Background
This case arose from a collection of petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Constitution Act (99th Amendment) Act and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act of 2014. These acts result in the replacement of the collegium system used to appoint judges to higher judicial positions.
The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) made a significant role in judicial appointments. This commission was established to increase the transparency of the selection procedure. However, the court determined that it violates the fundamental concepts of separation of powers and judicial independence. It also impacted the constitution’s fundamental structure. A five-judge constitution judge struck down the 99th Amendment and the NJAC. The primary issue before the court was the confidentiality of the candidates for judgeships. Justice Lokur was of the view that these never achieved a balance between the candidates’ right to privacy and the citizen’s right to information. In accordance with articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the constitution, the NJAC was established for the selection, appointment, and transfer of judges to the higher level to supplant the collegium system. The collegium comprised the Chief Justice of India and a forum of the supreme court’s four senior-most justices.
In this case, the collegium system for appointing judges that evolved from the decisions of the Supreme Court, was not established by statute or legislation. This system is the direct consequence of this decision. The collegium makes recommendations, which are subsequently approved by the Supreme Court collegium and the Chief Justice of India. After that, the case reaches the Government, which has the authority to investigate with the assistance of the Intelligence Bureau regarding the promotion of a counsel to judge. Government may only object once, and if the name is sent again by the collegium, the government must then ratify it.
In 2015, the SCAORA filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the 99th Amendment Act and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act. The case of the first judge S.P. Gupta v. Union of India expanded the executive’s ability to appoint members of the upper judiciary. The outcomes were inappropriate, and the dominance of the executive was not a viable appointment strategy.
In 2013, the UPA government introduced the 120th amendment bill, which proposed a Judicial Appointment Commission with six members.
ISSUES
Whether the 99th amendment act of 2014 and the Judicial Appointments Commission act of 2014 altered the constitution’s fundamental structure.
Whether the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act of 2014 was founded on the executive’s preponderant interests.
Explanation
A court-established constitutional principle cannot be rejected for any reason. The status of the constitutional law and the constitutional convention are comparable. The judiciary is criticised for its enforcement of international conventions. Conventions are intended to facilitate the interpretation of current laws. However, it is not required that the conventions cannot be fully enforced. Because constitutional principles must not be dominated, the mode of implementation must be accurately determined.
Article 50 of the Constitution indicates that the executive and judiciary must be as separate as feasible. The involvement of executives in the appointment process must be regulated; it must not exceed the threshold that compromises the appointments’ transparency and accountability. The superiority of the executive will compromise the independence of the judiciary, which is a fundamental structure of the constitution.
According to Articles 124 and 214 of the Indian constitution, the president has the power relating to the appointment judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts based on the advice of cabinet ministers. The Chief Justice of India has advisory authority but not appointment power. The president is vested with supreme authority by the Constitution, rendering the executive branch superior in decision-making.
Arguments presented
By the petitioner
The petitioner argued that the executive should be separated from the operation of the judiciary in accordance with Article 50 of the Indian constitution. The petitioner contended for the minimization of executive involvement in judicial appointments and that the CJI’s recommendation should not be disregarded. In the judicial appointment procedure, the CJI’s passive and detached status has proven counterproductive, as the president’s power has rendered the CJI a passive body rather than an active participant. Executive superiority is suffocating the independence of the judiciary, which will lead to the loss of a free and equitable justice system. The contested constitutional amendment has compromised the independence of the judiciary. By virtue of articles 124 and 217, the NJAC chief justice’s responsibility has been eliminated.
By the respondent
The Union of India filed a court motion challenging the legality of two precedents that are directly pertinent to the case. A higher judicials can only be appointed if five out of six members of the NJAC commission recommend a candidate. It was argued that the challenged provisions preserve the fundamental framework of the constitution. The Constitution itself has granted the president greater autonomy in the appointment procedure. The perks and salary have also been set by the constitution, and even a unanimous bill cannot reduce the amount of salary and allowances.
Judgement
The court agreed with the petitioner and determined that Article 124A of the constitution is crucial and cannot be eliminated. The court found that clauses (a) and (b) of Article 124A omitted the proper representation of the judicial component of the NJAC, which was insufficient to preserve the pre-eminence of the judiciary and in violation of the principles of judicial independence that form the constitutional framework. The majority of respondents supported the collegium system and suggested modifications to make it more efficient and transparent. The nine-judge bench reversed the S.P. Gupta v. Union of India ruling in 1993. The most important decision was to grant supremacy to the chief justice in order to limit the power of the executive. This decision upheld Article 50 of the constitution and emphasised the need to avoid favouritism in the selection process.
The ruling stipulated that the chief justice of India must have pre-eminence in the appointment process and that the influence of the executive must be restrained. Along with this judgment, the future procedures for the appointment of justices were also specified. It was stipulated that when the need to appoint a judge arises, the proposal must be initiated by the Chief Justice of India, and in the case of the High Court, by the respective chief justices. Transfer must adhere to the same process. The chief justice of India must initiate the transfer of the chief justice of a high court.
The Apex court stipulated that the view of the chief justice must be given precedence, but he must also consider the views of his colleagues. The appointment process must involve all of the constitutional machinery in a unified manner.
Conclusion
The ruling in this case upholds the constitutionally mandated pre-eminence of the Indian Judiciary. It was stated that executive dominance will alter the fundamental structure of the constitution. The new amendment was unconstitutional and violated fundamental principles, such as “separation of powers.” This decision reinterpreted the constitutional meaning of the term “consultation.” The primary characteristic of constitution of India is its fundamental structure. The creators had a long-held vision regarding the operation of various government agencies. To make decisions made by judges impartial and defensible, it is necessary to carefully select the members of the judiciary. The previous decision accorded weight to the government’s opinion. Appointments to the judiciary must not be made independently by anyone. In this instance, the decision gave weight to the view of the Chief Justice and diminished the impact of the executive. It decreased favouritism and prejudice. The Constitution mandates that executive influence in matters pertaining to the judiciary be kept to a minimum. The judiciary confronted a long-standing problem with political influence. This ruling assisted in overcoming these obstacles and prevented the government from interfering excessively in these matters. The authority to appoint was restored to the Chief Justice of India.
Even if these judgements were beneficial in numerous ways, they still have negative aspects. We cannot absolutely assert that favouritism will not exist. It depends on how the chief justice exercises his appointment authority. He has the authority to appoint individuals based on his own interests. Therefore, there is the potential for biassed appointments. It is possible to abuse authority for personal gain. Citizens’ liberties are safeguarded by the judiciary, which must be independent of other branches of government. Similar to a coin with two faces, the collegium system has its drawbacks. All appointments made under this system’s control are unlawful. However, the National Judicial Appointments Commission could not be justified. A democratic nation like India requires a suitable system for judicial appointments. There are a great number of qualified individuals who continue to be overlooked due to their lack of a family history in the judiciary. There is nepotism even in the legal profession. Regardless of family heritage or socioeconomic standing, all individuals must be afforded equal opportunity. The collegium system cannot be regarded an efficient method for appointing judges. It is necessary to devise and implement more productive alternatives. It can be acquired by taking public opinion into account. The National Judicial Appointments Commission was not a suitable substitute in this case. It centralised appointment authority within the executive branch. Appointments to the judiciary will decide the foreseeable future of the nation. Because it impacts the wellbeing of individuals. The views of specialists must be accorded greater weight. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is regarded as the leader of India’s judicial functions. Because he holds the qualifications required for that position, we cannot consider his ideas to be mere suggestions.
Reference
https://lawfoyer.in/supreme-court-advocates-on-record-association-vs-union-of-india/
Written by: Ankit Singh, 4th year, B.A.LL.B, CAIL Bengaluru, an intern under Legal Vidhiya
