TOP 10 LANDMARK JUDGEMENTS ON STRICT LIABILITY IN TORTS

STRICT LIABILITY

Sir John Salmond “A tort is a civil wrong for which the remedy is an action for unliquidated damages, and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract, or the breach of a trust, or the breach of other merely equitable obligation.”

Rule of Strict Liability

The strict liability principle is an extremely important concept under the law of torts. The basis of this principle basically lies in the inherent harm that some activities can inflict. For example, leaking of poisonous gasses, as it happened in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, will attract this rule.

The underlying principle of compensation in torts generally depends on the extent of precautions a person takes. Hence, if he takes abundant precautions to prevent some harm, the law may exempt him from paying damages. This principle, however, does not apply to strict liability.

Under the strict liability rule, the law makes people pay compensation for damages even if they are not at fault. In other words, people have to pay compensation to victims even if they took all the necessary precautions. In fact, permissions allowing such activities often include this principle as a pre-condition.

CASE LAWS

Rylands V/S Fletcher

• Citation: UKHL 1, L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
• Judges: Lord Cairns and Lord Cranworth 
• Date of Judgement- July 17, 1868
• The Fact of the case is that, the plaintiff and defendant were neighbouring property owners. The defendant, a mill owner hired independent contractors for the construction of a water reservoir on his land. While working, the contractors came across passages under the reservoir which was filled loosely only with Earth and Marl, but they chose to ignore the problem. Once the reservoir was full, water broke through these shafts, flooding the mine property owned by the plaintiff causing considerable damage. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant to recover his lost gains.
• The issue in this case is whether the defendant would be held liable for an act executed by another. 
• Here the Judgement is that Regardless of the defendant’s plea, the House of Lords considers the respondent answerable for all harms endured in the mine.
• Thus, the rule of strict liability was laid: that if a person bought any dangerous thing on his premises and if that thing escapes and cause damage, then the person would be held liable for all the damage it has caused regardless of his negligence, knowledge or intention. The Court however, also provided certain exceptions where this rule won’t be applied i.e. Act of God, Plaintiff’s own default. 
• But as none of these exceptions are there in Rylands v/s Fletcher case, the Court held Ryland liable for the damage caused to Fletcher. Hence the defendant is held liable to the loss incurred on the property ,he is liable to pay the compensation. 

Cambridge Water Co. v Eastern Countries Leather plc 

• [1994] 2 AC 264
• It is a  case focusing on nuisance and the rule Rylands vs Fletcher.The Defendants were engaged in leather tanning at Sawston. During their work, as a result of the process of degreasing pelts, small quantities of a solvent known as Perchloroethene (PCE) was spilt on the floor of the building in which the Defendants carried out their activities. These solvents eventually spreaded through the building floor and into the soil, which eventually meant that they contaminated the Claimant’s borehole at Sawston Mill near Cambridge, some 1.3 miles away.
•  The borehole was used to extract and supply water to local residents and consequently this meant that the water available for extraction as contaminated and to such a degree that it could not be safely used by the Claimants. 
• The Claimants brought a claim against the Defendants on the grounds of nuisance, negligence and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The issue in the case was whether the rules for remoteness of damage and foreseeability of the type of damage caused apply to cases involving the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and nuisance in the same way they do for negligence cases .
• It was held that the necessity to prove foreseeability of the type of damage suffered and to deal with remoteness of damage more generally applies equally to cases based on negligence, nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
•  It was held further that the damage in this case was too remote as it was not possible for the Defendants to reasonably foresee a spillage which would eventually lead to contamination of a water borehole so far away. The Defendants were therefore not liable for the damage.

Green vs. Chelsea Waterworks Co.,

• (1894) 70 L.T. 547
• A water main belonging to a waterworks company, which had been authorized by Parliament to lay the main, burst. The defendant company was under a statutory order to maintain continuous water supply. 
• A main belonging to the company burst without any negligence of the defendants and flooded the plaintiff’s premises with water. There had been no negligence on the part of the waterworks company. The claimants’ premises were flooded but the waterworks company was held to have no liability. The owner of land is, as an exception to the rule in Rylands -v- Fletcher, not liable for damage caused by works executed under statutory authority.
• Lindley LJ said the decision in Rylands decision ‘is not to be extended beyond the legitimate principle on which the House of Lords decided it. If it were extended as far as strict logic might require, it would be a very oppressive decision.’
• It was held that the company would not be liable as it was engaged in performance of a statutory duty.

Jay Laxmi Salt Works vs. the State of Gujarat

• 1994 SCC (4) 1, JT 1994 (3) 492
• Hon’ble Justice Sahai, R.M., Hon’ble Justice Kuldip Singh (J)
• 4^th May, 1994
• The case revolves around an important question of whether Article 36 of the Limitation Act or will it be covered under Article 121 of the Constitution of India. When the case went to the High Court it was decided in the favour of the state, contending that the suit is barred by time. The court while deciding the case held that the construction of bundh is not a non-natural use of land and its main purpose is the welfare of the public and therefore the state is not liable. Act of God as a defence was cited to the state. 
• Article 36 was also cited by the learned judge contending that the suit should have been filed within 2 years but it was filed after 2 years, 11 months and 15 days, therefore, the suit is barred the time.This case is a watershed moment in tort law by virtue of determining the government’s liability in negligence cases.
• The Gujarat government has issued an order for the construction of a dam. In 1955, the dam was completed successfully. The appellant filed many applications with the relevant authorities, requesting either a change in the project’s location or the outright cancellation of the project, but to no avail. The concerned authorities did not take any suitable action in response to this issue, and construction work continued. The water level in the dam rose above the safe threshold one day after heavy rainfall in the area. As a result of the dam’s excess water, the appellant’s factory facilities were inundated, causing substantial property and material damage.
• While the High Court ruled in favour of the Respondent, the State of Gujarat.The reason provided was because the construction of the dam was not a non-natural act and that the main purpose of the construction was the public’s welfare.The Supreme Court ruled that just because the dam was a non-natural act does not mean the government can abdicate its responsibility. They held that even though the dam was erected for the community’s benefit, it served an important purpose, and the use of land or water was not an act of non-natural use.
• However, this does not absolve the government of its responsibilities to its inhabitants in cases when infractions result in property damage or injury. The injury itself is the main source of concern, not how it occurred. Thus, the government was held liable.

Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar

• Appeal (civil)  6898 of 2002
• 05 may, 2008
• Bench:H. K. Sema & Markandey Katju
• This appeal by special leave has been filed against the impugned judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dated 25.6.2001 passed in MFA No. 1080 of 1998-B.Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
• The facts of the case are that a claim petition was filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) by the husband, mother and minor son of one Smt. Abja who died on 23.5.1996 in a train accident at Varkala Railway station. The Claims Tribunal disallowed the claim, but the appeal against the said decision was allowed by the Kerala High Court by the impugned judgment dated 25.6.2001 and compensation of Rs. 2 lacs with interest @ 12% from the date of the petition till the date of payment was granted. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed by the appellant.
• There is no dispute that Smt. Abja was a bona fide passenger holding a second class season ticket and an identity card issued by the Southern Railway. As per the forensic report the cause of death was due to multiple injuries due to the accident. The deceased fell on to the railway track and was run over by train No.6349 Parasuram Express
• Further, in Union of India v Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008), the Supreme Court stated that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher had been subsequently interpreted to cover a variety of things likely to cause damage if they escaped, regardless of whether they were dangerous per se. water, electricity, colliery spoils, and flagpoles were among the instances given by the Court.

MV Kew Bridge v Finolex Industries

• Bench: K.R. Sriram                    
• NMS NO. 255 OF 2011

• Notice Motion No. 255 OF 2011
• Admirality suit no. 20 OF 2006
• In MV Kew Bridge v Finolex Industries (2014), the plaintiff claimed that it had incurred economic loss as a result of the defendant’s vessel carrying LPG becoming grounded near the plaintiff’s jetty although no physical damage had occurred because the LPG had not escaped. The plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court had disregarded the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher and that the defendant was liable based on absolute liability in response to a motion by the defendant challenging the maintainability of the action on the basis that liability for negligence based on only an economic loss is not allowed.The plaintiff is also directed to pay the applicant a sum of US$ 3,50,000/- as compensation towards bank guarantee charges incurred by the applicant.It is also a fit case where costs have to be imposed on the plaintiff
• I direct the plaintiff to pay the applicant a sum of ` 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs only) as costs within two weeks from today.The Notice of Motion is disposed off as above.On pronouncement of the judgment, Mr.Dhond, counsel for the plaintiff requested for stay by two weeks. Stay refused.
• The Bombay High Court correctly ignored the plaintiff’s arguments and held that the strict liability concept still applies in India. Further, n the defendant’s motion, it was also decided that because there was no “escape” of the LPG gas.

Kaushnama Begum v New India Assurance

• Bench: K.T.Thomas, R.P.Sethi
• Appeal (civil) 6  of  2001
• Special Leave Petition (civil):1431 of  2000
• In Kaushnama Begum v New India Assurance (2001), a jeep’s front tyre ruptured, causing the vehicle to capsize and collide with a person who died as a result of the injuries. The claims before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal were dismissed because there was no rashness or recklessness. However, the appellant maintained that the respondent is strictly liable.
• The Court said that the issue of liability rests on whether the Rylands v Fletcher rule may be applied to vehicle accident cases. It’s also worth noting that the appellant did not argue or demand compensation under Motor Vehicles Act 1988 & 140, which provided for “no-fault” liability and a fixed amount of compensation, but instead argued strict liability outside of the Act’s provisions. 

Gujarat SRTC v Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai

• citations: 1987 AIR 1690, 1987 SCR (3) 404
• Bench: Venkataramiah, E.S. (J)
• The Supreme Court held in the judgment of Gujarat SRTC v Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai(1987) that due to the ever-increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles on the roads may be considered to some extent to fall under the liability principle defined in Rylands v. Fletcher. Unless the idea of social justice has any validity, a pedestrian who is injured or killed by a motorist without his fault, whether negligently or not, should be allowed to recover damages through his or her legal representation.
• The case deals with the main question asto whether brothers can be legal representatives and can claim compensation as regards the Fatal Accidents Act and the Motor Vehicles Act. The court affirming the judgments of the lower court and the cases placed on record opined that the compensation awarded is rightful. The court further pointed that, in case of any accident, there can be a compensation of Rupees Fifteen Thousand (Rs. 15000/-) claimed by the legal representatives without having to show the carelessness or negligence of the driver.
• The rule in Rylands v Fletcher, like any other common law concept acceptable to India’s jurisprudence, can be followed at least until a new principle emerges that outperforms the former.However, this principle could not have been applied in the following case. This is because there was nothing placed onto a person’s land, no escape. Driving a jeep cannot be considered a non-natural use of the property. As a result, applying Rylands v Fletcher to car accident situations is incorrect. 

Read v. J Lyons [1947] AC 156

• The plaintiff (Read) was employed by the Ministry of Defence, to inspect the defendant’s (Lyons) weapons factory. During the course of her employment, a shell exploded that killed one and injured the appellant and others.
• No negligence was alleged and the company worked as agents of the mystery. Whether the manufacturers of such high shell explosive factories are under a ‘strict liability’ to prevent them from exploding and causing harm to others on and off the premises.
• The rule of strict liability, as stated in the case of Rylands vs Fletcher, mentions the two essential requirements for the rule to apply, namely the non-natural use of land by the defendant and the escape of something harmful from the land that can cause damage.
•  The Judge in the present case, Viscount Simon, held that the “escape” was an important part of the two necessary conditions on which the rule depended. Thus, in this case, there was no escape from the defendant’s land as the explosion had injured the plaintiff inside the premises and hence the rule of strict liability cannot be applied. The judgement was given in favour of the defendant due to the missing element of “escape” of the dangerous material.. Therefore no compensation was received by the plaintiff in this case. 
• The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. In the absence of any proof of negligence on behalf of the defendant or an escape of dangerous thing, there was no cause of action on which the claimant could succeed

Peters vs. Prince of Wales Theatre Ltd. Birmingham, (1942) 2 ALL ER 533- 

• The plaintiff took on rent a shop in the defendant’s premises after full knowledge of the fact that the defendant had a theatre and rehearsal room attached to the same premises. The claimant leased a shop adjacent to a theatre from the defendant, the owner of the theatre. The theatre had a water storage mechanism to douse fire in case of an emergency. 
• Unfortunately, the shop sustained flood damage when pipes from the theatre’s sprinkler system burst due to icy weather conditions. He sued the defendant for payment of damages suffered by him. The claimant brought an action based on liability under Rylands v Fletcher.
• The court held the defendant not liable as the plaintiff had impliedly consented to the presence of the dangers of a water storage tank situated right next to his shop by taking the defendant’s premises on rent . The sprinkler system was equally for the benefit of the claimant and the claimant was deemed to have consented to the use of the sprinkler system since it had been installed prior to him obtaining the lease.

Manuscript by: Dharani.M, Vels Institute Of  Science,Technology And Advanced Studies,Chennai.