Keshava Madhava Menon Vs The State of Bombay
| Citation | 1951 AIR 128; 1951 SCR 228 |
| Date of Judgment | 22 June 1951 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Case Type | Civil Appeal |
| Appellant | Keshava Madhava Menon |
| Respondent | The State of Bombay |
| Bench | • Chief Justice Hiralal J. Kania. • Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das. • Justice Sayyad Fazal Ali. • Justice M. Patanjali Shastri. • Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan. • Justice N. Chandrashekhara Aiyar. • Justice B.K. Mukherjea |
| Referred | • Article 13(1) of Constitution of India. • Press and Registration of Books Act (XXV of 1867). • Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. • General Clauses Act, 1897. • Interpretation Act, 1889 of the Parliament of the UK. |
FACTS OF THE CASE
In the case of Keshava Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, the petitioner, who served as the Secretary of People’s Publishing House India Ltd., faced prosecution for allegedly publishing a pamphlet titled ‘Railway Mazdooron ke khilaaf nai Zazish’ in Bombay in September 1949. The
the pamphlet was said to violate sections 15(1) and 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931.
While the proceedings in the case were pending, the Constitution of India came into force on January 26. On March 3, 1950, the petitioner filed a written statement challenging the constitutionality of the definition of ‘news sheet’ under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. The petitioner argued that the definition was ultra vires and void under Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 13 of the Constitution.
The petitioner requested a stay on the proceedings until the High Court decided on the matter of law. Accordingly, a petition was filed in the High Court on March 7, 1950, seeking a declaration that sections 15(1) and 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 were void in light of Articles 13 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
However, on March 23, 1950, charges were framed against the petitioner by the Chief Presidency Magistrate under section 18 of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. On April 12, 1950, during the hearing of the petition in the High Court, it was held that the word ‘void’ in Article 13 should be understood in the sense of ‘repealed,’ as per section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the High Court concluded that the proceedings under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 were not affected, even if the Act was inconsistent with the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution, and dismissed the petitioner’s application.
Subsequently, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court based on the High Court’s certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution.
ISSUES
1. The question arose regarding the retrospective prosecution for the violation of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 during the pendency of the trial after the Constitution of India came into force.
2. The petitioner argued that the retrospective prosecution contravened the newly formed Constitution. They contended that any laws inconsistent with the Constitution should be declared void ab initio, meaning they should be considered invalid from the beginning.
ARGUMENTS
The petitioner in the case contended that the pamphlet in question should be considered a ‘book’ under the Press and Registration of Books Act (1867). They argued that all provisions of the Act were duly complied with and that the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 was an oppressive law imposed by a foreign government to suppress the freedom of Indian citizens, particularly the press.
The petitioner further asserted that the Constitution, which was created by the people of India, guaranteed fundamental rights to its citizens. Article 13 of the Constitution aimed to eliminate any remnants of subordination to oppressive foreign laws and declared any laws inconsistent with the Constitution as void, as if they had never been passed or existed. Therefore, the
petitioner argued that a prosecution based on such an archaic law was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the respondent argued that the pamphlet in question fell within the definition of a ‘news sheet’ according to the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. They contended that the pamphlet was published without the necessary authority mentioned in the Act, making it punishable under the same Act.
These opposing contentions were presented before the court for consideration and resolution.
JUDGEMENT
The judges examined the implications of Article 13(1) of the Constitution. They concluded that Article 13(1) did not have retrospective operation and did not intend to give it such effect. They emphasized that fundamental rights were granted to Indian citizens only after the commencement of the Constitution on January 26, 1950. Therefore, questions regarding the inconsistency of existing laws could only arise from that date onward.
Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan pointed out that in September 1949, when the alleged offense occurred, the appellant did not possess the right to freedom of
speech and expression. Fundamental rights must be possessed before seeking their protection through the courts. Consequently, relief cannot be claimed for rights that were not in existence at the time.
Justices Saiyid Fazal Ali and B.K. Mukherjea stated that while Article 13(1) did not have retrospective operation, it had implications for inchoate matters and pending proceedings at the time of the Constitution’s enforcement. They held that if a law had become void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution, it could not be applied to ongoing cases. The focus should be on the state of the law when the question arises as to whether an offense was committed. If the law that made the act an offense has become completely ineffectual and nugatory, neither charges could be framed nor could the accused be convicted.
• The judges emphasized that unless stated otherwise, the repeal of a law or the expiration of a temporary statute should be treated as if it never existed. They referred to the word ‘void’ as used in Article 13(1) and other articles, indicating that it means null and void, without legal force or binding effect. The precision in the language of the Constitution’s framers indicated their intent that laws inconsistent with constitutional provisions be rendered completely void and nugatory.
• These judgments elucidate the interpretation of Article 13(1) and its impact on retrospective application, the rights possessed by individuals, and the effect of repealing laws or temporary statutes.
REFERENCES
https://utkaluniversity.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/DOCTRINE-OF-ECLIPSE.pdf
written by Ajay Kumar intern under legal vidhiya
