CASE NAME :- Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat & Anr
Petitioner :- Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel
Respondent:- State Of Gujarat & Anr
Acts/Rules/Orders:
SECTION 138 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
BENCH:- B.S. Chauhan, Jagdish Singh Khehar
FACTS:-
A. Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint on October 22, 2003, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, alleging that the appellant had taken a hypothecation loan of Rs. 20 lakhs but had not repaid it. The appellant issued a cheque, which was subsequently dishonored.
B. On February 6, 2004, respondent No. 2 filed an FIR (I.C.R. No. 18 of 2004) with the Sidhpur Police Station, accusing the appellant of criminal breach of trust, cheating, and abetment under Sections 406/420 of the Indian Penal Code.
C. The trial court convicted the appellant in Criminal Case No. 1334 of 2003, filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. However, the appellant appealed this decision and was subsequently acquitted in Appeal No. 12 of 2006 before the District Judge.
D. Respondent No. 2, dissatisfied with the acquittal, filed Criminal Appeal No. 1997 of 2008 before the High Court of Gujarat, which is still pending consideration.
E. The appellant filed an application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, seeking the quashing of I.C.R. No. 18 of 2004 and Criminal Case No. 5 of 2004, pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan. The grounds for the application included claiming that it amounted to an abuse of process of law and invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy since the appellant had already been acquitted in the criminal case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. However, the High Court dismissed the application.
CONTENTIONS OF PETTIONER :-
Shri Abhishek Singh, the counsel representing the appellant, argues that the pending ICR (FIR) and criminal case against the appellant are barred by Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This is because the appellant has already been tried under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I. Act) for the same offense. The appellant claims that this constitutes double jeopardy, and therefore, the High Court erred in not quashing the ICR and the criminal case.
CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT:-
Shri Rakesh Upadhyay, representing respondent No. 2, and Mr. S. Panda, representing the State of Gujarat, strongly oppose the appeal. They argue that the provisions of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which deal with the “Doctrine of Double Jeopardy,” are not applicable in this case. They contend that the offenses under Sections 406/420 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) have distinct elements that are separate from the case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I. Act). Therefore, they assert that the offenses do not constitute the same offense. They assert that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.
JUDGEMENT :-
In this particular case, the issue revolves around the interpretation and scope of the doctrine of double jeopardy as it pertains to the charges brought against the defendant. The relevant sections mentioned in the case include Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, and Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Section 300(1) of the Cr.P.C. states that once a person has been tried and either convicted or acquitted for an offense, they cannot be tried again for the same offense or for any other offense that could have been charged in the previous trial. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act clarifies that if an act or omission constitutes an offense under two or more laws, the offender can be prosecuted and punished under any of those laws but cannot be punished twice for the same offense. Section 71 of the IPC deals with the punishment for offenses made up of several offenses and states that an offender cannot be punished for more than one of such offenses unless expressly provided.
The case refers to various precedents and judgments to establish the principles and interpretations of double jeopardy. For example, the case of Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay held that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India prohibits putting a person in peril twice for the same offense. It further explains that the plea of “autrefois convict” or “autrefois acquit” asserts that the person has been previously convicted or acquitted of the same offense.
Other cases mentioned in the passage provide additional interpretations and explanations of the doctrine. The cases of Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District Jail, Amritsar and The State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte and Anr. emphasize that for offenses to be considered the same, their ingredients must be identical, and the offenses should not be distinct. They also highlight that the facts alleged in the two complaints are not as important as the ingredients that constitute the offenses.
Overall, the case seems to be centered around the interpretation of the doctrine of double jeopardy and determining whether the charges brought against the defendant constitute the same offense or distinct offenses. The court will likely consider the ingredients and elements of the offenses to make a determination.
written by AMAN BANSAL intern under legal vidhiya
