CASE NAME :-THOMAS DANA Vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB
Petitioner :- Thomas Dana
Respondent:- State of Punjab
Citations: 1959 AIR 3751959 SCR Supl. (1) 274
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Sea Customs-Confiscation of goods and imposition of penalty
by Collector of Customs-subsequent conviction and sentence
by Magistrate, if violative of fundamental right to
protection against double jeopardy-Constitution of India,
Art. 20(2)-Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878), ss..167(8) and
167(81).
BENCH:- SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
SUBBARAO, K.
WANCHOO, K.N.
FACTS:-
On June 11, 1957, the petitioner arrived in Bombay and later traveled to Delhi and Amritsar.
On June 23, 1957, the petitioner reached the Attari Road Land Customs Station and was arrested under Section 173 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
On July 7, 1957, the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, New Delhi, served the petitioner with a notice to show cause why penalties should not be imposed on him under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and Section 7(2) of the Land Customs Act, and why the goods should not be confiscated.
On July 24, 1957, the petitioner was found guilty under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, and his currency, car, and other things were confiscated. He was also fined Rs. 25,00,000.
The petitioner was later prosecuted before the Additional District Magistrate, Amritsar, on charges under Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act and Sections 23 and 23B of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
The petitioner was convicted on the charges and sentenced to imprisonment for various periods.
The petitioner argues that his prosecution and punishment by the courts violated his fundamental right under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, as he had already been prosecuted and punished by the Collector of Customs.
The Additional Solicitor General counters the argument, stating that the previous proceedings were not a prosecution before a judicial tribunal, and therefore, the petitioner’s case does not fall within the protection of Article 20(2).
ISSUE:-
It appears to be a legal argument or analysis discussing the interpretation of Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution in relation to a case involving the Collector of Customs and the imposition of penalties for smuggling activities. The argument revolves around the definition of “prosecution” and whether the proceedings before the Collector of Customs can be considered as a prosecution within the meaning of Article 20(2).
The argument presents different viewpoints on whether the Collector of Customs acts as a criminal court or a judicial tribunal, and whether the penalties imposed by the Collector can be considered as punishment for a criminal offense. It references previous court judgments, such as Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay and Sewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs, to support the interpretation that the Collector of Customs does not function as a court or judicial tribunal.
The argument also highlights the distinction between proceedings in rem (against offending goods) and proceedings in personam (against individuals involved in smuggling activities). It suggests that while the Collector of Customs may act judicially in considering evidence and hearing arguments, it does not make the Collector a court. The argument further emphasizes that the penalties imposed by the Collector are administrative in nature and not comparable to punishment for a criminal offense.
Overall, the text presents a legal analysis and interpretation of Article 20(2) and the role of the Collector of Customs in the context of prosecuting smuggling offenses.
CONTENTIONS OF Appellant :-
The petitioner’s main contention is whether his prosecution and punishment by the courts infringed his fundamental right under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, which prohibits a person from being prosecuted and punished for the same offense more than once. The court will need to determine whether the previous proceedings before the Collector of Customs can be considered a prosecution and whether the subsequent prosecution before the courts constitutes double jeopardy.
JUDGEMENT :-
No attempt has been made by the learned Solicitor General to contend that the offence under ss. 23 and 23B of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act for which the petitioner is convicted is an offence different from that for which he was prosecuted earlier under s. 167(8) of the Act. It is conceded that the decision in the writ petition covers the decision in the connected appeal also. In the result, the writ petition and the appeal are allowed.
