Section 202, it is not competent to the police to investigate the offence complained of independently of the Magistrate’s direction and send up the accused for a trial upon a charge-sheet.
Thus the police have no rights to arrest in the course of investigation under Section 20 of the Code.
The last question is whether in the present case the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3) instead of Section 202. The Magistrate has given reasons, which have been upheld by the High Court. The case has been held to be primarily of civil nature. The accused is alleged to have forged partnership. Whether such forgery actually took place, whether it caused any loss to the complainant and whether there is the requisite mens rea are the questions which are yet to be determined. The Magistrate has not found clear material to proceed against the accused. Even a case for summoning has not yet been found. While a transaction giving rise to cause of action for a civil action may also involve a crime in which case resort to criminal proceedings may be justified, there is judicially acknowledged tendency in the commercial world to give colour of a criminal case to a purely commercial transaction.
In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, 1964 (1) SCR 693 it was held that at the stage of enquiry under Section 202 CrPC, the test was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction.
In Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker AIR (1960) SC 1113 it was observed that the Section 202 says that the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against and direct an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. Thus the order of the Supreme Court should be upheld as there is no error found in the view taken by the Magistrate and the High Court in ordering an inquiry under Section 202 of the code instead of Section 156(3) .Herein the police cannot exercise power of arrest in the course of submitting report under Section 202. I agree to the judgement, in cases where prima facie has no evidence to prove the allegations against the accused it is not right to arrest the accused as it infringes the constitutional rights of the accused and also affects the reputation of the accused. Here in this case the appellant prima facie has no evidence to prove his allegations and thus whether or not a forgery has happened could be found only after the completion of civil proceedings going on regarding this matter, thus the decision of the Magistrate to conduct an inquiry was apt as that would help him proceed further and to find whether there is any ground for the allegations raised by the appellant.
- CONCLUSION
In this case the Supreme Court has upheld the judgement given by the High Court and Magistrate, to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code instead of Section 156(3) and also stated that the police cannot exercise power of arrest in the course of submitting a report under Section 202.
The Supreme Court in this case has come up with the following guidelines:
The Supreme Court here in the case has laid down that in a case prompt registration of FIR is mandatory, checks and balances on power of police are equally important. Power of arrest or of investigation is not mechanical; it requires application of mind in the manner provided. Existence of power and its exercise are different. Thus there should be a delicate balance maintained between the interest of society and liberty of an individual. Also the commercial offences have been put under the category of cases where FIR may not be warranted without enquiry.
It was also observed that a Magistrate has discretion either to direct registration of a case under Section 156(3) or to conduct inquiry himself as the situation may warrant. This discretion is to be exercised by the Magistrate in his wisdom and having regard to the nature of material available. Direction under Section 156(3) to register a criminal case and to investigate is to be exercised where the magistrate is satisfied that prima facie a cognizable offence has been committed.
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