| Case Name | Pramatha Nath Mukherjee v. The State of West Bengal |
| Equivalent Citation | AIR 1960 SC 810 |
| Date of Judgement | 11 March, 1960 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Case Number | Criminal Appeal No. 116 of 1958 |
| Case Type | Criminal Appeal |
| Petitioner | Pramatha Nath Mukherjee |
| Respondent | The State of West Bengal |
| Bench | (2 Justice)Justice K.C. Das GuptaJustice J.C. Shah |
| Referred | · Regarding Section332 in The Indian Penal Code· Regarding Section 190(1)(b) in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973· Regarding Article 134(1)(c) in The Constitution of India, 1950 |
FACTS OF THE CASE
A Criminal case was instituted in the court of a Magistrate at Calcutta against the appellant under s. 332 of the Indian Penal Code for voluntarily causing hurt to the Bailiff of Calcutta Corporation and another. The Magistrate opined that the charge under s.332 could not be sustained but did as there was evidence to establish a Prima facie case. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be have been acquitted and the trial for the offence. The Magistrate rejected the contention and convicted the appellant. The appellant’s application under s. 439 Cr. P.C. for revision of this order was rejected by the High Court. The learned Judge was of opinion that if the Magistrate finds on the materials before him that a summons case offence has been committed by the accused, he has, the right and duty to proceed in accordance with the provisions. The appeal was filed on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.
ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether a magistrate after making an order of discharge under S. 251A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of a charge of an offence triable as a warrant case can still proceed to try the accused for another offence?
CONTENTONS OF THE PETITIONERS
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the Magistrate is not empowered to proceed with the trial of these other offences that are triable under Chapter XX as due to reason that no cognizance has been taken of such other offences. The contention also stated that only after a fresh complaint has been made in respect of these offences triable under Chapter XX that the Magistrate can take cognizance and then proceed to try them after following the procedure prescribed by law.
CONTENTONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent supported the impugned judgment and admittedly pending before the court.
RATIO DECINDI
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held when a Magistrate takes cognizance of offences under s. 190(1)(b) Cr. P.C., he takes cognizance of all offences constituted by the facts reported by the police officer and not only of some of such offences. For example, if the facts mentioned in the police report constitute an offence under s. 379 I.P.C. as also one under s. 426 I.P.C. the Magistrate can take cognizance not only of the offence, under s. 379 but also of the offence under s. 426. In the present case the police report stated facts which constituted an offence under s. 332 I.P.C.
It is quite clear that, in deciding whether action shall be taken by him under sub-s. (2) or sub-s. (3) of s. 251A the Magistrate has to form an opinion whether there is any ground for presuming that an accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter XXI or there is no such ground. When his opinion is that there is ground for a presumption that the accused has committed an offence punishable under Chapter XXI Which the Magistrate is competent to try and which could be adequately punished by him, he shall proceed with the trial. But when he forms the opinion that there is no ground for presuming that an offence punishable under Chapter XXI has been committed by the accused his duty is to discharge the accused.
JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court interpreted stated and held The Magistrate when he took cognizance under s. 190(1)(b) Cr. P.C. of the offence under s. 332 I.P.C. cannot but have taken cognizance also of the minor offence under s. 323 I.P.C. Consequently, even after the order of discharge was made in respect of the offence under s. 332 I.P.C. the minor offence under s. 323 of which he had also taken cognizance remained for trial as there was no indication to the contrary. That being an offence triable under Chapter XX Cr. C.P. the Magistrate rightly followed the procedure under Chapter XX. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
CONCLUSION
In India the lower judiciary is a very essential element in the pillar of justice. The magistrates are expected to work in a ambit keeping justice first then the concept of constitutionalism. The right to bail is a essential right envisaged to every accused and it is upon the discretion of the competent court where the trial is being conducted to establish the very right of accused. The right is based on powers derived from not only the fundamental rights and constitutional scheme of the court. It must be interpreted in a wider scope and depending upon the status and necessity to deal with the matter with the law under which the person is accused of any offence and the past record of accused.
written by Devranjan Singh Shekhawat, B.B.A LL. B (H), VIth Semester, IIIrd Year, Seedling School of Law and Governance, Jaipur National University
