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M.C. MEHTA AND ANR V. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS, AIR (1987) SC 1086

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CitationAIR (1987) SC 1086
Date of Judgement20th December, 1986
CourtSupreme Court of India
Case typeWrit Petition (Civil) No. 12739 of 1985
AppellantM.C. Mehta and Anr…
RespondentUnion Of India and Ors…
BenchBhagwati, P.N. (CJ)Misra Rangnath (J)Oza, G.L. (J) Dutt, M.M. (J) Singh, K.N. (J)
ReferredThe Constitution of India,1949- Articles 12, 21, 32.

FACTS:

In 1984, the Bhopal Gas Disaster occurred, causing drastic injuries not only on bodies but also on minds of people. Later in 1985, the same incident took place namely “Oleum Gas Leakage”. Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution,1949 was filed against the Shriram Food & Fertilizers seeking compensation to persons who got injured during the escape of this Oleum gas leakage. Shriram Food & Fertilizers is an industry that manufactures various kinds of chemicals such as Chlorine, Sulphuric acid, etc. At that time two incidents of Oleum gas leakage took place, on 4th of December,1985, the first incident that happened was a major one in which employees as well as common people got affected. Along with them, an advocate practising in Tis Hazari Court died after leakage of harmful gases. The second incident took place two days after the first incident, it was a minor leakage of Oleum gas from joints of a pipe on 6th of December,1985. The incident was confirmed by both the petitioner and Delhi Bar Association. 

                           A Bench of three Hon’ble Judges, while permitting Shriram to restart its power plant as also other plants subject to certain conditions, referred the applications for compensation to a larger bench of five Judges because issues of great constitutional importance were involved. Before taking the writ petitions for hearing, the Supreme Court on 7th December, 1985, appointed “Nilay Choudhary Committee” to perform an inspection of the caustic chlorine plant and to report whether the recommendations of the Manmohan Singh Committee were properly implemented or not. A writ petition was filed by social activist lawyer M.C Mehta under Article 21 and 32 of the constitution. He sought the closure of the factory because it was engaged in manufacturing hazardous substances.  

ISSUES:

  1. whether the caustic chlorine plant of Shriram should be permitted to be restarted or not?
  2. Whether the jurisdiction and authority of the Supreme Court under Article 32 can be extended?
  3. whether a private corporation like Shriram would fall within the scope and ambit of Art. 12?
  4. Whether the right to life under Article 21 is available against a private corporation like Shriram?
  5. Whether the rule that was determined in Rylands v. Fletcher is applicable in India?

ARGUMENTS:

Arguments by Petitioners:

No doubt, it is true that we could have applied for amendment of the writ petition so as to include a claim for compensation but, merely because the applications for compensation made by the Delhi Legal Aid & Advice Board and the Delhi Bar Association cannot be thrown out. These applications for compensation are for enforcement of the fundamental right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution and while dealing with such applications, and thus adopting a hyper-technical approach which would defeat the ends of justice.

 The Committee that was appointed found multiple inadequacies in the safety measures & the complete elimination of hazards was impossible due to the location of the plant in a densely populated area. The petitioner submitted before the Court that the caustic chlorine plant should not be allowed to restart since there would always be a significant possibility of hazards to the people living nearby even if all the recommendations made by all the expert committees were properly implemented by the management of Shriram.

Arguments by Respondent:

The preliminary objection was that the Court should not proceed to decide these constitutional issues, since there was no claim for compensation originally made in the writ petition and these issues could not be said to arise on the writ petition. The escape of oleum gas took place subsequent to the filing of the writ petition but, the petitioner could have applied for amendment of the writ petition so as to include a claim for compensation for the victims of oleum gas but no such application for amendment was made and hence on the writ petition as it stood, these constitutional issues did not arise for consideration.

There is no reason why these applications for compensation which have been made for enforcement of the fundamental right of the persons affected by the oleum gas leak under Article 21 should not be entertained & the Court while dealing with an application for enforcement of a fundamental right must look at the substance and not the form. The counsel for Shriram cautioned against expanding Article 12 so as to bring within its ambit private corporations. He contended that control or regulation of a private corporation functions by the State under general statutory law such as the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951 is only in exercise of police power of regulation by the State. Such regulation does not convert the activity of the private corporation into that of the State.

JUDGEMENT:

 Regarding the decision on the relocation of the caustic chlorine plant, even though the opinions of the expert committees were conflicting, all of them unanimously expressed their views. Hence, the court noted that the management of Shriram later implemented all the recommendations of the three expert committees, the caustic chlorine plant may be restarted due to the absence of imminent danger to the employees and the community and considered the fact that the factor of unemployment would arise due to the closure of the plant. 

The second question which requires to be considered is as to what is the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the court under Article 32 since the applications for compensation made by the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board and the Delhi Bar Association are applications sought to be maintained under that Article. A petition under Article 32 should not be used as a substitute for enforcement of the right to claim compensation for infringement of a fundamental right through the ordinary process of civil court. It is only in exceptional cases of the nature indicated compensation may be awarded in a petition under Article 32. This is the principle on which this court awarded compensation in Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar.

To expand Article 12 as to bring within its ambit even private corporations would be against the scheme of the Chapter on fundamental rights. In Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, court was called upon to consider whether the Rajasthan Electricity Board was an ‘authority’ within the meaning of the expression ‘other authorities’ in Article 12. The judgment of the majority pointed out that the expression ‘other authorities’ in Article 12 would include all constitutional and statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. In Ramanna Shetty vs The International Airport,1979 the case brought public sector corporations within the scope and ambit of Article 12 and subjected them to the discipline of fundamental rights.

 Article 21 was available, as Shriram was carrying on an industry which, according to the Government’s own declared industrial policies, the Government immediately embarking on that industry, Shriram was permitted to carry it on under the active control and regulation of the Government. 

 The court also observed that rule of strict liability in Rylands v. Fletcher case doesn’t apply in such cases and held that all of its exceptions are not applicable for the industries engaged in hazardous activities. In such cases where an industry is dealing with hazardous substances, situated around a community owes an absolute and non-delegable duty towards that community. The industry must ensure a high level of safety of the people residing or working nearby. The court held that the rule of strict liability cannot be applied in such cases because this rule was evolved in the 19th century, at that time the technology and science was not developed. But now, there is a need for new laws which can adequately deal with new problems. Therefore, the court introduced the concept of absolute liability or no-fault liability, an industry dealing with hazardous substances would be liable for the compensation for the harm caused by it even if the harm was caused by an act of God, the company owes absolute liability towards it & there is no defence mechanism is absolute liability.

REFERENCE:

https://indiankanoon.org/

https://main.sci.gov.in/

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This case analysis is done by Miss. Rutuja Santosh Kokare of Ismailsaheb Mulla Law College, Satara, Legal Intern at Legal Vidhya.

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