The case involves the appellant, a Director of Bharti Retail Limited, accused of misbranding food products under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA). The alleged offense occurred before the PFA’s repeal on August 5, 2011, with the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSSA) coming into force. The appellant challenges the order of cognizance, arguing that FSSA provisions, effective from specific dates, override the PFA.
The appellant’s counsel asserts that FSSA provisions on misbranding, effective from July 29, 2010, take precedence over the PFA. They highlight Section 89 of FSSA, with a non-obstante clause, emphasizing the overriding effect on inconsistent laws. The counsel argues that FSSA penalties, such as fines up to Rs 3 lakhs, replace PFA’s stricter penalties, rendering PFA inapplicable post-July 29, 2010.
Additionally, the appellant’s counsel points out the continuity of PFA Rules until PFA’s repeal and contends that, despite the absence of corresponding FSSA rules at the alleged violation’s time, PFA should not apply due to Section 89.
Conversely, the respondent argues that the alleged offense predates PFA’s repeal, making its provisions applicable. They rely on FSSA’s Section 97(4), allowing cognizance of PFA offenses within three years of FSSA commencement. The respondent cites Hindustan Unilever Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh as precedent, asserting that FSSA protects ongoing PFA prosecutions post-repeal.
The court must consider whether the appellant, accused of misbranding under PFA, can be prosecuted under FSSA provisions and if the repeal’s impact on penalties applies retroactively. The interpretation of Section 89’s non-obstante clause, the continuity of PFA Rules, and the relevance of FSSA’s Section 97(4) will be pivotal in determining the case’s outcome.
In conclusion, the case revolves around the appellant facing charges of misbranding food products under the repealed Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA). The alleged offense occurred before the PFA’s repeal on August 5, 2011, when the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSSA) came into effect. The key arguments presented include the appellant’s contention that FSSA provisions, effective from specific dates, supersede the PFA, and the respondent’s assertion that the alleged offense predates the repeal, making PFA applicable.
The appellant’s counsel emphasizes the overriding effect of FSSA, particularly Section 89, and argues that penalties under FSSA should replace those of the PFA. They also highlight the continuity of PFA Rules until the repeal and contend that PFA should not apply due to Section 89.
On the other hand, the respondent argues that the alleged offense occurred before the PFA’s repeal, making its provisions applicable. They rely on FSSA’s Section 97(4), allowing cognizance of PFA offenses within three years of FSSA commencement. The respondent cites precedent to support the idea that ongoing PFA prosecutions are protected by FSSA.
AREEBA, LLYOD LAW COLLEGE, First Year Legal Journalism intern at Legal Vidhiya.
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