Advocate Babasaheb Wasade Vs. Manohar Gangadhar Muddeshwar

Introduction

Since 1946, “Shikshan Prasarak Mandal” has been a charity society registered under the Registration Act. The Society then established its own set of guidelines. Subsequently, the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was used to register the Society as a Public Trust. The Society legally registered its byelaws, which included its rules and regulations, under the Trusts Act. Members of the Society were obliged to pay the Society an annual membership contribution of Rs. 11/-. The Executive Body, presided over by the President, passed a resolution authorising the Adv. Wasade i.e. appellant 1 to be appointed as the Working President prior to the President’s death from illness. 

Seven individuals who claimed to be Society members filed objections, arguing that they had not received notice and that appellant 1 lacked the right to call a meeting for an election. The objections further claimed that the signatories to the request letter were not legitimate members of the Society and had not yet received approval from the Executive Committee.

We will see how the appellants have prominently employed the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’ to support the appointment as a working president in this case. Additionally, we would see that different precedents are being cited to support the arguments.

Facts of the Case

1. Since 1946, Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Mul has been registered as a charity society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society then established its own set of guidelines. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was later used to register the Society as a Public Trust. The Society’s bylaws included its rules and regulations, which were properly registered under the Trusts Act.
2. Appellant No. 1 is now serving as the Trust’s President, according to the most recent entry in Schedule-I for the year 1998. In a letter dated August 20, 2002, the members of the Trust’s General Body requested that the appellant no. 1, in his capacity as working President, call a General Body Meeting to elect the Trust’s Executive Committee, since the committee had not been elected in a long time and the recorded Secretary, President, and Vice President of the Trust were also no longer in office.
3. Thus, on September 8, 2002, at Panchayat Raj Prashikshan Kendra, Mul, appellant no. 1 called the General Body Meeting of the Trust by notice dated September 3, 2002. All of the members received notice of the aforementioned meeting through certificate of posting and personal delivery. There was a unanimous election of a new Executive Committee at the General Body Meeting on August 9, 2002. 
4. As a result, a Change Report was presented to the Assistant Charity Commissioner in accordance with Section 22 of the Trusts Act.
5. However, the Change Report was met with opposition by the former members of the Trust, including Shri Rishidev Choudhary, Narayan Choudhary, Muralidhar Patil, Dhanji Shah, Vinayak Dhote, Dattatraya Nagose, and one Shrawan Pendholkar. The primary complaint made by the objectors was that, despite being Trust members, they had not received the notice of the meeting on August 9, 2002, and as a result, the resolution adopted at that meeting was not at all lawful, appropriate, or right.
6. The objections further claimed that the signatories to the request letter were not legitimate members of the Society and had not yet received approval from the Executive Committee. Additionally, some signatories to the same objection had retired, making them no longer members.
7. All seven of the objectors who had submitted objections to the Change Report passed away while the appeal before the Joint Charity Commissioner was still pending. The petitioning respondents want to be admitted as respondents before the Joint Charity Commissioner. Despite the appellants’ protests that they had no locus because they were neither trustees nor members of the Society or the Trust, the request was granted.
8. The Change Report was rejected by the Assistant Charity Commissioner after the objections were accepted. The Change Report was approved and the appellant’s appeal before the Joint Charity Commissioner was granted. The Objectors filed an application with the District Judge in opposition to this, and it was granted. Feeling offended by this, the appellant 1 filed a first appeal with the Bombay High Court, which was rejected by the contested ruling and gave rise to the current appeal.

Issues Raised

1. Whether the Objectors claimed that only the Secretary or, in the alternative, the President could have called the meeting in accordance with the byelaws, or if the Working President, Mr. Wasade, could have done so?
2. Considering that the seven objectors were disqualified by Section 15 of the Registration Act, were they entitled to notice of the meeting scheduled for September 8, 2002?
3. Is the entire election meeting on September 8, 2002, void since the seven objectors were not notified?
4. Is it true that ineligible members who signed the 20.08.2002 requisition were elected to the Executive Committee?
5. Did the private respondents have the right to file an appeal or petition against the Joint Charity Commissioner’s order, or to have their case heard before any forum?

Contentions of Appellant

• According to section 15 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, an individual who has been admitted into a society in accordance with its rules and regulations, paid a subscription, signed the roll or list of members, and has not resigned in accordance with those rules and regulations is considered a member of that society. The learned Senior Counsel Shri S.V. Manohar submitted a challenge to this First Appellate Court order, arguing that the objectors were no longer members of the Trust when they acknowledged they had not paid the subscription fees required by section 15 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. As a result, they were also not allowed to cast a vote at the Meeting.
• Thus, there was nothing improper in not giving them notice. He argues that the appellants are not in any way claiming that the objectors were kicked out of the Trust. The appellants’ sole argument is that, since the objectors had not paid the subscription fees and were therefore not entitled to vote, the notice of the meeting to them was not necessary. Therefore, calling the meeting and adopting the resolution therein for which the objectors had no right to vote could not be considered unlawful in any way that would lead to the rejection of the Change 2007 FA 811/2016 9 Judgement Report.
• The appellants’ learned Senior Counsel has cited the ruling in Shri Sarbjit Singh and others Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society and others, ILR (1989) II Delhi 585 as support for their contention. He claims that the learned ACC has not relied on this ruling, instead arguing that as the appellants are now part of the Public Trust, the Societies Registration Act of 1860 cannot be applied to them.
• Finally, the appellants’ Learned Senior Counsel has stated that the objectors the members of the Executive Committee have all passed away. A third party has now taken up and continued this case, however they lack the right to contest the Change Report on the grounds raised by the objectors. In summary, the appellants’ learned Senior Counsel has stated that the impugned ruling issued by the First 2007 FA 811/2016 11 Judgement Appellate Court must be set aside.

Contention of Respondent

• As an alternative, the respondents’ learned counsel has supported the aforementioned order by highlighting a number of irregularities in the meeting’s call and by arguing that, even under section 15 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, a member who has not paid the subscription fees cannot be immediately removed or expelled from the Trust or the society unless the correct procedures are followed, such as issuing a show cause notice and passing a resolution to that effect.
• Because no such procedure was followed and the objectors were not given notice of the meeting, the resolution for the election of additional members to the Executive Committee was not lawful and legitimate. 
• Rival arguments made by the respondents’ learned counsel, which the First Appellate Court agreed with, asserted that the Trust’s constitution does not give the working president the authority to call a meeting and to do so without giving prior notice to the Executive Committee members. The resolution that was adopted at the meeting is therefore invalid and unconstitutional on this count.

Judgement

The Commissioner decided to grant the Appellants’ request and accept the Change Report after all seven objections passed away, as the Court observed. Being neither a legitimate member of the society nor an objector before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, the opposing respondent who was pretending to be the Vice-President lacked standing. Because there was not enough evidence, the District Judge denied the respondent’s petition. 

The Court saw an inexplicable feature four retired Employee Members kept up their membership and made subscription payments. After their retirement without a suitable settlement, the Court questioned the validity of their ongoing membership in the Employee Members category. It was decided that new elections for a new Executive Committee within six months were required due to the Society’s protracted stagnation. The Charity Commissioner was assigned to conduct a comprehensive investigation, settle membership disputes using the documentation already in place, and guarantee a transparent and equitable election procedure. As a result, the Court granted the Appeal, overturned the contested High Court decision and order, upheld the Change Report, and mandated that the Charity Commissioner hold new elections for the Society’s Executive Committee in accordance with the law within six months.

Analysis

Acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, the Court highlighted its application in exceptional circumstances to support actions that depart from the norm. In this instance, the Working President was instrumental in averting a standoff by giving specific requests from the 16 members who were still alive. The Court noted that the ‘Working President’ was required to obey orders in accordance with Byelaws Clause 11. After 16 formal requests, it was decided that the remaining members’ request to call a meeting was legitimate. The Working President’s decision to call the meeting on September 8, 2002, was deemed impeachable by the Bench considering the facts. The first issue was resolved in the appellants’ favour.

The High Court and all three authorities had confirmed that all Objectors had been behind on their membership dues for more than three months, a fact that the Court acknowledged. Concerns over the ramifications of non-payment under Section 15 of the Registration Act were raised by the Objectors’ reluctance to accept notices. The Bench states that it is pointless to not provide notices because non-paying members are not allowed to vote and are not regarded as members of the society. In the absence of automatic termination under the byelaws, defaulters’ names remained on the Society’s Roll. A readiness to settle dues application was required for reinstatement, pending review by the Society.

Show cause notices were used as a legal remedy to give defaulters an opportunity to keep their membership by meeting their duties. Due process was followed in the termination due to the failure. The Court highlighted the legitimacy of such provisions in connection with pertinent elements of the governing legislation, drawing comparisons with a case that was comparable to its own. The Bench cited Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society v. Registrar of Societies and Others [(2000) 1 SCC 566] and observed that the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act classified Objectors as suspended members since the Society’s byelaws did not provide for an immediate cessation. Because they were not members and could not vote, they were not eligible to receive notices. Concerning invalid members taking part in requisitions and executive elections, the appellants countered that signatories were properly allowed in an earlier meeting and that objections regarding retired members were postponed because they lacked vital information.

Conclusion

In summary, the ruling of the Supreme Court rests on the tenet that all governmental entities that derive their authority from laws or policies must uphold the rule of law and be transparent, equitable, and compliant. William Blackstone, in his book “Commentaries on the Laws of England,” Book 1 of the Rights of Persons, discusses the meeting of the convention-parliament prior to Charles II’s return, noting that it was an extraordinary measure taken out of necessity. In this case, we tried to see the validity of the arguments through the precedents and the doctrine of necessity in Common Law. He explains how the urgent need to restore order can be used to justify behaviours that would not normally be accepted. This is known as the doctrine of necessity. All the Supreme Court’s evaluations and the appropriate interpretation of laws have led us to the case’s conclusion. 

References

https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2017/23960/23960_2017_8_1501_49750_Judgement_23-Jan-2024.pdf

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/adv-babasaheb-wasade-ors-v-manohar-gangadhar-muddeshwar-ors-2024-insc-52-1516845

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/126903584

https://www.supremecourtcases.com/adv-babasaheb-wasade-and-others-v-manohar-gangadhar-muddeshwar-and-others

This Article is written by Anjali S. Raut, student at Dr. Ambedkar College of Law, Nagpur: Intern at Legal Vidhiya.

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