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Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 653

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Citation(2013)7 SCC 653
Date of Judgement10/7/2013
CourtSupreme Court of India
Case TypeWrit Petition (Civil)
PetitionerLily Thomas and General Secretary S.N.Shukla
RespondentUnion of India
BenchJustice A.K.Patnaik and Justice S.J Mukhopadhaya

INTRODUCTION – 

Indian attorney Lily Thomas petitioned the Supreme Court and her lower courts to improve and change existing legislation. Her petitions have resulted in numerous historic rulings in a variety of areas, including family law and clauses that are ultra-virulent with regard to the Indian Constitution. Two applications were submitted to the supreme court, one by attorney Lily Thomas and the other by general secretary S.N. Shukla. The subject of whether MP’s and MLA’s should be disqualified was brought up by this petition.

A South-borough Committee was established under the Colonial Government’s control with the goal of creating an electoral system for the Dominion of India. Dr. Ambedkar was consulted by the committee for his opinion on electoral representation. The two most significant rights that make up citizenship, according to Dr. Ambedkar’s list of significant requirements when submitting, are “the right of representation and the right to hold office under the States.”

However, as numerous politicians have repeatedly exploited the aforementioned aspect, as indicated by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the opinions expressed by the father of our Constitution are no longer relevant. Many of the MPs and MLAs who have recently been elected to the Houses of Parliament had criminal records, therefore Lily Thomas, the petitioner, went before the court to ask that the criminals with a history of convictions be barred from running for office and winning. 

FACTS OF THE CASE – 

Subsection 4 of Section 8 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, was contested as the ultra-virus to the constitutional provisions in a petition submitted under Article 32 of the Indian constitution as a public interest case.  The petition’s major goals were to prevent convicted individuals from serving in the legislative bodies and to reduce political crime.

The Indian Constitution’s Articles 102 and 191 provide for the disqualifications for membership in the Legislative Assembly and Parliament, respectively, and give the central government the authority to change the rule regarding the disqualification of members as he sees fit.

According to Section 89, subsection 4, if a sitting member of the house is convicted of a crime carrying a sentence of more than two years in prison and files an appeal within three months of the conviction, he is not barred from continuing to hold his position as a member of the house.

ISSUES – 

  1. Whether there be a remedy available for the individual who was convicted if the appeal court clears them?
  2. Has Sub-section 4 of Section 8 of the Act constituted a ultra-virus to the Indian Constitution.
  3. Whether Subsection 4 of Section 8 of the Act was properly enacted by the Parliament and whether it had violated the goal of the document’s writers?
  4. What effects would Section 8(4)’s current proceedings have if it were found to be invalid?

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER – 

  1. First, one of the petitioners’ key arguments was based on how the constitutional clauses for Article 102 and Article 191 regarding the disqualification of members of the National Assembly or State legislatures were interpreted. The petitioners argued that Sub-clause (1) of Articles 102 and 191, which state that “A person shall be disqualified for having been chosen as, and for having been, a member of either House of Parliament,” expressly prohibits both being chosen for and already holding the office of legislator. Therefore, Section 8(4) cannot specify a different disqualification process for members who are currently in office.The Constitution Bench’s ruling in the case of Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao2, which found that Article 191 lays down the identical set of disqualifications for to-be-elected and sitting members, was used in support of this contention. In light of these arguments, Section 8(4) is in conflict with Article 102 and Article 191 requirements.
  2. Second, discussions about Article 83 of the Draft Constitution, which is equivalent to Article 102 of the current Constitution, were brought up. One of the Constituent Assembly members proposed an amendment to establish a separate disqualification process for those who, at the time of their conviction, were already members of the Union or State Legislatures. The clause under Article 102(1)(e) that empowers the Parliament to enact pertinent laws on the matter was instead enacted because the Constituent Assembly did not accept this revision. The petitioners argued that even while the Constituent Assembly rejected a different method of disqualifying sitting members, Parliament nevertheless passed a provision akin to that under Section 8(4) of the Act.
  3. Thirdly, it was argued that neither Article 102 nor Article 191 contain any clauses giving the Parliament the ability or authority to shield sitting members of the legislature or members of the parliament from disqualification. Therefore, it was argued that Subclause (4) of Section 8 was unconstitutional since Parliament lacked the authority to enact it.
  4. The petitioners then contest the constitutionality of Section 8(4), which is based on the Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal ruling that said that when a conviction is overturned, an acquittal occurs retroactively, or as of the date the conviction was recorded. This decision is opposed by the decision in B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu, which overturned the Manni Lal order on the grounds that the conviction and sentence are fully enforceable until set aside and that any disqualification associated with such a conviction would be fully enforceable as well.The petitioners also claimed that this stance had been upheld in the K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan case. In light of the foregoing, the petitioners contended that, regardless of whether an appeal is filed or not, a person convicted under Section 8(1), (2), and (3) instantly loses their eligibility to serve as a Member of the Legislature.
  5. Finally, it was argued that Section 8(4)’s distinction between those who are currently serving as Members of the Parliament or State Legislatures and those who are up for election is arbitrary and in violation of Article 14. No person, whether a serving member of the Parliament or a candidate for election to the State Legislatures, should be allowed to use the special privilege after being found guilty under Section 8(1), (2), or (3).

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS – 

  1. The ruling in the matter of K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan was one of the main arguments put out by the respondents. It was argued that the validity of Section 8(4) had already been debated and upheld in the case of K. Prabhakaran, where it was stated that the goal of enacting Subclause (4) of Section 8 was to safeguard the government and the legislative body rather than to grant privileges to the sitting Members of Parliament or State Legislatures. The replies emphasised the two main effects of a sitting member’s exclusion from membership, which were also covered in the case. First, fewer people are members of the house and of the political party. In some circumstances, such disqualification could result in the government losing its majority in the house, which would have a significant impact on how well it functions. Second, if the condemned member is found not guilty by the Court, issues could arise from the by-election held to fill the vacancy following disqualification. The respondents stated that the provision of Section 8(4) was required in order to avoid such difficulties. The respondents further stressed the characteristics of the Indian judicial system, where convictions in the High Court are quite frequent, and how Section 8(4) aids in preserving a person’s seat whether they are elected to the Union or State Legislatures.
  2. The respondents next discussed the legislative authority of Parliament, arguing that Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) provide the legal authority for the passage of Section 8(4). Additionally, reference was made to Article 246(1) of the Constitution, Schedule VII List I Entry 97, and Article 248 of the Constitution, all of which give the Parliament the authority to pass laws regarding residuary issues—that is, issues not covered by the State or Concurrent List.
  3. It was also argued that Section 8(4) offers the same disqualifications as stated in Section 8’s Sub-clauses (1), (2), and (3), regardless of whether the person is an upcoming or incumbent member of Parliament or a State Legislature. The effect of disqualification only applies to sitting Members of Parliament or State Legislatures when the revision or appeal filed against the conviction has been resolved.
  4. The respondents cited Articles 101 (3) (a) and Article 191 (3) (a), both of which state that a member of the legislature may only resign his or her seat after being found ineligible under Articles 102(1) and 191(1), respectively.Therefore, a combined reading of the given provisions provides that a member may resign only after his revision or appeal is rejected by the appellate Court and a decision confirming the member’s disqualification is taken by the President or Governor as the case may be, in accordance with procedure set forth under Art. 102(1)(e) and Art. 191(1)(e), which give the Parliament the authority to determine when disqualification would take effect.
  5. Finally, the respondents rejected the petitioners’ suggestion that they file an appeal under Section 389 of the CrPC, arguing that the appellate court lacks the authority to delay the disqualification, which would take effect as of the date of conviction. Section 8(4) is a required provision as a result.

JUDGEMENT – 

The Court agreed that the Constitution Bench in the case of K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan did not debate or take into consideration the issue of the legislative power with the Parliament to implement Section 8(4). Therefore, it needs to be thoroughly explored in this instance. The Court cites the R. v. Burah case, which established the fundamental guidelines for interpreting the Constitution in disputes involving legislative authorities. The case established that courts must examine the precise laws that specifically grant or restrict legislative authorities when determining the extent of a power. In the case of Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, these rules of interpretation are reiterated. The court must therefore look at the clauses and conditions that either strengthen or weaken t he legislative powers.

When reading Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e), the Court agreed with the petitioners’ argument and the opinion offered in the case of Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao, concluding that both candidates for election as members of the Parliament or State Legislatures and those who are currently serving as members must meet the same set of disqualifications. The Court ruled that the language of the relevant laws clearly states that, in the event that a person is disqualified from selection as a member, he or she is also disqualified from further membership in the Union or State Legislatures.

 The Court acknowledged that Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) give the Parliament positive authority to pass laws for “same” disqualifications of candidates for office and incumbent members of the Parliament and State Legislatures. The interpretation of Articles 103(3)(a) and 192(3)(a) imposes a limitation on these legislative rights of the Parliament, forbidding the passage of legislation that would delay the effect of disqualification from the day on which it happens. As a result, if these clauses are read collectively, it would be implied that Section 8(4)’s requirements go beyond the scope of the authority granted to Parliament.

The issue of Section 8(4) infringing Article 14 of the Constitution is therefore unimportant because it has been determined that Section 8(4) is ultra vires of the Constitution. The Court consequently decided not to continue the matter.

Finally, the Court cited Chief Justice Subba Rao’s opinion in the case of Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, where he held that “Court has the power to declare law and also restrict the operation of the law so declared to future transactions,” when deciding the Furthermore, it was noted in the case of Harla v. State of Rajasthan that it would be against the principles of natural justice to punish or penalise a person under rules about which he was unaware or had no opportunity to exert reasonable diligence to become aware. Therefore, the judgement would not affect the sitting members of Parliament or State Legislatures who have pending appeals under Section 8(4) in conformity with the principles of natural justice and the judgements already cited. Only prospectively would the ruling be applicable.implications of the judgement on the pending appeals or revisions under Section 8(4). 

CONCLUSION – 

The first step in eradicating criminalization from politics was this judgement. Politics that is criminalised encourages the use of money and power for personal gain, which breeds corruption and a host of other issues that have a negative impact on society and the nation. The court has increased trust in the judiciary and shed light on the issue of limiting political criminality with the aid of this decision. But without robust legislation on the subject, the criminalization cannot be entirely limited.

The Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) decision addresses the constitutionality of Section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act 1951, which grants Members of Parliament and State Legislatures a special privilege against exclusion from membership upon conviction under Article 102, Article 191, or Section 8 (1) (2) & (3) of the Act. The Court determined that the provision under Section 8(4) is ultra vires of the Constitution because the Parliament lacks the authority to enact it in accordance with Article 102(1)(e), Article 191(1)(e), Article 101(3)(a), and Article 190(3)(a), respectively.

REFERENCES – 

  1. https://vidhinama.com/case-analysis-lily-thomas-v-union-of-india-2013-7-scc-653/.
  2. https://legalvidhiya.com/lily-thomas-v-union-of-india-20137-scc-653-the-disqualification-of-mps-mlas/.

Written by Shashank Sandesh Verma an intern under legal vidhiya

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