| Citation | 1979 AIR 1848, 1980 SCR (1) 25 |
| Year of Judgment | 25 July, 1979 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Appelant | Syad Akbar |
| Respondent | State Of Karnataka |
| Bench | Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh |
| Referred | Evidence Act- Res ipsa loquitur, Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code |
FACTS OF THE CASE
On March 18, 1974, at approximately 8:30 p.m., the appellant (Syad Akbar) was driving a passenger bus (No. MYM-5859) on the Dharampura-Hiriyur Road towards Hiriyur in Karnataka, India. When the bus reached a point where a dirt path branched off for villages Hariyabbe, a 4-year-old girl named Gundamma ran across the road. The appellant swerved the bus towards the extreme right side of the road to avoid hitting the child. Despite his efforts, the child was struck by the bus and tragically died on the spot.
A complaint was filed by the village Patel (Gunde Gowda) at Hariyabbe Police Station, leading to the appellant’s trial. He was charged under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code for causing death by negligence. The Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Chitradurga, convicted him and sentenced him to six months of simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500, or one month’s imprisonment in default.
During the trial, the prosecution presented 11 witnesses, including some passengers on the bus, as evidence. The child’s parents were also witnesses but not eyewitnesses to the accident. Four passengers (P.W. 2, P.W. 5, P.W. 6, and P.W. 9) who were on the bus at the time of the incident testified as eyewitnesses. Their testimonies generally indicated that the appellant was driving the bus slowly due to a narrow bridge ahead, and the child unexpectedly ran onto the road. The mother (P.W. 4) of the child, before crossing the road, had told the child to stay back at home, but the child disregarded her instruction and ran across the road to join her mother. The appellant tried to save the child by swerving the bus to the right side but couldn’t prevent the accident. Most witnesses confirmed that the appellant had also sounded the horn. However, the prosecution treated all four eyewitnesses as hostile witnesses and cross-examined them to challenge their credibility.
ISSUES
The issue raised are as follows-
1. Whether the lower courts were correct in completely disregarding the testimony of eyewitnesses who were treated as hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined?
2. Whether the principle of “res ipsa loquitur” (the thing speaks for itself) is applicable in criminal proceedings and, if so, whether it could be invoked to presume negligence on the part of the accused in the circumstances of the case?
ARGUMENTS
- In the legal proceedings, the prosecution adopted a strategy of considering the eyewitnesses as adversarial witnesses, subjecting them to rigorous cross-examination. However, it is noteworthy that their testimony remained consistent and uncontradicted on crucial aspects such as the vehicle’s speed, the sounding of the horn, the unforeseen appearance of a child on the road, and the driver’s evasive maneuver to the right. Consequently, the credibility of these witnesses concerning these pivotal details remained unscathed.
- It is imperative to emphasize that the lower courts made a significant judicial error in disregarding the entirety of these witnesses’ testimonies solely on the grounds of being treated as hostile witnesses during their examination. Such an approach fails to consider the substantive value of their accounts and unjustly diminishes their relevance in the case.
- Pertaining to the legal doctrine known as “res ipsa loquitur,” it is essential to assert that this principle primarily finds its roots in the realm of tort law and should not be indiscriminately transposed into the context of criminal proceedings. In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the application of the “res ipsa loquitur” doctrine should not be utilized as a means to shift this formidable burden onto the accused.
JUDGEMENT
The trial court had convicted the appellant based on the premise that the eyewitnesses were unreliable, even though their testimonies were consistent on key facts. However, the High Court endorsed the view that the principle of “res ipsa loquitur” applied in the case. The Supreme Court analyzed both issues raised in the case:
- Testimony of Eyewitnesses: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had failed to impeach the credibility of the eyewitnesses regarding material facts. While the prosecution had treated them as hostile witnesses, they were not contradicted on important points related to the accident. The Court emphasized that the mere fact that a witness was treated as hostile did not mean their entire testimony should be discarded. Therefore, the lower courts were not justified in brushing aside their testimony.
- Application of “Res Ipsa Loquitur”: The Court discussed the principle of “res ipsa loquitur” but clarified that it primarily belonged to the law of torts. In criminal cases, the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rested with the prosecution, and this principle should not be used to shift that burden to the accused. The Court held that the principle of “res ipsa loquitur” could not be applied in criminal proceedings to presume negligence on the part of the accused, especially when there was a reasonable explanation for the accident.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had caused the child’s death by negligent or rash driving. The accident was attributed to an error of judgment rather than gross negligence. Therefore, the Court allowed the appellant’s appeal and acquitted him of the charges.
RFERENCES
This Article is written by Anoskaa Barui of Symbiosis Law School, Pune, Intern at Legal Vidhiya.
