This article is written by Pavni Dua of OP Jindal Global University, an Intern under Legal Vidhiya

Abstract

Contemporary armed conflicts are increasingly fought in densely populated urban environments, placing civilian lives at heightened risk. Urban warfare tends to collapse the traditional separation between military objectives and civilian spaces, exposing civilians to harm from airstrikes, artillery, sieges, and ground operations. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) seeks to mitigate such harm through principles including distinction, proportionality, and precaution, which are designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities and protect civilians and civilian objects. This article examines the extent to which existing IHL norms provide effective protection for civilians in urban warfare and analyses the practical challenges associated with their application. It explores how the conduct of hostilities in cities complicates compliance with core IHL principles and assesses the limitations of accountability and enforcement mechanisms, particularly in relation to war crimes. This article seeks to assert a framework that recognizes the gaps that exist between the law on paper and actual real world accountability.

Keywords

Urban Warfare, Protection of Civilians, International Humanitarian Law, Distinction and Proportionality, Civilian Harm, War Crimes and Accountability, Armed Conflict in Cities

Introduction

Modern armed conflicts increasingly take place in cities, endangering civilians’ lives as well as key infrastructure. This is, however, not a modern phenomenon. It is something of a war strategy that has always existed, from famous sieges like Constantinople and Jerusalem to decisive urban fights like Stalingrad, Berlin and Seoul; cities have historically played a strategic role when it comes to combat. Cities are often chosen as battlegrounds because of their control over trade, administration and key resources; loss of civilian lives was seen as collateral. The emergence of modern International Humanitarian Law (IHL) codified the protection of innocent civilian lives.  Articles 48, 51 and 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions serve as a bedrock for safeguarding civilian lives during armed conflict. However, when it comes to actual on-ground protection, these safeguards are often not enough. Parties often disregard or weaponize these laws, hospitals and protected buildings are used as shelters by combatants in their war strategies. The loss of civilian lives is not only a grotesque moral failure but a bigger question on the applicability of IHL. Treaties are often not enough to protect against real-world damage in urban warfare; civilian harm is inevitable, but steps must be taken to regulate it.

Nature of Urban Warfare and Civilian Harm

The ICRC has raised concerns about the way that provisions, which were meant to protect civilian lives while maintaining a delicate balance between military objectives, are now being increasingly interpreted in a manner that justifies the very conduct they sought to ban. This is particularly the case in attacks targeted towards destroying critical infrastructure in densely populated areas, cutting off access to resources for citizens. Another major concern is the use of IHL-granted protection to civilians in military tactics where armed groups often operate from within densely populated civilian environments rather than from distinct military zones. Fighters may live among civilians, store weapons in residential buildings, or launch attacks from within urban neighbourhoods. Unlike conventional battlefields, cities rarely allow for a clear spatial separation between civilians and combatants. The use of weapons designed for wide-area effects, such as heavy explosive weapons, including airstrikes, artillery, and rocket fire, to target military objectives within cities poses a grave risk of incidental harm due to blast radius, fragmentation, and secondary effects such as building collapse. Sieges further compound civilian harm. By encircling urban areas and restricting access to food, water, electricity, and medical supplies, sieges disproportionately affect civilian populations who have little ability to leave or protect themselves.

Legal Framework under IHL

The ICRC has on its study of customary international humanitarian law, identified 161 rules meant to ensure a fair and just conduct. It has enshrined in Rule 1, The Principle of Distinction, which mandates that distinction be made between combatants and civilians in an armed conflict. This principle was first laid down in the St. Petersburg Declaration, which states that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”. In conjunction with such, also exists the Principle of Proportionality enshrined in Rule 14 of ICRC and Art 51(5) of the Additional protocols, which bans the use of what may be considered “excessive” in relation to what would be a direct military advantage of said act. It is the term “military advantage” that has been a subject of major discourse surrounding the interpretation of IHL. States have devised interpretations that suit them the best. Australia, Canada and New Zealand have stated that the term “military advantage” includes the security of the attacking forces. Rules 15 to 21 of the ICRC’s Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) form the core obligations for Precautions in Attack. These rules mandate that parties to a conflict must take specific steps to protect the civilian population and civilian objects from the incidental effects of hostilities. Rule 15 is the foundational rule for the section. It requires that, in the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, individual civilians, and civilian objects. Parties must take all feasible precautions to avoid, and at least minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.

Challenges in Urban Warfare

Now, while there exists an established framework to protect citizens in IHL, when it comes to actual, real combat, it often breaks down completely. While there exists the Principle of Distinction, how does one actually distinguish between civilians and fighters in cities? It is soldiers/combatants in high-pressure situations, in a matter of split seconds, that have to take these calls. With combatants disguising themselves as civilians and seeking shelter in civilian-populated areas, the principle of distinction does little to minimise civilian casualties during war. While there exists the Principle of Proportionality, how does one actually calculate proportionality when civilians live everywhere? This principle has often been misinterpreted and used to justify grotesque military tactics; after all, proportionality cannot be calculated through some mathematical formula when it directly involves the loss of human lives on both sides. Authorities often condemn mass destruction weapons as they are a major cause of civilian harm and large collateral damage, however, even the use of precision weapons can result in insurmountable civilian damage. Warnings and evacuations aren’t always effective in a situation of crisis, where loud sirens often do more to fuel the atmosphere of panic and fear than to act as warnings. Civilians are scared and cannot do much to escape when their whole city has been turned into a battleground.

Accountability and Enforcement

The question of accountability for civilian harm in urban warfare presents one of the most persistent challenges in the application of International Humanitarian Law. While IHL provides a detailed framework regulating the conduct of hostilities and expressly prohibits attacks directed against civilians and civilian objects, translating these legal norms into effective enforcement mechanisms has proven exceptionally difficult in densely populated conflict settings. Urban warfare frequently generates large-scale civilian casualties, yet the legal responsibility for such harm is rarely established in a clear or timely manner, contributing to a broader culture of impunity. Under international criminal law, serious violations of IHL committed during urban hostilities may constitute war crimes, including intentionally directing attacks against civilians, launching indiscriminate attacks, or conducting attacks in violation of the principle of proportionality. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides jurisdiction over such crimes, including those arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. In theory, the ICC represents the primary international mechanism for holding individuals criminally responsible for unlawful conduct in urban warfare. In practice, however, the Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction is constrained by both legal and political limitations.

A central obstacle lies in the evidentiary challenges associated with urban combat. Establishing individual criminal responsibility requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a specific perpetrator possessed the requisite intent and knowledge at the time of the attack. In urban warfare, military operations are often conducted through complex chains of command, relying on intelligence assessments, real-time targeting decisions, and automated or long-range weapons systems. Civilian casualties may result from cumulative operational decisions rather than a single identifiable act, making it difficult to attribute responsibility to individual commanders or operators. Furthermore, access to conflict zones is frequently restricted, evidence is destroyed during ongoing hostilities, and reliable forensic investigation is often impossible while fighting continues.

The requirement to demonstrate intent poses an additional hurdle. Many alleged violations in urban warfare involve disputes over proportionality, which is inherently context-dependent and assessed based on information available at the time of the attack. Proving that an attacker knowingly launched a disproportionate strike, rather than making a wrong but lawful military judgment, is legally demanding. This difficulty is increased by the fact that military actors often frame civilian harm as incidental or unavoidable due to the conduct of opposing forces operating within civilian areas. As a result, even where civilian casualties are extensive, establishing the mental element necessary for war crimes prosecutions remains challenging. Beyond evidentiary issues, enforcement is further undermined by political considerations. The ICC relies heavily on State cooperation for arrests, access to evidence, and enforcement of its decisions. In situations involving powerful States or politically sensitive conflicts, cooperation is frequently withheld, limiting the Court’s practical reach. Additionally, many States involved in urban warfare are not parties to the Rome Statute, further restricting the ICC’s jurisdiction unless the situation is referred by the UN Security Council, a process itself subject to political vetoes and geopolitical interests.

Domestic accountability mechanisms, while theoretically available under the principle of universal jurisdiction or national military justice systems, also face significant limitations. States may be unwilling to prosecute their own officials or military personnel, particularly where such prosecutions conflict with national security narratives or political priorities. Investigations may be superficial, delayed, or narrowly framed, reinforcing the perception that accountability mechanisms function more as political safeguards than as genuine avenues for justice.

When we take together all these factors, it demonstrates that while the gap between the legal framework for protecting civilians in urban warfare and its enforcement. Even where civilians are harmed unlawfully and credible allegations of war crimes arise, accountability is the exception rather than the rule. This gap between legal norms and their enforcement underscores the central weakness of the current international system, not the absence of law, but the persistent inability or unwillingness to apply it effectively in the context of modern urban warfare.

Conclusion

The protection of civilian lives in urban warfare represents one of the most pressing challenges facing contemporary International Humanitarian Law. As modern armed conflicts are increasingly fought in densely populated cities, civilians are exposed to heightened risks arising from the convergence of military operations and everyday civilian life. Urban environments blur the traditional spatial and functional separation between combatants and civilians, placing immense strain on the core principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution that underpin IHL. While these principles remain legally sound and universally recognised, their effective application in urban settings has proven deeply problematic. IHL provides a comprehensive framework aimed at safeguarding civilians during hostilities, including clear prohibitions on direct attacks against civilians, indiscriminate attacks, and the starvation of civilian populations. The law also imposes positive obligations on parties to take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm. However, the realities of urban warfare, characterised by fighters operating within civilian areas, the widespread use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, and prolonged siege tactics, expose significant gaps between legal norms and operational practice.

Civilian harm in urban warfare is often justified through claims of military necessity or the conduct of opposing forces. While IHL recognises that incidental civilian casualties may occur during lawful attacks, it does not permit the erosion of civilian protection simply because compliance is difficult. The continued reliance on heavy firepower in cities, coupled with the strategic embedding of military objectives within civilian infrastructure, risks normalising high levels of civilian casualties as an unavoidable consequence of warfare. Such normalisation undermines the humanitarian purpose of IHL and threatens to weaken its normative force over time. The shortcomings of civilian protection are further compounded by the limitations of accountability and enforcement mechanisms. Although war crimes committed in urban warfare fall squarely within the scope of international criminal law, practical barriers, including evidentiary challenges, the requirement to establish intent, and political resistance, frequently prevent meaningful accountability. The International Criminal Court, while symbolically significant, remains constrained by jurisdictional limits and dependence on State cooperation. Domestic mechanisms and universal jurisdiction offer alternative avenues for justice, but these too are often shaped by political considerations rather than legal obligation. As a result, unlawful civilian harm in urban warfare is rarely met with proportionate legal consequences.

Ultimately, the central problem is not the absence of legal rules protecting civilians, but the apparent failure to enforce them effectively in complex urban conflict environments. Such action requires more than reaffirming existing legal principles; it demands greater political will, enhanced operational compliance, and a genuine commitment to accountability at both international and domestic levels. States and armed actors must adapt their military doctrines and tactics to reflect the realities of urban warfare, prioritizing civilian harm mitigation as a legal obligation rather than a discretionary policy choice. In conclusion, International Humanitarian Law remains an essential normative framework for protecting civilian lives in armed conflict, including in urban settings. However, its credibility and effectiveness depend on the extent to which its principles are meaningfully applied and enforced. As urban warfare continues to dominate the landscape of modern conflict, the protection of civilians must move beyond rhetorical commitment and become a central measure of lawful and legitimate military conduct. Without sustained efforts to close the gap between law and practice, civilian populations will continue to bear the heaviest burden of contemporary warfare.

References

1. Charter of the United Nations arts. 2(4), 51.
2. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes (St. Petersburg Declaration), Dec. 11, 1868.
3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
5. International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), https://www.refworld.org/reference/research/icrc/2005/en/98261.
6. International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts.
7. International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf.

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