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K.B. LAL (KRISHNA BAHADUR LAL) Vs. GYANENDRA PRATAP & ORS.

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CITATION2024 INSC 281
DATE OF JUDGMENT8th April 2024
COURTSupreme Court of India
APPELLANTK.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal)
RESPONDENT Gyanendra Pratap & Ors.
BENCHHon’ble Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia  and Hon’ble Justice Prasanna B. Varale
STATUTES REFERREDThe Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order IX, Rule 7, No. 5, Act of Parliament,1908(India).Limitation Act,1963, section 5, No. 36, Act of Parliament,1963 (India)
PRECEDENTSEsha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649.  Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384.P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556.Basawaraj & Anr vs Spl.Laq Officer on 22 August, 2013 (indiankanoon.org).

INTRODUCTION 

The case K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) Vs. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors. is an appeal challenging the order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 19.05.2022 which dismissed the appellant’s petition. This case involves a dispute regarding ownership and possession of a piece of land. The core of the case lies in the determination of an inordinate delay in filing of application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the appellant to set aside an ex-parte order passed against him. Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963 deals with extension of time limit in certain cases for filing an application if there is “sufficient cause” for delay. In this case, the Supreme Court examined the legal principle governing condonation of delay and interpretation of the term “sufficient cause” under section 5 of Limitation Act,1963. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

Let’s understand the facts of the case in two parts. The first part deals with the first civil suit which was filed by the respondents of this case against the appellant on April 22,2006. 

  1. The dispute in this case concerns a plot of land situated at village Gharsaniya, Barabanki. On 30th March 2006, Kalawati sold the land to Mansa Ram by way of sale deed. The next month, on 13th April 2006, Mansa Ram sold the same property to appellant K.B. Lal through a registered sale deed. 
  2. Thereafter on 22nd April 2006, a civil suit was filed by Respondent Nos.1,2 &3, before Civil Judge (Junior Division), Barabanki praying for permanent injunction and cancellation of the sale deed dated 30th March 2006. Defendant No.3 in this suit was appellant.
  3. The validity of the subsequent sale to the appellant was contested by plaintiff’s (respondent no. 1,2 & 3) before the trial court on grounds that when she sold it to Mansa Ram, Kalawati (Respondent No.4) did not possess transferable rights over the property.
  4. They claimed themselves as bhumidhar (landholder) and joint owners of said property alleging their uncle had executed a will deed in their favor.
  5. After serving of notice, appellant’s Counsel filed Vakalatnama on 22nd April 2006, but failed to file written statements with the court. Upon failure of filing written statements, the trial court passed an ex-parte order against him.

The second part of the case concerns an application filed by the appellant against the above judgment.

  1. After an inordinate delay of 11 years on 1st September 2017, an application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed by the appellant to challenge the ex-parte order passed against him. This application was dismissed due to inconsistencies in facts.
  2. After 3 years, on 23rd November 2020, another application was filed by the appellant under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC. This application was dismissed by the trial court on 7th October 2021. This decision was upheld by the Additional District Court. The court noted that the appellant was duly served but he failed to take timely action without giving any satisfactory reasons for such a delay.
  3. Therefore, the appellant filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The high court upheld the order of both the courts and dismissed the said petition.

ISSUES RAISED

  1. Whether the application filed by the appellant under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the ex-parte order dated 06th September 2006, can be allowed after a delay of almost 14 years?
  2. Whether the appellant has provided sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT:

  1. The appellant contended that the summons and notices were not properly received by him due to which he was unable to file the written statements. 
  2. The appellant also claimed that the advocate appointed by him did not pursue the matter diligently and he became aware of the ex-parte order only after his inspection about the matter in 2011. As a result, the appellant changed his advocate to Shri R.D. Rastogi in May 2006.

JUDGEMENT

In this case the Supreme Court relied on the judgements and findings of the trial court, the additional district court and the High court.

The Trial court in its judgment dated 7th October 2021, stated that the appellant was duly served with the notices. The appellant filed the vakalatnama in April 2006 but failed to file written statements and in 2011 an application was filed by the appellant under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC. The trial court found that the explanation given by the appellant for the delay caused was contradictory and unreasonable.
The additional district court observed that the first application filed in 2017 was not pressed because the appellant alleged that wrong facts were mentioned by the junior advocate. Hence another application was filed in 2020 by another advocate. The court observed that the signature on both applications filed in the year 2017 and 2020 was of the same advocate. The court also held that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and dismissed the case. The High Court found no error in the above two judgements and dismissed the appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court’s judgment and found no reason to interfere with it.

The supreme court recognized that the term “sufficient cause” is not specifically defined under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It emphasized that the term must be interpreted liberally so that deserving cases are not dismissed solely on the grounds of delay. This discretionary power of the court is not absolute, and they should exercise it judiciously. At the same time the Supreme Court provided the following legal precedents to establish limitation to such discretionary powers.

Firstly, in Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384 it established that discretionary power cannot be exercised in cases of gross negligence and absence of due diligence.

Secondly, the court cited the case P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556 and restated that such discretion is not supposed to be exercised in unreasonable, unsatisfactory or inappropriate explanation of delay.

Additionally, the citation of the case Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, made it clear that a liberal interpretation of the term ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963 is accepted only in the absence of negligence, inaction, or lack of sincerity on the part of the litigant. This implies that there must be a legitimate reason for the delay, and the delay should not be attributed to carelessness or lack of effort on the part of the litigant.

The Supreme Court also emphasized the judgement given in the case Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649. This case summarized the principles of condonation of delay as follows:

  1. The court should take a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented and non-pedantic approach while dealing with cases of condonation of delay.
  2. The term “sufficient cause” should be interpreted broadly and applied in its proper spirit according to the facts and circumstances of each case.
  3. Substantial justice should be the priority and excess focus technical detail should be avoided.
  4. The lenient approach should include being reasonable and fair. 
  5. There is a difference between inordinate delays and short delays. Inordinate delays require strict approach. 
  6. Courts should balance the interests of both the parties.
  7. Courts should be vigilant and not burden the opposite side in case the explanation given is concocted.

The Supreme Court, after considering the above legal precedents regarding condonation of delay, found no satisfactory or reasonable ground given by the appellant explaining the delay of 14 years in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC.

Further, the Supreme Court observed that the appellant himself admitted that he came to know about the ex-parte order in 2011 yet he did not file any application that year itself. He filed the application after 3 years and the reason for such a delay was unconvincing and unsatisfactory. 

The Supreme Court held that the appellant had been grossly negligent in pursuing this matter. Therefore, the trial court, the additional district court and High Court were correct to dismiss the application. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal upholding the High Court’s judgement.  

ANALYSIS

It is necessary to understand the relationship between the limitation period and condonation of delay. Limitation period is a time limit within legal actions can be initiated. Initiating legal actions beyond the limitation period is barred by law. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963 deals with extension of time limit in certain cases for filing application if there is “sufficient cause” for the delay. The court will allow admission of an appeal or an application after the prescribed period only if the appellant is able to satisfy the court that there was “sufficient cause” for such a delay. As the term “sufficient cause” is not defined, the court held that it is to be interpreted liberally and will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Supreme court emphasizes the need to be liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented in cases with condonation of delay so that deserving cases are not dismissed on grounds of delay. At the same time the Supreme Court referred to various precedents to emphasize the need to apply such discretionary power judiciously and not in cases of negligence. The judgement strikes a balance between a liberal approach and establishing a reasonable explanation for condonation of delay. 

The latin maxim “vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subvenitent” meaning that the law assists those who are vigilant and those who sleep on their rights summarizes the underlaying principle in the above case. The appellant in this case was not vigilant. Despite being aware of the ex-parte order in 2011, he filed an application after three years. Appellant’s explanation for delay and negligence on part of his advocate were unsatisfactory and did not amount to “sufficient cause”. The appellant was grossly negligent and careless in pursuing the case due to which the legal remedy available for condonation of delay cannot be invoked by him. The judgement reflects the court’s commitment to achieving substantial justice over adherence to technicalities. The dismissal of the appeal in the above case discourages unwarranted delays.

CONCLUSION

This case highlights the importance of having timely and dedicated legal representation, as well as the necessity of providing acceptable reasons for delays in legal proceedings. The courts affirmed that unjustified and unreasonable delays cannot be tolerated, ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of the judicial system.

REFERENCES

This Article is written by Himali Jain, student of Adv. Balasaheb Apte College of Law,Mumbai LL. B (Gen); Intern at Legal Vidhiya.

Disclaimer: The materials provided herein are intended solely for informational purposes. Accessing or using the site or the materials does not establish an attorney-client relationship. The information presented on this site is not to be construed as legal or professional advice, and it should not be relied upon for such purposes or used as a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney in your state. Additionally, the viewpoint presented by the author is of a personal nature.

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