JAGAT BAHADUR SINGH V. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

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The Supreme Court is more than a Court of appeal. It exercises power ely when there is supreme need. It is not the fifth court of appeal but the final court of the nation. Therefore, even if legal flaws may be electronically detected, we cannot interfere sans manifest injustice or substantial question of public importance.

~ VR Krishna Iyer, J.[1]

INTRODUCTION:

In the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

Equivalent citations: 1966 AIR 945, 1966 SCR (2) 822

Bench: 3

MUDHOLKAR, J.R.; SARKAR, A.K.; BACHAWAT, R.S.

 Decided on: 30/11/1965

PETITIONER:
JAGAT BAHADUR SINGH
       VERSUS
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accussed is a police officer who was on a 15 days leave to return to his village Hati in District Satna but instead went to Jabalpur wearing the uniform of a police head constable; where also he met Ram Kumar (complainant in the particular case) near a pan shop.
He told Ram Kumar that a theft had been reported from that area and that he had come to Jabalpur to investigate into it and that Ram Kumar answered the particulars of the man wanted in connection with the theft.
To a matter of fact Ram Kumar was also wearing a gold ‘mohar’, threaded in a piece of string, round his neck; which was questioned by him and Ram Kumar; P.W. 1; replied that he had received it as a present from his father-in-law.
The appellant(police constable) again and again tried to pressurize him that it was a stolen article but Ram Kumar kept on resisting it.
The appellant than took him with himself into a rikshaw and instead of stopping at the police station proceeded to Katni road and after getting out of vehicle beated the complainant and snatched the gold mohar from his neck.
While they were standing on the road to Katni a motor truck happened to pass that way. The appellant stopped it and got into it along with Ram Kumar and proceeded towards Katni. After reaching the place the appellant sent off Ram Kumar to fetch a cup of tea for him.
While Ram Kumar was away the appellant got into a goods train which happened to be leaving Katni railway station in the direction of Satna at that time and travelled in the brake van. Ram Kumar, finding that the constable had escaped, he than lodged a report with the police.
He was found and than charged u/s r ss. 170, 342 and 392, Indian Penal Code but was acquitted by the trying Magistrate of all these offences.
The High Court to which an appeal was preferred by the State Government set aside the acquittal and convicted the appellant of each of these offences. It sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year in respect of the offence under s. 170 and to a period of six months for an offence under s. 342. In respect of the offence under S. 392 the High Court sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years and further ordered that all the sentences should run concurrently.
The accused police constable than pleaded an appeal in this Hon’ble Supreme Court.

ISSUES RAISED:

Is the appellate court is competent to impose a punishment higher than the maximum that could  have been imposed by the trial court?

STATUTES CONCERNED:



Sections:  31(1),  32 and 423(1)(a) of the Code  of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898)

These are read as follows:-

31. Sentences in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial.(1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), sentence him for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after

the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently..[2]

32. Amendment of section 378.- In section 378 of the principal Act,-

(i) for sub- section (1), the following sub- section shall be substituted, namely:-” (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2), and subject to the provisions of sub- sections (3) and (5),-

(a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non- bailable offence;

(b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court[ not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.”;

(ii) in sub- section (2), for the portion beginning with the words” the Central Government may” and ending with the words” the order of acquittal”, the following shall be substituted, namely:-” the Central Government may, subject to the provisions of sub- section (3), also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal-

(a) to the Court of Session, from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non- bailable offence;

(b) to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court[ not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision”;

(iii) in sub- section (3), for the words” No appeal”, the words” No appeal to the High Court” shall be substituted.[3]

423. Warrant for levy of fine issued by a Court in any territory to which this Code does not extend. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or in any other law for the time being in force, when an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine by a Criminal Court in any territory to which this Code does not extend and the Court passing the sentence issues a warrant to the Collector of a district in the territories to which this Code extends, authorising him to realise the amount as if it were an arrear of land revenue, such warrant shall be deemed to be a warrant issued under clause (b) of sub- section 1 of section 421 by a Court in the territories to which this Code extends, and the provisions of sub- section (3) of the said section, as to the execution of such warrant shall apply accordingly.[4]

SIMILAR CASES:

This decision was followed in Emperor v. Abasali Yusufalli[5] and also in Mehi Singh v. Mangal Khandu [6]; Emperor v. Muhammad Yakub Ali [7]; and Maung E Maung v. The King. In in re Tirumal Raju[8] it has been held that an appellate court is not competent to impose a punishment higher than the maximum that could have been imposed by the trial court. It seems to us that these cases lay down the correct law.

THE JUDGMENT:

View of SC in regard to the decision of High Court as the same person who committed the particular offence (to identify correctly).

This Court does not ordinarily interfere with a finding of the High Court based on appreciation of evidence, unless there are strong reasons for doing so. Mr. Agarwala could point out no other reason except this that the High Court had taken a view of evidence different from that of the trying Magistrate and set aside the appellant’s acquittal and that therefore this Court should appraise the evidence . That of course is no ground for discarding the finding of the High Court. The High Court has given good reasons in its judgment for accepting the prosecution evidence for coming to the conclusion that the identity of the appellant was established. It has also given good reasons for not accepting the defence evidence. In these circumstances we did not permit learned counsel to take us through the evidence adduced in the case.

In respect to acquittance by the Magistrate:

The only other question urged by learned counsel is regarding sentence. He points out that the appellant was tried by a Magistrate of the First Class and that under s. 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the maximum sentence which such a Magistrate is entitled to pass is imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years and a fine not exceeding Rs. 2,000/-. There is nothing to show that the learned Magistrate was invested with powers under s. 30 of the Code by virtue of which he could, under s. 34, pass a sentence of imprisonment up to the limit of seven years. If the learned Magistrate, instead of acquitting the appellant, had con- victed him, he could, therefore, not have passed a sentence of imprisonment in respect of the offence under s. 392 for a term exceeding two years and that, therefore, the High Court was incompetent to pass the sentence of imprisonment of four years.

Jurisdiction of High Court as an appellant court:

An appeal court is after all “a court of error”, that is, a court established for correcting an error. If, while purporting to correct an error, were to do something which was beyond the competence of the trying court, how could it be said to be correcting an error of the trying court ? No case has been cited before us in which it has been held that the High Court, after setting aside an acquittal, can pass a sentence beyond the competence of the trying court. Therefore, both on principle and authority it is clear that the power of the appellate court to pass a sentence must be measured by the power of the court from whose judgment an appeal has been brought before it. The High Court was thus in error in sentencing the appellant to undergo imprisonment in respect of the offence under s. 392 for a period exceeding two years. Accordingly we allow the appeal partially and reduce the sentence of imprisonment in respect of the offence under S. 392 from rigorous imprisonment of four years to a period of two years. Subject to this modification we dismiss the appeal.

Thus, the appeal was partly allowed by this court.

CONCLUSION:

The police constable was held guilty under the particular offences.
The power of the appellate court to pass a sentence must be measured by the power of the court from whose judgment an appeal has been brought before it.

Name: Madhav Puri, BA.LL.B (1^st Year),College: Panjab University, Swami Sarvanand Giri, Hoshiarpur.