CASE ANALYSIS – The State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh

CITATION	2024 INSC 562, (2025) 1 SCC 1, [2024] 8 SCR 1321
DATE	01 AUGUST, 2023
COURT NAME	SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/PETITIONER	THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. (APPELLANTS)
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT.	DAVINDER SINGH & ORS. (RESPONDENTS)
JUDGES	D.J.Y. CHANDRACHUD (CJI)MANOJ MISHRA, J.B.R. GAVAI, J.VIKRAM NATH, J.BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.PANKAJ MITHAL, J.S.C. SHARMA, J.

FACTS

1. The reference to this Constitution Bench arises from challenges to state laws and notifications that sub-classified Scheduled Castes for the purpose of reservation. 
2. Under the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006, there is a rule which says when the govt. hires people directly for jobs, half of the seats reserved for Scheduled Castes should be given first to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, if candidates from these communities are available.
3. A Haryana notification in 1994 classified Scheduled Castes into two blocks (A and B), reserving 50% of the quota for each block. A Tamil Nadu Act in 2009 provided 16% of the Scheduled Caste quota in educational institutions and government posts to Arunthathiyars.
4. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the Andhra Pradesh High Court (challenged in Chinniah) had declared such sub-classification unconstitutional, relying on the Supreme Court judgment in E.V. Chinniah v. State of Andhra Pradesh.
5. Appeals and petitions challenging these decisions and acts led to references questioning the correctness of the Chinniah judgment for consideration by a larger bench.

ISSUES/QUESTIONS OF LAW

• Whether a reserved class be sub-classified under Articles 14, 15 and 16.
• Whether Schedule Castes be constituted under a homogenous or heterogenous group.
• Whether the constitutional framework permits the sub-categorization of Scheduled Castes within the reservation system to ensure equitable distribution of benefits.
• Whether the operation of Article 341 establishes a legally uniform class of Scheduled Castes through the use of deeming language, thereby restricting further classification.
• Whether there is any limit on how far sub-classification can go.

REASONING

1. Unified Reasoning (Majority):

• The court held that Article 14 permits sub-classification of a class that is not similarly situated for the law’s purpose, and the validity of such sub-classification depends on whether the class is homogenous for the sub-classification’s objective.
• If a group of people (or a class) is not truly similar for a specific legal or policy purpose, then the govt. can divide them into smaller groups only if there is a clear and logical reason for the division (called intelligible differentia), and that reason is connected to the goal of the law or policy.
• The court found that Indra Sawhney did not limit the application of sub-classification only to Other Backward Classes, upholding its application to beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4).
• It was reasoned that Article 341(1) does not create a deeming fiction of homogeneity; the word “deemed” means “regarded as”.
• Even if it creates a constitutional identity, the only logical consequence is that castes listed receive benefits, not that they form an integrated homogenous class.
• Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes does not violate Article 341(2) unless it effectively excludes castes from the benefit of reservation, which is prohibited.
• Historical and empirical evidence demonstrates that Scheduled Castes are socially heterogeneous, allowing the State to classify them under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) based on a rational principle showing inter-se backwardness and having a nexus with the sub-classification’s purpose.
• The court overruled the holding in Chinnaiah that sub-classification of Scheduled Castes is impermissible.
• Sub-classification must aim at providing substantive equality, potentially based on inadequate representation, but the State must prove that inadequacy is due to backwardness.
• Data on inadequacy of representation in “services of the State” is required as an indicator of backwardness.
• Article 335 is not a limitation on Articles 16(1) and 16(4) but a restatement of considering Scheduled Castes/Tribes claims, and efficiency must promote inclusion and equality.
• The State can follow either a preference model where a certain percentage of seats is preferred for a sub-group, or an exclusive model where a percentage is exclusively for a sub-group, provided no caste is entirely excluded from the possibility of competing for reserved seats.
• The carry-forward rule under Article 16(4-B) is applicable to sub-categories. 

2. Concurring Opinion(s):
3. Justice Gavai:

• Concurred with the Chief Justice’s opinion.
• Highlighted the enduring fight against caste-based injustice and underscored Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s transformative vision of a society rooted in social democracy and egalitarian values.
• Highlighted that Scheduled Castes were historically depressed classes facing varying degrees of untouchability and social disability, indicating heterogeneity.
• Argued that N.M. Thomas did not hold Scheduled Castes to be a homogenous group, and that Indra Sawhney’s logic permitting sub-classification for OBCs should extend to SCs under Article 16(4) where they are included in “backward class of citizens”.
• Stated that Articles 341/342 are for identification, not reservation, and don’t preclude the state from providing more preferential treatment based on inadequate representation, provided it does not entirely exclude other castes from the list. 
• Argued that requiring empirical data for classification ensures reasonableness and prevents political interference.
• Condemned the resistance to sub-classification within Scheduled Castes, arguing that such opposition perpetuates entrenched patterns of caste-based exclusion and mirrors historical hierarchies.
• Strong advocate for applying the ‘creamy layer’ principle to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, arguing that excluding socially, economically, and educationally advanced members ensures benefits reach the truly backward and promotes real equality, though the criteria might differ from OBCs.

2. Justice Mithal:

• Generally agreed with the reasons and conclusions of the Chief Justice and Justice Gavai.
• Agreed that E.V. Chinnaiah should be overruled and sub-classification is permissible based on the reasons provided.
• Affirmed that the principle of excluding the socially and economically advanced individuals—commonly referred to as the “creamy layer”—is applicable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, ensuring that reservation benefits reach those most in need.
• Emphasized the need for a fresh look at reservation policy and potentially other criteria besides caste, limiting reservation to one generation for those who achieve higher status, and periodic exclusion of advanced individuals.
• Also, briefly touched upon the historical varna system vs caste system.

3. Justice Sharma:

• Briefly stated agreement with the Chief Justice and Justice Gavai regarding the constitutional permissibility of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes and the applicability of the ‘creamy layer principle’ to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

3. Dissenting Opinion(s):
4. Justice Trivedi:

• Questioned the propriety of the reference order itself, arguing a three-judge bench should not have doubted a five-judge bench decision (Chinnaiah) without cogent reasons, especially after 15 years. 
• Argued that States should not be permitted to tinker with or vary the Presidential List under Article 341 by sub-classifying or regrouping castes.
• Contended that the object and purpose of Article 341, as seen in Constituent Assembly debates and prior judgments, was to create a final list alterable only by Parliament, preventing state political interference.
• Argued that Scheduled Castes notified under Article 341 are a homogenous class, acquiring a special status, and any state action to sub-classify them for reservation amounts to prohibited tinkering with Article 341 and violation of Article 14.
• Asserted that Articles 15(4)/15(5) and 16(4) are merely enabling provisions and do not grant states legislative competence to divide/sub-divide Scheduled Castes.
• Maintained that the Chinniah judgment correctly interpreted the law and was not inconsistent with Indra Sawhney or Jarnail Singh, which did not directly address the issue of state sub-classification of Scheduled Castes under Article 341.
• Concluded that the law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah case is correct and should be confirmed.

DECISION/HOLDING

• The Court pronounced that it is legally allowed to divide the Scheduled Castes into smaller sub-groups so that the most disadvantaged communities within them can get better support through reservation. This decision overrules the earlier judgment in (E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh) which had said that all SCs must be treated as one single group and no further division was allowed.
• For such sub-classification, the State must justify it on the basis of empirical data showing that the group provided preferential treatment is inadequately represented and more disadvantaged compared to other castes in the list. 
• The State cannot allocate the entire quota of reserved seats exclusively to a particular sub-group within the Scheduled Castes, thereby excluding other castes listed under Article 341. Such sub-classification is constitutionally valid only when reservation is proportionately extended to both the sub-group and the broader Scheduled Caste category.
• The creamy layer rule means that people from reserved communities who are socially and economically well-off should not get reservation benefits, so that the help reaches those who truly need it.
• (Justice Trivedi dissented, holding Chinnaiah was correct and the reference improper, and that States lack competence to sub-classify SCs).

REFERENCES

1. Manupatra, MANU/SC/0816/2024
2. Supreme Court Observer (SCO), https://www.scobserver.in/cases/punjab-davinder-singh-validity-of-sub-classification-within-reserved-categories-case-background/

Written by Sushavan Das, Brainware University, Intern under Legal Vidhiya (July, 2025).

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