Ashby vs. White, (1703) 92 ER 126

Citation	(1703) 92 ER 126, (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938, (1703) 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 253
Year of Judgment	1 January, 1703
Court	Court of King’s Bench
Plaintiff	Mr. Matthew Ashby
Defendant	William White
Bench	Holt CJ, Powell J, Powy J, Gould J.
Referred	UK constitutional law, English tort law and Damnum Sine Injuria

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Mr. Ashby encountered a situation where he was unjustly deprived of his voting rights during a parliamentary election due to the erroneous actions of the defendant, Mr. White, who served as the returning officer. This occurrence sparked significant public attention and discourse within Parliament, eventually becoming known as the Aylesbury election case. Within the House of Lords, Peter King, 1st Baron King, prominently advocated for the right of electors to seek redress through common law mechanisms to challenge the nullification of their votes. This advocacy occurred despite the Conservative party’s staunch insistence on the supremacy of the House of Commons in matters related to electoral rights. Sir Thomas Powys defended William White’s actions in the House of Lords, asserting that the authority to adjudicate election cases rested exclusively with the House of Commons, rather than the judicial courts.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the particular case under examination, the plaintiff, Mr. Ashby, found himself subjected to an unjust impediment imposed by the defendant, Mr. White, who held the official position of returning officer during the course of a parliamentary election. This obstruction unjustly curtailed Mr. Ashby’s inherent and fundamental entitlement to exercise his right to vote as a citizen. It is noteworthy that Mr. Ashby, in his capacity as the plaintiff, actively sought to participate in the electoral process, and notably, he emerged as the triumphant candidate in the election in question.

However, the defendant, discharging his duties as the returning officer, proceeded to obstruct and impede Mr. Ashby’s exercise of his voting franchise. It is of critical importance to underscore that while Mr. Ashby did not suffer direct financial or material losses as a consequence of this impediment, a distinct and discernible legal injury became manifest. This legal injury was primarily rooted in the unwarranted denial of Mr. Ashby’s fundamental right to cast his vote in the election.

In response to this affront to his voting rights, Mr. Ashby initiated legal proceedings to seek a remedy for the harm suffered. Specifically, he pursued a legal recourse by instituting a claim for damages against the defendant. In the capacity of the presiding authority over the case, Lord Holt played a pivotal role. He undertook the task of assessing and adjudicating Mr. Ashby’s claim for damages.

Lord Holt, in his judicial capacity, not only acknowledged the validity of Mr. Ashby’s claim but also substantiated it by firmly establishing that a transgression against a legally recognized and protected right had unmistakably occurred. This ruling by Lord Holt underscored the principle that a breach of a legal right, irrespective of the absence of demonstrable financial or pecuniary losses, warranted legal redress and compensation..

ISSUES

The issue raised are as follows-

1. Whether an individual possesses a recognized legal entitlement to exercise their voting privilege in a parliamentary election?
2. Whether there is a legal duty incumbent upon the returning officer to permit all duly qualified voters to exercise their voting rights?
3. Whether an individual can initiate legal proceedings seeking compensation for the infringement of a legally protected right, even in the absence of tangible financial harm or loss?

ARGUMENTS 

Argument for the Appellant:

The plaintiff has filed a petition asserting that, as a qualified voter, his vote was not properly registered, leading to his exclusion from the electoral process. Consequently, he seeks compensation from the defendant.

1. Fundamental Nature of Voting Rights: The plaintiff’s right to cast his vote in an election, which directly contributes to the selection of representatives responsible for legislating and governing, is of paramount significance. This right is acknowledged as exceedingly vital in various statutes, as evidenced by the statute of 34 & 35 Henry VIII, chapter 13, titled “An Act for Making of Knights and Burgesses within the County and City of Chester.” In this statute, it is explicitly recognized that the denial of this privilege has historically resulted in considerable harm and losses to inhabitants, encompassing damage to their property, well-being, and the effective governance of their county. This legislative stance underscores the immense value attached to the right to vote, with Parliament deeming its absence as a source of substantial loss and harm.
2. Parliamentary Acknowledgment: This profound significance of voting rights is further exemplified in the 25 Charles II, chapter 9, titled “An Act to enable the County Palatine of Durham to send knights and burgesses to serve in Parliament.” This act acknowledges the absence of the liberty and privilege of electing and dispatching knights and burgesses to the High Court of Parliament as a matter of concern. The act thereby underscores that the right to vote in the election of representatives holds tremendous importance, emphasizing that the deprivation of this right is a substantial injury.

Argument for the Respondent:

The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s unregistered vote actually favored the winning candidate, and thus, no harm or injury has been suffered by the plaintiff.

1. Power of Commons in Election Cases: The defendant argues that the determination of election-related matters falls within the exclusive purview of the Commons, not the judicial courts. Therefore, the plaintiff’s case, based on an alleged injury, is not maintainable.
2. Understanding Injury and Damage: The defendant contends that the absence of harm or damage to the plaintiff’s interests is a crucial point to consider. It is asserted that while damage is often associated with pecuniary losses, injury itself inherently implies harm. Even if the plaintiff has not incurred any financial cost due to the alleged injury, the injury remains, hindering the plaintiff’s exercise of his right. This analogy is likened to cases of slanderous words where financial loss need not occur for an action to be pursued. Likewise, in situations such as a cuff on the ear or trespassing on another’s property without causing quantifiable harm, legal actions can still be pursued because they represent personal injuries.
3. Protection of Franchise: It is further argued that trespass vi et armis, a legal action applicable to property invasions, does not apply to the violation of another’s franchise. In cases where an individual’s franchise, like the right to return writs (return brevium), is invaded, an action of trespass on the case is the appropriate legal recourse, even in the absence of tangible losses. In the current case, the plaintiff’s right to vote has been obstructed, necessitating legal redress.
4. Multiplicity of Actions: The argument against potential multiplicity of actions is dismissed on the grounds that, if injuries are multiplied through wrongful actions, a corresponding multiplication of legal actions becomes necessary. This principle underscores that every person who suffers an injury is entitled to recompense for the harm inflicted upon them.

JUDGEMENT

Lord Holt’s Judgment:

“Each subject of England possesses the entitlement to participate in the electoral process for the selection of Members of Parliament. This right is inherent to every Englishman, as it enables them to elect individuals responsible for legislating and to be bound by the laws thus enacted. It is a right of such intrinsic nature that it cannot be abrogated without the individual’s explicit consent.

“The returning officer, in their official capacity, is a public official entrusted with the duty to execute their responsibilities in accordance with the law. Should the returning officer refuse a qualified voter the opportunity to cast their vote, such an action constitutes a contravention of the law, rendering the officer liable to legal action for damages.

“In the present case, the plaintiff qualifies as a voter by meeting the necessary criteria. The plaintiff tendered their vote to the defendant, who holds the position of returning officer for the election in question. Regrettably, the defendant declined to permit the plaintiff to exercise their voting right. This refusal, unequivocally, was an unlawful act, amounting to a civil wrong.

“The defendant posits that the plaintiff did not suffer any concrete harm resulting from the refusal to allow them to vote. Nonetheless, it is my contention that the violation of a legal right in itself constitutes a harm. The plaintiff possesses the right to vote, and the defendant’s transgression of that right is adequate to bestow upon the plaintiff the entitlement to seek compensation in the form of damages.

“Consequently, I find in favor of the plaintiff and hereby award them damages amounting to five pounds.”

Significance of the Judgment:

Lord Holt’s pronouncement in Ashby v White bears significant legal import for several reasons. Firstly, it codified the principle of “injuria sine damno,” which signifies that an individual may pursue legal action for damages even in the absence of demonstrable financial losses. This principle has found broad application across various cases, encompassing those involving encroachments upon fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and the right to privacy.

Secondly, Lord Holt’s judgment enshrined the right to vote as a fundamental and intrinsic entitlement. This right is indispensable for the effective operation of a representative democracy, affording citizens the capacity to engage in the political process and exert influence over their nation’s governance.

Thirdly, Lord Holt’s verdict served as a safeguard for the right to vote. By permitting individuals to seek damages in the event of an infringement upon their voting rights, Lord Holt’s decision served as a deterrent against unwarranted interference with the exercise of the right to vote.

Arguments Supporting the Court’s Ruling:

1. Inviolable Nature of the Right to Vote: The right to vote is a fundamental entitlement. It stands as a cornerstone of the proper operation of a representative democracy, affording citizens the means to partake in the political process and influence the governance of their nation.
2. Infringement of Legal Rights Constitutes Harm: The encroachment upon a legally recognized right constitutes a harm, regardless of the absence of any other tangible or monetary loss. Such infringement signifies wrongdoing, even if it does not result in financial detriment or physical injury. In such cases, the affected party has sustained a harm warranting compensation.
3. Protection of the Right to Vote: The court’s judgment serves to safeguard the right to vote. By permitting individuals to seek damages in instances where their voting rights have been violated, the court acts as a deterrent against unwarranted interference with the exercise of this fundamental right.

Arguments Opposing the Court’s Ruling:

1. Potential for Frivolous Litigation: The court’s decision has the potential to give rise to a proliferation of frivolous lawsuits. Allowing individuals to pursue damages even in the absence of demonstrable financial harm could result in an influx of legal actions lacking substantial merit.
2. Erosion of Election Officials’ Authority: The court’s decision may undermine the authority of election officials. If election officials can be subjected to legal claims for damages in cases where individuals perceive their voting rights to be impeded, it might impede the efficient execution of electoral duties and deter individuals from taking on these roles.

IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE

In the case of Ashby v. White, which pertains to voting rights in the eighteenth century, it is often asserted that it set forth the principle that a remedy must exist for every legal right, a concept often articulated in Latin as “Ubi jus, ibi remedium.” This principle has held significant sway in Anglo-American legal discourse. Scholars and legal thinkers, dating back to Blackstone, have contended that the Ubi jus principle is foundational to the rule of law. Marbury v. Madison applied this Ubi jus principle when establishing the basis for judicial review, and subsequent courts have relied on it in various contexts. Some have even argued that the Due Process Clause mandates adherence to the Ubi jus principle.

Despite common belief, Ashby v. White, often regarded as the originator of this principle, did not, in fact, establish the notion that every right must be accompanied by a remedy. While the historical documentation resists easy categorization of the “holding” in Ashby, the ultimate resolution of the case implicitly rejected the Ubi jus principle. Both English and American courts of that era understood Ashby as ruling that only certain infringements of rights led to remedies enforceable through the judiciary.

RFERENCES

https://indiankanoon.org

https://ww.scconline.com

https://www.manupatrafast.com

This Article is written by Anoskaa Barui of Symbiosis Law School, Pune, Intern at Legal Vidhiya.