Nagayasami Naidu And Ors. vs Kochadai Naidu And Ors. on 24 April 1967
| Case Name | Nagayasami Naidu And Ors. vs Kochadai Naidu And Ors. on 24 April 1967 |
| EquivalentCitation | AIR 1969 Mad 329 |
| Date OfJudgement | 24th April 1967 |
| Case No. | Appeal No.117 of 1961 |
| Case Type | Civil Appeal |
| Petitioner | Nagayasami Naidu |
| Respondents | Kochadai Naidu |
| Bench | Ramamurti, Alagiriswami |
| Statutes Referred | 46 of Sarkars Evidence Act Sec 35 of the Evidence Act Sec 21 of the Evidence Act Sec 157 of the Evidence Act Sec 145 of CrPC |
FACTS
- The second defendant has been ordered to account for the income from the family properties from September 1957 to September 1958, as specified in the plaintiff’s claim.
- The plaintiffs contend that both the second defendant and members of his branch, as well as the first defendant and members of his branch, are members of a joint Hindu family.
- The claim is that two branches are entitled to a half share in all of the properties at issue in the lawsuit, both immovable and movable.
- Kochadai had four daughters with his first wife, Chellammal who passed away in 1948.
- It’s vital to remember that Ayyalu is wed to Kochadai’s daughter’s daughter.
ISSUES
- Whether Kochadai Naicker adopted the first defendant, Ayyalu, in 1914, would affect his eligibility for any claim or share in the suit properties.
- Whether the properties stated in schedules B to E are independent properties of the contesting defendants or joint family properties if the adoption claim is proven to be untrue.
ARGUMENTS
- The main defence of the contesting defendants 2 to 5 is that around 1914, the plaintiffs’ father (Ayyalu, the first defendant in the suit) was adopted by one Kochadai Naicker, the brother of the paternal grandfather of defendants 1 and 2 and that after the adoption, the first defendant ceased to be a member of his natural family and became both technically and factually, a member of defendants 1 and 2.
- As a member of his adoptive father’s family, Ayyalu was not entitled to any stake in his natural father’s holdings, and his sons, plaintiffs 1 and 2, are similarly not entitled to any right or share in the properties.
- The defendants’ further contention is that the various goods claimed by them (schedules B to E) are all their distinct properties and that, in any case, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to any claim or part in them. The first defendant sailed with the plaintiffs’ boys and backed their argument.
- The court emphasises that the father’s, Kochadai’s, admissions and declarations about Ayyalu being the adopted son are not inherently binding on the sons, plaintiffs 1 and 2. The court rules that the sons have their rights apart from the father and should not be punished for the father’s past statements and admissions.
- In addition, the court analyses the assumption of joint family ownership in the case of properties in the name of female relatives. It concludes that there is no such presumption, and if the burden of proof is not reached, the female member in whose name the property is registered is regarded as the beneficial owner.
JUDGEMENT
The court assessed the first issue, which is whether Kochadai Naicker adopted Ayyalu in 1914. Given that adoption had substantial ramifications for succession, the burden of proof lay on the person making the claim.
Even though there are no particular standards of evidence for establishing an adoption, the burden of proving an adoption is exceedingly heavy and serious because an adoption replaces natural succession.
Although a contemporary deed of adoption would be substantial proof in this instance, none exists.
Kochadai may have adopted Ayyaludai, but additional documentation evidence strongly implied that he remained a member of his biological family.
The court had to decide whether the properties stated in schedules B to E are separate properties of the content in the defendant’s Joint family properties concerning the second question.
The court noted that there was equally strong evidence that there had not been any adoption during the time before 1944.
A contemporaneous adoption document that came into existence at the same time as the adoption would, without a doubt, be strong convincing proof. Again, transactions, deals, and papers referring to the adoption in issue, in which third parties or relatives referred to the person’s position as an adopted son, and others with knowledge of the party concerned family history referred to that status.
Evidence of family members, outsiders, authorities, and public and school authorities, recognising and treating the individual involved as an adopted son would be valuable.
The documentary evidence is separated into four periods: (a) the first until December 1944, when Kochadai Naicker executed the document admitting and acknowledging that he had adopted the first defendant around 30 years prior thereto; (b) the second until December 1944, when Kochadai Naicker executed the document admitting and accepting that he had adopted.
The second period, from the adoption deed until 1948, when Kamakshiammal, the senior widow of Kochadai, asserted title to the properties as Kochadai’s heir but was resisted by the first defendant claiming as an adopted son, and the culmination of criminal proceedings resulting in Kamakshi not pressing her claims and virtually accepting the defendant’s claim.
The third period, from January 1948 to January 1957, when disagreements emerged between the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant, and Angammal, the daughter of Kochadai, started actions in O. S. 48 of 1957 against the first defendant, claiming ownership to the assets as the daughter of Kochadai.
CONCLUSION
The court rules in favour of the plaintiffs and denies the defendants’ claim of adoption. The B schedule properties (aside from item 2), as well as the C, D, and E schedule properties, are found to be non-participable properties, and as a result, the plaintiffs and first defendant are not entitled to any interest in those properties. The plaintiffs and the first defendant are also denied the remedy of an accounting of the income from the properties, and each party is responsible for their costs throughout the proceedings.
written by Nishita Mehta a student at Kirit P Mehta School of Law,3rd Semester, an intern under Legal Vidhiya
