Cricket Association of Bengal and ors v.
State of West Bengal and Ors. (AIR 1998, SC 1971)
BACKGROUND FACTS:
The appellants were charged for making a rash and negligent sitting plan in the cricket stadium, which led to dissatisfaction among spectators and resulted in trouble; subsequently, police had to lathi charge the spectators. A complaint was filed against the office bearers of the first appellant under sections 337, 338, and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The chief presidency magistrate took up the matter and summoned the accused. This was challenged by the accused in the high court through criminal revision. where the Honourable High Court of Calcutta found charges to be absurd under implicated sections and only offence Under Section 336 of the IPC, hence, the prosecution shall be given a chance to prove the charges against the same.
When the matter reached a further stage in trial court, the complainant filed an application to withdraw the complaint against eight accused for some reasons, and the magistrate discharged them under 253(2). The magistrate further held that he would not allow the discharge of the accused as the proceedings were under Section 338 of the IPC, which was a warrant case. But later on, the accused was discharged, as the complainant did not appear to be serious and was often absent from the court.
The High Court’s Action:
The Calcutta High Court took suo moto cognizance of the case and issued notice to the concerned parties to show why the order discharging the accused should not be set aside. After hearing the parties, the court set aside the orders of the chief presidency magistrate on the grounds that the discharging of the accused under Section 204(3) of the CrPC is not valid as there is no such provision in the rules framed by the High Court where non-payment of process fee to issue summons by the complainant and the chief presidency magistrate is not empowered to discharge the accused in a warrant case and it is so justified. It was also noted for the magistrate to proceed with the trial under Section 336 of the IPC because the offence under Sections 337 and 338 read with Section 114 of the IPC does not stand. Furthermore, the magistrate had to acquit the accused once he had allowed the complainant to withdraw.
Appellants:
The learned counsel on behalf of the appellants contended that the High Court is unjustified in interfering with the order of the Chief Precedency Court. It did not appreciate the reasoning of the magistrate in discharging the accused. It also contended that after the order of the high court, the trial court should pursue the summons case procedure as laid out in Section 248 of the CrPC, as the magistrate had the jurisdiction to do so. The magistrate also
had jurisdiction to discharge the accused even if it were a warrant case, as in Section 253(2); hence, the high court’s view is not justified.
The Supreme Court’s Action:
An appeal by special leave was preferred before the Supreme Court from the judgement of the Calcutta High Court in criminal revision. Taking the case into cognizance, the supreme court investigated the conduct of the trial court, where it issued summons and search warrants, believing the case to be under sections 337, 338, and 114 of the IPC. The court also made perusal of the dismissal of the criminal revision by the high court and its judgement, in which it found the judgement of the trial court to be misconceived, charges under offences under sections 337, 338, and 114 do not stand, and no prima facie inference can be drawn that the offence of Section 336 IPC does not form. The high court also accordingly refused to uphold the issue of summons.
No one appeared in the Apex Court on behalf of the state or the complainant to support the reasoning of the High Court. The apex court further observes that the interference by the learned high court judges is not justified or warranted in such circumstances. In the apex court’s observation, the leaning judges base their judgement upon the fact that the trial court has not proceeded in the absence of the charges under sections 337, and 338, read with 114 of the IPC, but 336 of the IPC. It found an error in the high court’s judgement that the contention of the complainant was misconceived pertaining to sections 337 and 338 of the IPC. It was further noted that it was not convenient for the magistrate to look into the existence of the case under Section 336 IPC. The magistrate did not quash the proceedings but directed the prosecution to establish charges under Section 336 of the IPC.
The division bench, unfortunately, committed a serious error in its judgement as it ignored the findings of the magistrate. The Apex Court supported the jurisdiction of the magistrate to discharge the accused under Section 253(2). The Apex Court shall proceed, taking the discharge order of the magistrate under Section 253(2) into consideration. There can be no comment made as the inquiry by the Sen Commission is ongoing. The summons case procedure has to be followed with the investigation in the direction of the establishment of charges under Section 336 of the IPC. The magistrate, under Section 248 CrPC, has to acquit the accused where allowed the complainant to withdraw.
Judgement:
The Apex Court held the interference of the High Court with the Chief Presidency Magistrate’s Order unjustifiable. It is also clear that in proper cases, the high court has the power to take suo moto cognizance against subordinate courts. The appeal is allowed, the judgement of the High Court remains set aside, and the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate is restored.
written by Swarnim Tripathi, Lloyd School of Law.
