Subramaniam Swamy vs Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 2728

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Writ Petition was filed by several politicians, including Subramanian Swamy, Rahul Gandhi, and Arvind Kejriwal, who had been charged with criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code. Many petitions were brought under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, challenging the constitutional validity of criminal defamation as an offense stated in Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 199(1) to 199 (4) of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Many petitions were brought under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, challenging the constitutional validity of criminal defamation as an offense stated in Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 199(1) to 199 (4) of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Petitioners challenged the validity of the criminal defamation crime, claiming that it violated their right to freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. Criminal proceedings against the Petitioners had been postponed until the result of the constitutional procedures.

ISSUES RAISED:

Whether Section 499 of the CrPC violates the freedom of speech and expression provided for in Article 19(a) of the Constitution.?

Whether Sections 199(1) and 199(4) of the Constitution violate Article 19(a).?

 ARGUMENTS OF PETITION SIDE:

• Under Art 19(1), the right to uninhibited freedom of expression is essential to the preservation of parliamentary democracy. IPC Section 499 ex facie infringes freedom of expression and constitutes a severe infringement of the constitutional right under Art 19(1)(a).
• The power to impose fair restrictions pursuant to Art 19(2) is intended to safeguard the interest of the State and not any person. And thus, it cannot be considered that Art 19(2) is a source of authority for Sec 499 IPC.
• A restriction that goes beyond the public interest criterion cannot be viewed as a fair restriction and would be arbitrary.
• Art 19(2) is an exception to Art 19, and must, therefore, be read strictly and not liberally.
• An individual’s defamation is a legal error, for which the common law recourse is a damages lawsuit.
• According to Art 19(1), defamation of any person is unconnected to fundamental rights, and hence Sec 499 is beyond the scope of Art 19(2) 7. The right to one’s reputation, which is a facet of Art 12, is essentially applicable against the State, and so cannot be used under Article 19. (2).
• Since defamation of any person by private persons does not serve any public purpose, it cannot be considered a “crime” because it is an offense against the society over which the State has jurisdiction.
• The provision even goes so far as to make truth a punishable offense, which violates the respected value entrenched in Art 51-A(b), which is linked with the national battle for independence.
• Because the terms “public good” are so imprecise, the accused’s obligation to prove that his argument was for the public benefit is unnecessary and unfair.
• Sec 199 of the CrPC’s procedural provisions need not pass the reasonableness test established in Art 19(2) of the Constitution

ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT:

• Art 19(1)(a) is not an unrestricted right to freedom of expression or defamation, since Art 19(2) is an essential component of the freedom of expression.
  • The right to free speech in Art 19(1)(a) is conditioned/qualified by restrictions found in Art 19(2), which includes “defamation” as one of the restriction reasons, and the term “defamation” must include criminal defamation, and nothing indicates its exclusion.
  • The context of the term “defamation,” as well as the reasons for exceptions under Art. 19(2), indicate a public interest since its primary goal is to defend integrity as a common value.
  • The claim that Section 499 elevates private wrong to the level of public wrong is totally untrue, as defamation or reputational harm are examples of public wrong. is an act performed to promote basic polity harmony.
  • In monetary terms, a reputational loss cannot be properly paid, and there is no reason to believe that it can be rectified by obtaining a civil Court ruling.
  • Because the integrity of a person is a component of individual identity under Art 21 and cannot be damaged in the name of the right to freedom of speech, the rights established in Art 19(1)(a) and Art 21 must be balanced.
  • Using civil laws to safeguard one’s integrity should not be used to declare Section 499 invalid. The remedy for defamation under Civil Law and Criminal Law is different and so does not create any difficulty to the plaintiff. to any of the articles of the Constitution.
  • The value of freedom of expression must be allowed to have a detrimental impact on individual dignity, which is likewise an intrinsic aspect of Art 21.
  •  the Constitution was established, the provision stood the test of time, and the meaning of “reputation” was not weakened, but became an integral part of Art 21.
  • The ten exclusions give the legislation fair protection, so it can never be alleged that the law lacks direction, provoking the wrath of Art 14 of the Constitution.
  • The argument that the term “defamation” in Art 19(2) must be read using the norm of noscitur a sociis since the word “defamation” is manifestly incapable of similar interpretation. On the other grounds stated.

JUDGEMENT

In the judgment, the Court examined the meaning and interpretation of the term “defamation” and “reputation.” The Court then discussed a number of international treaties highlighting the value of honor and respect with one’s life, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Court also adds that the legislation regulating reputation, freedom of expression, and defamation in other countries, such as the U.k, is of the opinion that “freedom of expression”. may be subject to restrictions that are mandated by law and necessary in a democratic society to safeguard others’ reputations.

The Court then cited the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar Raghavendra Nath Nadkarn and other case trustee boards before presenting the Indian perspective on moral and freedom of expression. In this case, the court determined that the term “life” has a much broader meaning than just animal nature or enduring drudgery through life, and that a person’s “reputation” is the finer social graces that make life worthwhile, and that the same can only be jeopardized by legislation that inherits equal procedures. Andhra Pradesh State and another, the Court noted in Umesh Kumar v. A.P State. Court observed in right to reputation un personal human rights.

The Court also held that Section 499, which declares that someone who defames a private individual, violates Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, has no connection to that provision because Art. 19(2) protects the public interest rather than an individual, and as a result, the provision cannot be the basis for criminal defamation. In accordance with this analysis, the Court rejected the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court further declared that the petitioners will be permitted to challenge the summonses issued against them before the High Court under Art. 226 or Sec. 482 of the CrPC.

CONCLUSION

The main responsibility of every democratic administration is to maintain the harmony among the various privileges guaranteed by the people. The entire nation’s economy will be in chaos if such a balance cannot be struck. Similar issues arise in the present instance, where the rights to reputation and to freedom of speech and expression are at odds. In this ruling, the Court has rather well balanced these two rights.

The Court carefully considered the nature and purpose of the rights before realizing the need of balancing the two rights. In addition to declaring that there are no restrictions on the same right and that no one is exempted, this decision makes clear the importance of freedom of speech and expression. The main responsibility of every democratic administration is to maintain the harmony of the many rights enjoyed by the populace. The entire nation’s economy will be in disarray if such a balance cannot be struck. Similar issues arise in the present instance, where the rights to reputation and to freedom of speech and expression are at odds. In this ruling, the Court has rather well balanced these two liberties should be used that power to harm someone else’s reputation. Hence, it may be claimed that this decision would set a high standard for any disagreements arising in the exercise of the rights and freedoms of the people.

THIS ARTICLE IS WRITTEN BY A. DARRIN, ST. JOESPH`S COLLEGE OF LAW, BAGALORE, AN INTERN UNDER LEGAL VIHDIYA