| Citation | (1888) ILR (All) 425 |
| Year of Judgment | 02, July, 1888 |
| Court | Allahabad High Court |
| Plaintiff | Mahip Singh |
| Defendant | Dawan Singh |
| Bench | Division Bench, Mahmood, J ; Brodhurst, J |
| Referred | Tort of Defamation, Section-220, 562 of Civil Procedure Code, Section-44, 95, 499, 504 of Indian Penal Code |
FACTS OF THE CASE
In this case, the plaintiff Mahip Singh filed a complaint in which he claimed that a certain individual named Sheobadan Singh had initiated a lawsuit in the City Munsif Court of Jaunpur against the current defendant, Dawan Singh. In that lawsuit, Sheobadan Singh had called Mahip Singh as a witness. On May 10, 1887, while Mahip Singh was testifying as a witness before the Munsif, Dawan Singh allegedly verbally abused him, making derogatory comments about his mother. As a result of this, Mahip Singh suffered significant damage to his reputation, emotional distress, and a loss of respect among his peers. Therefore, Mahip Singh requested that a decree be issued in his favor against the defendant, Dawan Singh, for Rs. 300 in damages, along with the costs associated with the legal proceedings. In response, Dawan Singh, in his written statement, denied using any abusive language and asserted that he had merely explained, in response to a question from the Court, the reasons for his strained relationship with Mahip Singh and the resulting enmity between them.
ISSUES
The issue raised are as follows-
- Whether the defendant abused the plaintiff, and if he did, does the suit lie for slander?
ARGUMENTS
Mahip Singh, the plaintiff, asserted that the defendant, Dawan Singh, had verbally insulted him, resulting in his loss of honor within his community. He claimed that his reputation remained unchanged even after the insult. Dawan Singh’s abuse specifically involved making derogatory comments about Mahip Singh’s mother. This incident occurred while Mahip Singh was providing testimony in response to a question posed by the former Munsif. After Mahip Singh had completed his deposition, the Munsif inquired of Dawan Singh, “Why did such a respectable individual as witness Mahip Singh tell a falsehood?” In response, Dawan Singh proceeded to utter further abusive language, stating, “There is a difference between Mahip Singh’s parents, and for this reason, there is a separation in terms of eating and drinking.”
Dawan Singh, the defendant, in his deposition, clarified that he was being examined during his own case, in which Mahip Singh had appeared as a witness for the opposing party. He informed the Munsif that there was a pre-existing animosity between him and Mahip Singh. When questioned by the Munsif about the nature of this enmity, Dawan Singh explained that the discord revolved around their shared practice of eating and drinking together. When the Munsif sought further details regarding the cause of this enmity and the cessation of communal dining, Dawan Singh attributed it to Mahip Singh’s mother.
The Subordinate Judge made the following observations: Firstly, he acknowledged that in this jurisdiction, verbal abuse is indeed legally actionable. Individuals who engage in such behavior in a courtroom, without any provocation, can be subject to damage claims. The defendant argued that he had a privilege to use such language, but he failed to produce any evidence, such as a copy of his deposition, to support this claim. The plaintiff, in his testimony, clearly stated that he was subjected to verbal abuse after the defendant’s deposition had concluded. Based on this, and in the absence of any contradictory evidence, the Subordinate Judge believed that the defendant had no right to use derogatory language against the plaintiff, who was a respected individual in his private life.
The Subordinate Judge pointed out that the lower court had misinterpreted the plaintiff’s testimony, where he had indicated that the abuse occurred after the defendant’s deposition, in response to a question from the court, and not during his own examination as a witness. The Judge noted that the privilege of a witness to speak freely extends only as long as they are giving testimony under oath in the witness box, and not beyond that point.
In light of these considerations, the Subordinate Judge decided to allow the appeal and sent the case back to the original court for a re-trial on its merits, pursuant to Section 562 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Chief Justice Cockburn stated that witnesses have an unequivocal privilege to speak freely during their examination, irrespective of the relevance of their statements to the issue at hand. This privilege is firmly established in numerous precedents, including Dawkins v. Lord Rokehy (L. R. 7 H. L. 144), and disputing it is futile. It was explicitly decided that a witness’s evidence, even if given maliciously, remains privileged. However, Cockburn agreed that if the statements in this case were made maliciously but not in the capacity of a witness or outside the context of giving evidence, the outcome might differ.
Considering the case’s circumstances and the aforementioned ruling, he believed that Dawan Singh had absolute privilege when making the statements during his witness examination in the City Munsif Court of Jaunpur.
Therefore, he said that would allow the appeal, overturn the Lower Appellate Court’s judgment, reinstate the first Court’s dismissal of the suit, and order the plaintiff-respondent to bear all costs.
The plaintiff’s deposition indicates that he was subjected to verbal abuse by the defendant after the defendant had concluded his testimony. The Lower Appellate Court correctly interpreted this to mean that the defendant had no right to use derogatory language against the plaintiff once his own testimony had ended, as the privilege of a witness is limited to their time in the witness box.
However, it’s important to note that this issue, as highlighted by the Lower Appellate Court, has not been thoroughly examined on its merits. The deposition provided by the current defendant in the Sheobadan Singh v. Dawan Singh case would be crucial evidence to determine if the alleged abusive language in the present case was indeed spoken during his witness examination. This language supposedly came in response to a question posed by the presiding Munsif, seeking an explanation for why the plaintiff had testified against the defendant’s claims in the previous lawsuit.
While it is acknowledged that the abusive language was in response to a question posed by the Munsif, it’s important to note that the question was unnecessary. Extending the privilege doctrine to allow unbridled verbal abuse in open court solely based on such a question would go beyond the established boundaries, even in English law. Such a privilege should only be granted after a proper trial to establish the factual basis for it, which is not within the jurisdiction of a second appeal court.
Since the case has not undergone a substantive trial, it remains uncertain which, if any, of the aforementioned legal propositions are relevant to the specific facts of the case. However, it is established that abusive and insulting language is legally actionable without the necessity of demonstrating special or actual damage, unless such language is justified or protected by another legal principle.
JUDGEMENT
The Judge in this case, to summarize the key legal propositions upon which this judgment is based said that:
1. The English law of slander, which includes distinctions between actionable words and those requiring proof of special damage, is not applicable in British India, either through legislation or established legal precedent.
2. Unlike English defamation law, British Indian law recognizes personal insult conveyed through abusive language as actionable per se, without the need to prove special damage.
3. Abusive and insulting language, unless excused or protected by other legal principles, constitutes a standalone cause of action and civil injury distinct from defamation.
4. Malice is a crucial element in establishing liability for abusive and insulting language.
5. Malice is presumed or inferred unless evidence to the contrary is presented.
6. In cases where the defendant lacks absolute privilege and protection due to their office or the occasion, they can be held civilly liable for damages regardless of any claim of truth in the statements contained in the abusive language.
7. The principle of privilege or protection for a witness concerning defamatory statements made in the witness box is based on public policy and applies equally to insulting and abusive language used by such a witness.
8. Statements made in the witness box are considered privileged and protected, even if they are malicious and false, as long as they are relevant to the inquiry or have some connection to the inquiry in a broad sense.
9. In cases where such statements lack relevance to the inquiry, the defendant may demonstrate the absence of malice and that the statements were made in good faith for the public good.
The appeal was therefore dismissed in the court.
REFERENCES
This Article is written by Anoskaa Barui of Symbiosis Law School, Pune, Intern at Legal Vidhiya.
