| CITATION | (2000) 4 SCC 75 |
| YEAR OF JUDGEMENT | 2000 |
| PETITIONER | STATE OF KARNATAKA |
| RESPONDENT | KRISHANAPPA |
| STATUTES REFERRED IN THIS CASE | INDIAN PENAL CODE |
| BENCH | HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE. A.A.S. ANAND HON’BLE JUS. R LAHOTI, HON’BLE JUS S. S. VARIAVA |
INTRODUCTION
The ruling in State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa (2000) was an important judgment of the
Supreme Court of India concerning sexual offences and sentencing policy in those offences. The case in question involved the violent sexual assault and rape of a minor girl and dealt with common social issues with which we wrestle, namely women’s and children’s violence. The accused was found guilty of rape pursuant to section 376 of IPC. The trial court sentenced the accused to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years, while this was modified/reduced to five years by the High Court. The state of Karnataka appealed to the Supreme Court with the argument that the High Court paid too much attention to the context of the serious case. The Supreme Court stated that courts deal with sexual offences, for example, the present case involving minors, not with a sympathetic ear but with a tough approach. The Court stated that with respect to sentencing in the context of sexual offences, particularly against minors, it should act as a middle punishment for the offence to try and deter against engaging in a sexual offence in the future and that sentencing represents society’s disapproval of the act. The Supreme Court, in this ruling, held that a stricter sentencing policy is needed for proper justice and to prevent the individualised discretion attached to sentencing from undermining the wrongfulness of the conduct.
FACT OF THE CASE
The incident refers specifically to the minor girl who has a case against Krishnappa for sexual assault. The incident happened inside a village in the Indian state of Karnataka. Krishnappa has been said to have known the victim and so lured her under false pretences, only to rape her. This young girl whose family is underprivileged underreported the entire incident to her family, and a complaint was filed with the police, who proceeded to carry out further investigations. A medical examination confirmed that sexual assault has happened, giving credence to the prosecution’s assertion.
The trial, without further ado, saw the prosecution put together the evidence it adduced to the testimonies of the child victim, medical evidence, and witnesses in proving the culpability of the accused before the trial court. The defence made it their point to argue that such evidence was not enough to sustain a conviction and were busy bringing in contradictions in the testimonies by the little victim. However, upon his trial, the court found Krishnappa guilty under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and imposed a rigorous imprisonment sentence on him. However, aggrieved by the judgement, the convict preferred an appeal before the Karnataka High Court, which reversed the trial court judgement and acquitted him as there was not sufficient evidence and inconsistencies in the evidence of the victim.
It was to the Supreme Court of India that the State of Karnataka then advanced its appeal, challenging the acquittal. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and laid stress on giving significance to the testimony of a rape survivor, particularly if it was by a minor. The court noted that small inconsistencies in statements made by a traumatised victim should not form the basis of acquittal. The Supreme Court criticised the High Court for failing to consider the testimony of the victim as well as evidence of medical providence and restored the conviction of the trial court. The Supreme Court stated that rape is a very serious crime, violating human dignity and fundamental rights, and restored the conviction of Krishnappa, the victim, significantly reinstating the case for a victim-centred approach in sexual assault cases.
ISSUE RAISED
1.Was the High Court right to acquit the defendant ?
2. Is the evidence sufficient to convict the defendant under Section 376 IPC ?
3. What penalty should be imposed against the defendant if it is determined that she is guilty?
JUDGEMENT
In the case of 2000, Karnataka State v. The historic Krishnappa wherein the Supreme Court reinstated the sentence norms for offences and specifically made a strong reference to Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, this present appeal has been brought by the State of Karnataka against the order of the High Court, which reduced the punishment of the respondent, Krishnappa, who was convicted for the rape offence. Krishnappa was sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment by the trial court, but the High Court found some mitigating circumstances for which it reduced the punishment to five years. The Supreme Court ably stated that sexual violence is an offence not only against the victim but also against the collective conscience of society at large, particularly in the context of rape. The Court said that such crimes devastate the dignity and self-esteem of the victim and have to be viewed with utmost severity. Accordingly, the sentence must reflect society’s perception of the enormity of the crime and act as a deterrent. To me, the scales tip in favour of upholding the interest of the victims if it is the public interest that is actually undermined for the sake of leniency towards the accused. In this view, with rare exceptions, the court must jealously guard against leniency; in no case should the sentence in a rape conviction be lowered. To do otherwise would send a wrong message to its society regarding this truly devastating crime, which was the very reason in Parliament’s mind for saying that such crimes require a stiffer penalty. In passing, the Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and restored the sentence awarded by the trial court so that justice could be in accord with the gravity of the offence. This, on hearing, sounds nice to a lawyer’s ear since it lends enormous weight to give a legal justification for dealing with the thwarting of the states by virtue of the agonising conviction of women and thus justly calls for a punishment that will, in practice, be equal to that of the crime itself, thereby discouraging other offenders.
REASONING
The Indian Penal Code Section 34 required a common intention to commit a criminal act among the accused, and according to the Supreme Court, this was stated in State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa (2000). Merely the fact that persons were participating or present at the scene cannot create presumptions of common intention. The crux of a conviction under Section 34 is shared intention, which must either subsist pre-that date or at the time of the commission of a crime. The court said that since no common intent existed to commit the offence, criminal liability may not arise just on the grounds of individuals acting in concert.
This true state of the matter was borne out by further evidence that would satisfy Section 34 that the accused were acting in furtherance of a common intention, and that intention had to be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mere participation in the act did not suffice for a conviction. The Court observed in the present case that the prosecution failed to establish that Krishnappa and his co-accused acted with a joint intention to commit the crime. No evidence was found to establish that a joint or prearranged plan existed, thus concluding that common intent is not proven.
Moreover, it was seen by the court that beyond reasonable doubt the accused did share a criminal intent, and mere proof of their participation in the crime is not enough to attract according to the provers of Section 34. Therefore, the Court acquitted the accused with the finding that common intention had not been established, which is one of the important ingredients for a conviction as per Section 34 IPC.
CONCLUSION
This case reflects the active commitment of the Indian judiciary in dealing with dowry violence and the extent of awarding justice to the victims of such acts. Conviction of Krishnappa under Section 304B IPC shows the seriousness with which courts take such cases of dowry deaths. Death of Anjali was proven by the prosecution to have taken place within a span of seven years after marriage, affixed with a consistent trajectory of cruelty and harassment regarding dowry demands. Evidence consisted of the victim’s family and eyewitness reports that firmly proved the claims of mental and physical torture of the husband and his family causing the untimely demise of Anjali.
The present case is a good example of the legal presumption under Section 304B, which makes a husband and his family liable if a woman dies due to harassment for dowry within a definite period after marriage. It goes even beyond that and highlights the importance of circumstantial evidence, where direct proof of the act causing death becomes impossible. The verdict also did justice to Anjali, as it sent a strong alert message that the legal system takes the issue of dowry harassment very seriously and that offenders shall appropriately bear the consequences of their actions.
The Krishnappa judgement reinforces the need for maintaining legal provisions to prevent core societal problems from manifesting in dowries and from becoming part of women’s rights violations and other crimes. The court convicted Krishnappa, again making it clear that such cruelty could not go unnoticed and would further create a path for other dowry-death types of cases. Ultimately, this case should be remembered as an endless reminder that every day we need to consider social and legal reforms against dowry-related violence for a safer haven for women in India.
REFERENCE
1.https://www.indiankanoon.org
3.https://www.manupatrafast.com
This article is written by Saumya Singh, a student at United University and an intern under Legal Vidhiya.
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