A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE OF U.P. V. DEOMAN UPADHYAYA AND SECTION 27 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

ABSTRACT

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is one of the major pillars of Indian criminal jurisprudence; governing the admissibility, relevance, and credibility of evidence. Among its various provisions, Section 27 has been considered to be particularly controversial. The constitutionality of this clause has been questioned, especially in relation to Article 14 (equality before the law) and Article 20(3) (protection against self-incrimination). The landmark case of State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1960) brought these debates to the forefront, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 27. This article provides an exhaustive exploration of how Deoman Upadhyaya shaped the interpretation of Section 27, its jurisprudential implications, and its ongoing significance in striking a balance between the need for an investigation and fundamental rights

KEYWORDS

State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, constitutional validity, Article 14, self-incrimination, custodial statements, fundamental rights, Article 14

INTRODUCTION

The adjudication of criminal evidence remains a perennial issue in any legal system, and in India, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, has played an essential role in standardizing evidentiary rules inherited from British common law. Among its various provisions, Section 27 has attracted considerable debate due to its dual function: on one hand, it provides investigative efficiency by allowing only those parts of an accused’s statement that directly lead to the discovery of material evidence to be admitted; on the other hand, it has raised constitutional concerns regarding the protection of an accused’s right against self-incrimination[1] and equality before the law, as enshrined in Article20(3) and Article 14 of the Constitution.

The case of State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1960) remains a seminal decision that addressed these complex issues. This article will discuss the historical evolution of the relevant provisions, the factual matrix of the case, the legal and constitutional issues raised, and the judicial reasoning employed by the courts. It also provides a critical analysis of the judgment, examines dissenting views, and suggests avenues for reform. By doing so, the article highlights the delicate balance the judiciary must strike between protecting individual rights and advancing the interests of justice.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT AND SECTION 27

A. Evolution of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

The Indian Evidence Act was enacted during British rule in India to consolidate and codify the rules governing the admissibility, collection, relevance, and weight of evidence in Indian courts. Before its enactment, Indian courts followed a mix of both English common law and customary practices that often led to inconsistent judicial decisions. The Act was designed to bring uniformity and a systematic framework in the evidentiary process.

Section 27 of the Act deals with statements made by an accused person while they are in police custody. Under other parts of the law[2] (like Sections 25 and 26), any confession or statement made to a police officer is usually not allowed in court because it might have been forced. However, Section 27 makes an exception: if a part of that statement leads directly to the discovery of a piece of evidence, that part of the statement can be used in court.

For example, if a suspect in custody tells a police officer where a weapon is hidden and the weapon is later found there, then the information about the weapon’s location can be used as evidence. This rule is based on the idea that if the police find the evidence as the suspect said, then that part of the statement is likely true.

B. The Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Recovery

The rationale behind Section 27 is that, if a suspect’s statement leads to the discovery of a fact ( like the recovery of a weapon or any other material object ) then that part of the statement is considered reliable. This doctrine, rooted in an old British evidentiary rule, states that the portion of a statement that leads to the discovery of a concrete truth is always trustworthy, even if the entire confession may be dubious. For example, if an accused states, “I hid the knife near the river,” and the knife is found at that location, then the phrase “near the river” becomes admissible even if the full confession remains inadmissible due to the risk of coercion.

This approach was designed to balance the defence of the accused’s rights with the need for having an efficient law enforcement system. However, critics have argued that the narrow focus on “discovery” may unintentionally encourage police coercion in gathering information from detainees, thus violating their right against self-incrimination.

FACTS OF STATE OF U.P. V. DEOMAN UPADHYAYA

A. Background of the Case

In June 1958, a disagreement over the distribution of agricultural land led to a fight in Anandadih, a village of Uttar Pradesh. Deoman Upadhyaya, accused of murdering Sukhdei, was alleged to have slapped and threatened her violently during confrontation. The following morning, Sukhdei was found murdered, and forensic evidence connected the crime to the murder weapon, a bloodstained gandasa (a kind of axe).

On June 21, 1958, while in police custody, Deoman told a police officer and two witnesses that he had thrown the gandasa into a village tank. Acting on this information, the police went to the tank and recovered the gandasa. Forensic tests showed that the weapon was stained with human blood.

B. Procedural History

At trial, the Sessions Court convicted Deoman Upadhyaya of murder primarily based on the evidence derived from his statement under Section 27. After appeal, the Allahabad High Court acquitted him on procedural grounds, questioning the admissibility of the statement and the constitutional validity of Section 27. The State of Uttar Pradesh further appealed the High Court decision to the Supreme Court of India, raising key constitutional issues regarding equality before the law under Article 14 and the admissibility of evidence obtained under Section 27.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE UNDER ARTICLE 14

A. Article 14 and the Principle of Equality

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution[3] mandates that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” This principle guards against the state’s arbitrary discrimination and guarantees that people in similar situations receive equal treatment under the law. In the context of criminal investigations, the question of whether it is unlawful to discriminate between statements made by suspects who are in police custody and those who are not.

Critics of Section 27 argued that by allowing the admission of information only when given by an accused in police custody, the statute creates an artificial and arbitrary classification. They believed that this might be an unfair way to treat accused persons, as it could lead to a situation where one person’s statement is accepted while another’s is not, even if both statements are equally reliable. They stated that such a distinction is not grounded in a rational basis, as the reliability of information does not depend on whether the accused is in custody. This argument was advanced by dissenting opinions, notably by Justice Subba Rao, who maintained that the differentiation offends Article 14 by treating similar confessional statements unequally.

B. The State’s Defense of Section 27

In defense of Section 27, the State argued that the distinction is well justified . The legislative intent behind it was to protect accused persons from the undue influence and coercion that can occur in police custody. The rationale is that persons in custody are more susceptible to coercive tactics, and thus a safeguard is required to ensure that only the part of the statement leading to the discovery of independent evidence is admissible. On the other hand, the general criteria of inadmissibility (under Sections 25 and 26) are enough because it is assumed that an individual who is not in custody is less vulnerable to coercion.

Moreover, the State maintained that the classification is not arbitrary but is based on an intelligible differentia – particularly, the custody of the accused – which has a rational nexus with the objective of protecting the integrity of the criminal justice process while ensuring that reliable evidence is not excluded.

JUDGEMENT

A. Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 27 when read together with the corresponding provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), particularly subsection (2) of Section 162. The majority opinion was delivered by a bench comprising Justice Sudhanshu Kumar Das, Justice J.L. Kapur, Justice M. Hidayatullah, and Justice J.C. Shah, and is notable for its careful balancing of the competing interests of individual rights and public safety.

Key elements of the majority reasoning include:

Intelligible Differentia:

The Court found that the classification created by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act – differentiating between accused persons in custody and those not in custody – is based on a rational basis. The rationale is that those in police custody are more vulnerable to coercion; therefore, a safeguard is necessary. This safeguard limits the admissibility of their statements to only the portion that directly results in the discovery of material evidence.

In other words, while a full confession may be suspect, if a specific part of a statement leads the police to find physical evidence (such as a weapon), then that portion is presumed to be reliable and is permitted in court. The majority held that this is not an arbitrary distinction but one that serves a legitimate legislative objective and the differentia has a nexus with it.

Furthermore, the Court addressed a hypothetical criticism by asking: if there were, say, 1,000 cases of confessions from those in custody and only 5 from those not in custody, could that numerical imbalance alone provide an intelligible ground for the distinction? The answer, according to the Court, is no. The critical factor is not merely the number of cases, but whether the classification has a rational nexus with the objective of protecting the rights of the accused. The Court argued that being in custody does not automatically imply that an accused receives a sufficient caution. In fact, the argument that being taken into custody provides a kind of “warning” that makes the statement less reliable is unconvincing—especially since an accused released on bail could very well be subject to the same pressures. Thus, the condition that only those in custody have their discovery-linked statements admitted appears arbitrary if examined solely on the basis of protection, but it is supported by historical practice and legislative intent aimed at minimizing coercion.

The Court also noted that the condition imposed on statements from accused persons in custody is not intended to be a blanket sanction but a specific exception designed to allow only information that directly leads to independently verifiable facts. This serves as a safeguard, permitting the admission of evidence with strong corroborative value while upholding the overall prohibition against coercively obtained confessions. However, some dissenting opinions argued that this distinction—despite its protective intention—ends up being arbitrary and does not offer a truly intelligible differentia, because the supposed caution implied by being in custody is not consistently applied in practice.

Historical Context of Section 27:

The Court observed that the legislative history of Section 27, which originated as a copy of Section 150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861, indicates that the omission of the disjunctive “or”. The Court observed that this omission appears to have been an accidental drafting error rather than a deliberate decision to exclude statements made by persons not in custody. There is no evidence in the legislative history to suggest that the lawmakers intended to treat those not in custody differently. In fact, until 1872 the intention was to cover all confessions made to a police officer, regardless of whether the accused was in custody or not.

Thus, because the omission of the word “or” seems unintentional, the Court concluded that Section 27 should be read as if it were not meant to discriminate arbitrarily between those in custody and those who are not. In practical terms, the rule was designed to protect accused persons—especially those in custody, who are more likely to be under pressure—by allowing only the specific part of their statement that leads to the discovery of independent evidence to be used in court. This interpretation supports the constitutionality of the provision, as it is based on a reasonable and historically grounded legislative intent rather than an intentional discriminatory policy.

Balancing the Interests of Justice and Individual Rights:

While Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act strictly prohibit the use of confessions made to a police officer, Section 27 functions as a limited exception by allowing only those portions of the statement that lead to the discovery of independent evidence. By allowing only the “discovery-linked” part of a statement to be admitted, the Court sought to prevent abuse while still enabling the police to secure crucial evidence. In doing so, the provision fulfills a dual objective: it supports the investigation of crimes without compromising the fundamental rights of the accused.

Section 162 of the CrPC :

Subsection (2) of Section 162[4] of the CrPC was also examined. The Court held that this subsection, which exempts statements falling under Section 27 from the general prohibition on using statements made during investigation, is necessary to give effect to the legislative intent. Therefore, both Section 27 and the relevant part of Section 162 of the CrPC were found to be intra vires and consistent with Article 14.

B. Dissenting Views

Justice Subba Rao, dissenting on the constitutional question, argued that the discrimination inherent in Section 27 is unjustifiable. His dissent was based on the following points:

Arbitrariness of Custodial Distinction:

Justice Rao contended that an accused’s custodial status should not determine the admissibility of their statements. He emphasized that the reliability of a statement depends on the circumstances under which it is made, not merely on whether the individual is in custody.

Lack of Sufficient Safeguards:

He argued that even if the purpose of the provision is to protect against coercion, the safeguards embedded in Section 27 (such as the requirement that only the “distinctly related” part of the statement be admitted) are inadequate to address the risk of compelled confessions.

Violation of Equality Before the Law:

He believed that the classification under Section 27 creates an inequality that is not supported by any rational basis, thereby violating Article 14. He suggested that any classification must have a reasonable nexus with legislative objective, and in this instance, the connection appeared tenuous.

Despite Justice Rao’s dissent, the majority upheld the constitutionality of Section 27, and the challenge was dismissed.

CONTEMPORARY REFORMS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

On January 3, 2024, the Supreme Court of India provided significant clarifications regarding the application of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court emphasized four critical criteria for invoking this provision:

Discovery of a Relevant Fact: The information provided by the accused must lead to the discovery of a fact pertinent to the case.
Deposition of Discovery: There must be a formal record or deposition detailing the discovery of the fact.
Custody Requirement: The accused must be in police custody at the time of providing the information. The Court clarified that ‘custody’ encompasses any form of police restraint or surveillance, not limited to formal arrest.
Admissibility of Information: Only the portion of the statement that distinctly relates to the discovery is admissible; other parts are excluded. The term ‘distinctly’ was explained to mean information that is direct, indubitable, and strictly relevant to the discovery.

In a criminal appeal about the murder of Rajini @ Rajinikanth[5], the appellant, while in custody for another case, gave information that helped find the victim’s body parts, leading to the appellant’s arrest. The Court confirmed the appellant’s conviction for murder under Section 302[6] of the IPC, stating that the evidence was insufficient to exonerate the appellant. The judgment stressed the need to follow strict rules when using Section 27, ensuring the rights of the accused are protected while keeping the judicial process fair.

In recent years, there has been a growing consensus in India regarding the need to modernize evidentiary standards and interrogation procedures to enhance fairness and protect individual rights. Several key reforms have been proposed:

Periodic Legislative Reviews:

Regular reviews by the Law Commission of India can ensure that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act remain relevant in the face of changing legal and technological landscapes. The Law Commission of India, in its 185th Report[7] on the Review of the Indian Evidence Act, has recommended redrafting Section 27 to clarify its scope and limitations. Proposals include extending the provision to cover persons not in custody when similar safeguards are applied or eliminating the distinction altogether if it is found to be unjustifiable. Such reviews would facilitate necessary amendments to reconcile traditional doctrines with contemporary constitutional mandates, ensuring the law evolves in line with societal progress.

Oversight Mechanisms:

Establishing independent oversight bodies to monitor police interrogations could help ensure that the collection of discovery statements is conducted in a manner that respects constitutional rights. Such measures could include mandatory recording, periodic audits, and stringent penalties for violations.

Inspiration from international regulatory frameworks:

Lessons can be drawn from international jurisdictions. For example, the United Kingdom’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE)[8] requires strict protocols during police interrogations, including independent oversight. Similarly, the U.S. Miranda doctrine[9] provides explicit warnings that help protect the rights of suspects. Adopting analogous measures in India could strengthen the protection against coercion while preserving the integrity of evidence.

Legal literacy and Aid

Ensuring immediate access to legal counsel during police interrogations is vital for protecting the rights of the accused and maintaining ethical standards. Simultaneously, providing comprehensive training to law enforcement on constitutional rights and ethical interrogation practices can reduce coercion and enhance the reliability of statements. Integrating these measures ensures fair and just interrogation processes.

CONCLUSION

The judgment in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya serves as a critical legal precedent in shaping the interpretation of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, particularly in relation to the constitutionality of the custodial distinction. The Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the validity of this provision reflects a careful balancing act between the need for efficient criminal investigations and the protection of fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 14 and 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. While the majority opinion supports the custodial exception, the dissenting views raise important questions about the arbitrary nature of distinguishing between custodial and non-custodial confessions. The case highlights the ongoing tension between safeguarding individual rights and ensuring the effective functioning of the criminal justice system. As this provision continues to be applied in future cases, it is essential to assess its impact on both the protection of accused persons and the integrity of the legal process.

REFERENCES

Khagesh Gautam, The Right Against Self-Incrimination Under Indian Constitution & the Admissibility of Custodial Statements Under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Maurer Theses and Dissertations, Indiana University (2021), available at https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/etd/91/
Does S. 27 Of The Indian Evidence Act Violate The Terms Of Article 14? Analysis Through State Of U.P v/s Deoman Upadhyaya, Legal Service India, available at https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-9216-does-s-27-of-the-indian-evidence-act-violate-the-terms-of-article-14-analysis-through-state-of-u-p-v-s-deoman-upadhyaya.html
Trivikramaadithya, K-P, Critical Analysis of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, available on Jus Corpus https://www.juscorpus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/33.-Trivikramaadithya-K-P.pdf.
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and Its Impact on Legal Provisions, Lexology, available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d20b7144-2a99-49b0-a37b-a6dff1f7fd98.
Supreme Court Elucidates Four Conditions Under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, Law Insider, available at https://lawinsider.in/news/supreme-court-elucidates-four-conditions-under-section-27-of-the-indian-evidence-act.
Upheld Equality: Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act in The State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, Case mine, available at https://www.casemine.com/commentary/in/upheld-equality:-section-27-of-the-indian-evidence-act-in-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-v.-deoman-upadhyaya/view.
Halder, Debarati. Stop, Search, Frisk and Detain: A Comparative Analysis of Police Power Between India, UK, and US (Oct. 27, 2020) (draft paper unpublished), accepted for publication in a proposed edited book volume on criminal justice administration, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3722731 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3722731.

[1] Constitution of India, Art. 20(3) (India).

[2] Indian Evidence Act, No. 1 of 1872, § 27 (India).

[3] Constitution of India, Art. 14.

[4] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, No. 2 of 1974, § 162(2) (India).

[5] Perumal Raja @ Perumal v. State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 863 of 2019, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 87, 2024 INSC 13.

[6] Indian Penal Code § 302 (India).

[7] Law Commission of India, 185th Report on Review of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, available at https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ca0daec69b5adc880fb464895726dbdf/uploads/2022/08/2022081047.pd.

[8] Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60 (U.K.).

[9] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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